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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In his second term of office, the President nominates a Circuit Court judge to fill 
a recent vacancy on the Supreme Court.  The nominee, respected by practitioners and 
jurists alike, quickly receives a rating of “Well Qualified” from the American Bar 
Association.  In announcing the nomination, the President praises the nominee’s 
qualifications, temperament, and character.  Regrettably, the announcement of the 
nomination is the high point for the nominee.  Almost immediately, interest groups 
mobilize against the nominee.  The nominee’s previous decisions are scoured, 
scorned, and misrepresented.  Charges are leveled that the nominee is an ideologue. 
Heeding the call to battle, many Senators in the opposition party quickly criticize 
the nominee’s ideology, and announce their intentions to vote against the nominee.  
Interest groups quickly release reports charging that the nominee’s views are 
“outside the mainstream” of legal thought.  The confirmation hearing turns bitter; the 
nominee’s stock continues to decline.  Senators demand that the nominee comment 
on hypothetical questions of constitutional law, and they label the nominee’s judicial 
philosophy as politically driven.  After much mudslinging and overturning of stones 
by Senators, the Senate rejects the nomination by a significant margin.  The 
President immediately criticizes the Senate and laments the current state of the 
confirmation process.  In response, Senators assert that the Senate should have an 
equal role in the confirmation process.   
For some, the previous two paragraphs might conjure up images of the 
confirmation hearing of Judge Robert Bork.2  Given the recent, pervasive use of 
ideology3 as a relevant factor in judicial confirmations, the previous two paragraphs 
would plainly describe the confirmation hearings of Justices Antonin Scalia4 or Ruth 
                                                                
2Nominated by President Ronald Reagan for Justice Lewis Powell’s seat on the Supreme 
Court, Judge Robert Bork experienced a very controversial and contentious hearing before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.  In the end, the Senate rejected his nomination by a vote of 58-
42.  Edward Walsh & Ruth Marcus, Bork Rejected for High Court; Senate’s 58-42 Vote Sets 
Record for Margin of Defeat, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1987, at A1.   
3One can define ideology as “[t]he body of ideas reflecting the social needs and aspirations 
of an individual, group, class, or culture.”  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 343 (2d ed. 
1983).  One commentator defines ideology as “a systemic body of concepts especially about 
human life or culture.”  Stephen B. Presser, Should Ideology of Judicial Nominees Matter? Is 
the Senate’s Current Reconsideration of the Confirmation Process Justified?, 6 TEX. REV. L. 
& POL. 245, 246 & n.1 (2001) (quoting MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 575 
(10th ed. 1996)).  Whatever the wisdom of labeling judges as “liberal,” “conservative” or 
“moderate” may be, it is fair to say that “conservative” judges believe “that the Constitution 
should be interpreted in a textualist and originalist manner,” while “liberal” judges “accept a 
more open-ended, interpretive methodology.”  John O. McGinnis, The President, The Senate, 
the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 
71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 634 n.6 (1993) [hereinafter McGinnis, A Reply]. 
4See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW: 
AN ESSAY (1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION] (offering a detailed 
explanation of Justice Scalia’s judicial philosophy); see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law 
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Rule of Law].  
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003
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Bader Ginsburg5 were they nominated to the Supreme Court today.6  More 
importantly, each of the events described in the preceding paragraphs has happened 
over the past fifteen years to individuals nominated by Republican and Democratic 
Presidents.7 
The only point of agreement concerning the confirmation process is that the 
process is deeply flawed.8  The pervasive, unjustified use of ideology as a factor in 
evaluating nominations has lowered the quality and tenor of the confirmation 
process.9  Past ideological scrutiny by Senators of both parties has embittered many 
                                                          
Confirmed unanimously by the Senate in 1986, Justice Scalia has been frequently mentioned 
as the paradigmatic example of a Justice who is “outside the mainstream” of American legal 
thought.  See, e.g., Sean Wilentz, From Justice Scalia, A Chilling Vision of Religion’s 
Authority in America, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at A19 (“Justice Scalia’s remarks show 
bitterness against democracy, strong dislike for the Constitution’s approach to religion and 
eager advocacy for the submission of the individual to the State.  It is a chilling mixture for an 
American.”).  
5The most recent litmus test is whether a judicial nominee supports Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973).  Opponents of many of President Bush’s nominees have focused their attacks on a 
nominee’s opposition to Roe.  See, e.g., Editorial, Judging Michael McConnell, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 29, 2002, at A36 [hereinafter Editorial, Judging Michael McConnell] (“Mr. McConnell 
has not merely expressed abstract reservations about the Roe v. Wade ruling, but has also 
actively crusaded against it.”).  Over the past two years, any bad words spoken about Roe 
made a judicial nominee “outside the mainstream.”  Justice Ginsburg, however, has criticized 
the reasoning of Roe.  See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and 
Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 382 (1985) [hereinafter Ginsburg, 
Some Thoughts] (“I believe the Court presented an incomplete justification for its action. 
Academic criticism of Roe, charging the Court with reading its own values into the due 
process clause, might have been less pointed had the Court placed the woman alone . . . at the 
center of its attention.”).  So too have many law professors.  See infra note 457.  It strains the 
limits of reason to conclude that these commentators are “outside the mainstream.”   
6The preceding scenario envisions the Presidency controlled by one political party 
(Republicans or Democrats), and the Senate controlled by the other political party 
(Republicans or Democrats).  The unexpected gains by Republicans in the 2002 Midterm 
Elections and the takeover of the Senate by Republicans now make it likely (but not certain) 
that many of President George W. Bush’s nominees to the Circuit Courts of Appeal will be 
confirmed.  Nonetheless, the changes to the confirmation process this paper proposes are not 
dependent on electoral returns.  But cf. David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, On Truisms and 
Constitutional Obligations: A Response, 71 TEX. L. REV. 669, 669 n.4 (1993) [hereinafter 
Strauss & Sunstein, A Response] (“The election of a President and a Senate majority of the 
same political party in 1992 means that our arguments are now largely moot. . . .  The 
distinctive circumstances that justified an active senatorial role no longer exist.”).     
7See infra Part II.B. 
8David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, The Constitution, and the Confirmation 
Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1491 (1992) [hereinafter Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation 
Process]; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Confirmation Mystery, 83 GEO. L.J. 395, 395 
(1994) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994)) [hereinafter Gerhardt, Confirmation Mystery] (“The 
confirmation process is like the weather: everyone complains, but no one seems able to do 
anything about it.”). 
9See infra Part III.D.1.  
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nominees,10 threatened judicial independence,11 discouraged individuals from 
enduring the confirmation process,12 and contributed to the vacancy crisis in the 
federal judiciary.13  Along the way, the boundary between law and politics has 
eroded substantially.14  Political necessity, not principled evaluation, is the currency 
in the confirmation process.15 
Little intellectual consistency exists in the confirmation process.16  When a 
Senator’s party controls the White House, that Senator extols the virtues of 
presidential dominance in the confirmation process.17  Conversely, when a Senator’s 
                                                                
10See infra Part III.D.5. 
11See infra note 315. 
12See infra Part III.D.5. 
13See infra note 19.  
14See Gary J. Simson, Thomas’s Supreme Unfitness—A Letter to the Senate on Advise and 
Consent, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 619, 663 n.162 (1993) [hereinafter Simson, Supreme Unfitness] 
(advocating a close link between the confirmation process and politics). 
15Fierce opposition is sometimes the best a judicial nominee can expect.  Following the 
announcement of the Bork nomination, Planned Parenthood took out an advertisement in the 
Washington Post, which claimed: “Bork upheld a local zoning board’s power to prevent a 
grandmother from living with her grandchildren because she didn’t belong to the ‘nuclear 
family.’”  WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1987, at A9.  The case Planned Parenthood cited is Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).  Whatever one thinks of Moore, that case was 
decided before Judge Bork became a Circuit Judge.  This advertisement, then and now, 
puzzles Judge Bork.  ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 289 (1990) (“I was surprised to learn that I had ruled against the 
grandmother. . . . Not only didn’t I decide the case, I have never written about it or even 
discussed it.”).  Nor was Judge Bork the only one dismayed by this blatant misinformation.  
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Confirming Supreme Court Justices: Thoughts on the Second Opinion 
Rendered By the Senate, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 101, 115 [hereinafter Ginsburg, Thoughts on the 
Second Opinion] (calling the Planned Parenthood advertisement “an egregious example of the 
misinformation such campaigns breed”).   
16See Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1995 (1988) 
[hereinafter Carter, Confirmation Mess]. 
17See 143 CONG. REC. S2538 (1999) (statement of Senator Biden) (“This is about trying to 
keep the President of the United States of America from being able to appoint judges [on] the 
courts of appeals.”); 143 CONG. REC. S2528 (1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 142 CONG. REC. 
S10,740 (1998) (statement of Sen. Dorgan) (“The confirmation process on judges has virtually 
ground to a halt.  That is unfair.  It is unfair to the judges that have been appointed and are 
awaiting confirmation. . . .”).   
And, of course, the reverse is true.  See 148 CONG. REC. S9863 (2002) (statement of Sen. 
McConnell) (“It is beyond a doubt, with respect to circuit court nominees in particular, that 
President Bush is being treated far worse—dramatically worse—than any President in recent 
history in his first term.”); 148 CONG. REC. S8253 (2002) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“[T]his day 
is a very dark day in the history of the Senate.  The Senate Judiciary Committee . . . has just 
rejected, on a purely partisan party line vote, the nomination of one of President Bush’s finest 
nominees to the U.S. Circuit Court, Justice Priscilla Owen. . . .”); 148 CONG. REC. S4127 
(2002) (statement of Sen. Santorum) (“I am here on the anniversary of the President’s first 
nominations to the circuit court to, once again, focus the Senate on what really is a great 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003
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party does not control the White House, that Senator suddenly argues for increased 
ideological scrutiny of judicial nominees, and greater input in the process.18  Claims 
that a judicial vacancy crisis exists can appear and vanish, depending on statistical 
interpretation.19  Commentators have described the confirmation process in rhetorical 
flourishes that remind one more of The Sopranos than the Senate floor.20  When a 
nomination is rejected, Senators of one party bemoan the state of judicial 
nominations, and insist: “There must be a better way.”  Still, the game continues.21 
                                                          
obstruction of justice that is occurring as a result of the actions within the Judiciary 
Committee.”). 
18Compare 148 CONG. REC. S9418 (1998) (statement of Sen. Lott) (“We should look not 
only at their education, background, and qualifications, but also . . . what is their philosophy 
with regard to the judiciary and how they may be ruling.  We have a legitimate responsibility 
to ask those questions.”), with Senator Charles E. Schumer, Judging by Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 26, 2001, at A19 (“Senate opposition to judicial nominees outside the mainstream is 
justified. . . . If the president uses ideology in deciding whom to nominate to the bench, the 
Senate, as part of its responsibility to advise and consent, should do the same in deciding 
whom to confirm.”).  Senate Democrats and Republicans have also called for greater input in 
nominating judges.  Compare Schumer, supra (“[T]he president was elected by the narrowest 
of margins, while the Senate is closely split.  In such a time, the president and the Senate must 
collaborate in judicial appointments. . . .”), with  Stephan O. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World of 
Judicial Confirmations in the Era of Hatch and Lott, 103 DICK. L. REV. 247, 294 (1999) 
(noting that Senate Republicans during the Clinton Administration “wanted to require the 
White House to clear names of potential nominees with both Senators from a specific state, 
regardless of party affiliation, before the nomination could be forwarded to the Senate”).   
19Compare 143 CONG. REC. S9163 (1999) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“There are more 
sitting judges today then there were throughout virtually all of the Reagan and Bush 
administrations. . . . Let’s just be honest about it.”), with 148 CONG. REC. S2936 (2002) 
(statement of Sen. Hatch) (“The bottom line of all of this is that America is facing a real crisis 
facing its federal judiciary, especially the circuit courts of appeals, due to the nearly 100 
vacancies that plague it.”).  In fairness, Chief Justice Rehnquist repeatedly warned Senators 
during the Clinton Administration of a vacancy crisis in the federal judiciary.  Compare 
WILLIAM REHNQUIST, 1996 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 8 (1996) [hereinafter 
REHNQUIST, 1996 YEAR-END REPORT] (“It is hoped that the Administration and Congress will 
continue to recognize that filling judicial vacancies is crucial to the fair and effective 
administration of justice.”), with WILLIAM REHNQUIST, 1997 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE 
JUDICIARY 4 (1997) [hereinafter REHNQUIST, 1997 YEAR-END REPORT] (calling the vacancy 
crisis the most immediate problem faced in the federal judiciary). 
20Compare Simson, Supreme Unfitness, supra note 14, at 626 (“[Y]ou should have made 
up your mind that this guy had to go.”  (emphasis added)), and id. at 663 n.162 (“As some 
Thomas supporters already have learned or will learn the hard way . . . the elected 
officeholders who put [Supreme Court nominees] there definitely are not.”  (emphasis added)), 
with The Sopranos: The Knight in White Satin Armor (HBO television broadcast Apr. 2, 2000) 
(“You and I both know, he’s gotta go! (emphasis added)), and The Sopranos: Second Opinion 
(HBO television broadcast Apr. 8, 2001) (“You ever go whining about [stuff] between me and 
you to the big man again, we’ll have a problem, my friend.”  (emphasis added)). 
21The confirmation process resembles a game in that both “teams”—Republicans and 
Democrats—often seek payback for perceived past wrongs.  This particular game has a unique 
set of rules that Senators often claim have been violated.  See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S8280 
(2002) (statement of Sen. Sessions) (stating that “three liberal activist professors” met with the 
Democratic Conference shortly after President Bush was inaugurated “to discuss changing the 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss4/3
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There is a better way.  To improve the current process and eliminate the bitter 
nature of confirmation hearings, Senators should not consider a nominee’s ideology 
in determining whether to vote for that nominee.22  Ideological scrutiny lacks 
historical and constitutional support; it has led to repeated, prolonged battles that 
threaten to draw the confirmation process into a dangerous stalemate.23  Removing 
ideology from judicial nominations would return the confirmation process to its 
original understanding,24 one in which the President enjoys the dominant role.25  
Those who argue that allowing the President, not the Senate, to consider a nominee’s 
ideology would harm the federal judiciary and ignore the nature of the federal 
judiciary and the judicial process.26   
Part II analyzes the text of the appointments clause, the history of judicial 
nominations, and the use of ideology in evaluating past Supreme Court and Circuit 
Court nominations.  Part III argues that the use of ideology as a criterion by the 
Senate lacks both historical and textual support.  The President can—and should—
consider a nominee’s ideology when making judicial nominations.  Moreover, the 
Senate’s refusal to do so will benefit the federal judiciary.  Terms such as “outside 
the mainstream”27 or “burden of proof”28 are wholly inapplicable to a judicial 
                                                          
ground rules on the nominations of Federal judges”).  The question addressed in this paper is 
whether the Senate’s consideration of a nominee’s ideology makes this particular game worth 
the particular candle.  I conclude that it does not. 
22See infra Part III. 
23See infra Part III.B. 
24See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 635 (“As a dispassionate reading of the text and 
historical sources shows, the Appointments Clause assigns no prenomination role of a 
constitutional dimension to the Senate.”), for a detailed examination of the original 
understanding of “Advice and Consent.”  See Strauss & Sunstein, A Response, supra note 6, at 
673 (“Professor McGinnis suggests that we are mistaken in saying that a nominee bears the 
burden of proof. . . . No one has a right to serve on the Court. . . .”), for a response to Professor 
McGinnis.  See John O. McGinnis, A Further Word Against Consensus, 71 TEX. L. REV. 675, 
678 (1993) [hereinafter McGinnis, A Further Word] (“[W]hile I agree that the current 
confirmation process is flawed, I believe that their proposed reforms will make the process 
worse and that vigorous exercise of presidential power rather than an increased prenomination 
role for the Senate is the way to make it better.”), for a reply to Professors Strauss and 
Sunstein’s response. 
25McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 636 (“Accordingly, undiluted presidential 
responsibility for selection is to be preferred. . . .”); see also Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed 
Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. REV. 672, 675 (1989) (“The Senate thus lacks any 
electoral mandate to justify rejecting Supreme Court nominees on the basis of judicial 
philosophy.”) 
26See infra Part III.B. 
27The claim that the judicial philosophy of a nominee is “outside the mainstream” is far 
easier to make than it is to prove.  Ronald D. Rotunda, The Confirmation Process for Supreme 
Court Justices in the Modern Era, 37 EMORY L.J. 559, 565-66 (1988) [hereinafter Rotunda, 
Supreme Court Justices in the Modern Era] (“If even half of the charges [that Judge Bork was 
‘outside the mainstream’] were true, one wonders why he had earlier been unanimously 
confirmed as a Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Court of Appeals while winning an 
endorsement from the New York Times.”  (footnote omitted)).  The term “outside the 
mainstream” has been so repeatedly used and distorted that it no longer deserves any serious 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003
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nomination.  The continued use of these terms, in any form or fashion, will allow 
Senators to easily reject qualified nominees for unjustified reasons.29  Part IV 
analyzes the various justifications for considering a nominee’s ideology and asserts 
that these justifications lack prudence and logic.  This paper concludes that removing 
ideology from judicial nominations will prevent more “blood on the [Senate] 
floor.”30 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Constitutional Meaning of “Advice and Consent” 
The Constitution states that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United 
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall 
be established by law.”31  Unfortunately, the Constitution says little about the precise 
contours of “advice and consent.”32  Two things are clear.  First, the President 
possesses the power to nominate an individual.33  The structure and text of the clause 
plainly prove that conclusion.34  Second, the Senate does not have to confirm any of 
                                                          
mention.  Moreover, this term is one of convenience.  See infra Part III.D (discussing the 
many logical flaws underlying recent use of the term “outside the mainstream”).  Judicial 
philosophy, “especially as the term is used by proponents of quizzing judicial nominees about 
their own, is not easy to distinguish from the prediction of results in concrete cases.”  Carter, 
Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, at 1190.  Unsurprisingly, various Senators use the term 
“outside the mainstream” to describe those nominees who disagree with Senators on a 
particular legal or political issue, regardless of the reasons for that disagreement.   
28Application of the term “burden of proof” to a judicial nomination suffers from many of 
the logical flaws that application of the term “outside the mainstream” does—both terms 
“import[] a concept from court proceedings into a political process.”  McGinnis, A Reply, 
supra note 3, at 636 (footnote omitted).  Moreover, judicial nominees do not bear the burden 
of proof in a confirmation process.  See infra Part III.A.5. 
29See infra Part II.B. 
30STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 187 (1994) [hereinafter CARTER, CLEANING UP]. 
31U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
32See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Principles, Politics, and Constitutional Law, 88 MICH. L. REV. 
49, 66 (1989) (“We know from the language of the Constitution what the Senate is to do with a 
nomination: it is to advise and consent.  Yet the language of the Constitution does not say how 
the Senate should do that. . . .”); Christopher Wolfe, The Senate’s Power to Give “Advice and 
Consent” in Judicial Appointments, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 355, 364 (1999) (“The text simply does 
not specify the grounds for Senate advice and consent any more than it specifies the grounds 
for presidential appointment.”). 
33Strauss & Sunstein, A Response, supra note 6, at 670. 
34McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 635 (“[T]he Framers wanted to assure accountability 
in appointments by making the President alone constitutionally responsible for the act of a 
nomination.”). 
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the President’s nominees.35  The constitutional collision of these two principles 
produces a thorny question of interpretation: To what extent is power shared between 
the President and the Senate?  Some commentators assert that the President must 
take the Senate’s advice into account before making a nomination.36  Other 
commentators claim that the President can listen to Senators and heed their advice, 
but he need not do so.37  As a matter of language and interpretation, advice is not 
mandatory; the person receiving that advice may follow or reject it at his or her 
peril.38  Even when a Senator advises the President to nominate a particular 
individual for a judgeship, the President is entirely free to accept or reject that 
advice.39  Thus, it is doubtful that the President must follow Senatorial prerogatives. 
The appointments clause envisions two countervailing forces: the President 
nominating whomever he wants, and Senators voting for or against whomever they 
want.40  Many commentators advocating increased Senate participation in the 
confirmation process note that the Constitution prescribes a power-sharing scheme 
between the President and the Senate.41  This observation is entirely true and quite 
irrelevant.42  The President and the Senate do share power, but the President and the 
Senate do not have equal amounts of power.43  By the terms of the appointments 
clause, the Senate can reject a nominee for any reason.44  The President, of course, 
                                                                
35Fein, supra note 25, at 677 (“The assertion that the Senate is not obliged to confirm any 
nominee is unassailable.”).   
36Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, supra note 8, at 1495 (averring that the 
Senate has two roles—“an advisory role before the nomination has occurred and a reviewing 
function after the fact”).  But see Strauss & Sunstein, A Response, supra note 6, at 671 (“[W]e 
do not claim that consultation is formally necessary to make a nomination effective.”). 
37See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 635 (noting that Senators may make 
recommendations to the President concerning potential nominees, but arguing that the 
President has a constitutional obligation to nominate individuals “who he believes will 
interpret the Constitution as it should be interpreted”).   
38Id. 
39See id.  
40See Michael J. Gerhardt, Supreme Court Selection as War, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 393, 394 
(2002) [hereinafter Gerhardt, Selection as War] (“The structure of the Constitution pits 
Presidents and Senators against each other in the federal appointments process, and the 
framers fully expected (even hoped) conflict would ensue from this design.”). 
41Lloyd N. Cutler, The Limits of Advice and Consent, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 876, 877 (1990) 
[hereinafter Cutler, Limits of Advice and Consent] (“[T]he President and the Senate share the 
power to select Justices.”). 
42See Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal 
Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 479 (1998) [hereinafter Gerhardt, 
Comprehensive Understanding] (“The Constitution also establishes a presumption of 
confirmation that works to the advantage of the president and presidential nominees.”); id. at 
481 (“Thus, a president holds the structural advantage for influencing the exercise of judicial 
power.”); id. at 480 (“The structure is set up to ensure a high presidential success rate.”). 
43See id. at 532 (“[T]he constitutional structure grants the president the balance of power 
in the federal appointments process. . . .”  (footnote omitted)). 
44See Fein, supra note 25, at 677; Wolfe, supra note 32, at 364. 
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can nominate whomever he wants.45  The best interpretation of the appointments 
clause made by those who advocate a strong Senate role is the following: the 
President must listen to the Senate’s advice.46  The President can, however, reject 
any advice as he sees fit.47   
The appointments clause does not delineate the grounds for Senate approval or 
rejection of a nominee; thus, one may argue that the appointments clause envisions 
strong ideological scrutiny by the Senate.48  One could also argue that the 
appointments clause allows the President, not the Senate, to consider ideology when 
nominating individuals.49  In the end, the debate continues.50  One must consequently 
examine the history of the confirmation process, as well as policy arguments, to 
determine whether it is wise for Senators to consider a nominee’s judicial 
philosophy.51 
B.  A [More Recent] History of the Confirmation Process52 
Many commentators argue that the history of the appointments clause proves that 
the Senate should not utilize ideology as a criterion in evaluating a nominee.53  
Significant historical evidence supports this conclusion.54  The grounds for rejecting 
                                                                
45Once the President does so, “a nominee . . . is clothed with an aura of respectability, 
credibility, and presumptive merit.”  Gerhardt, Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 42, 
at 480. 
46See Strauss & Sunstein, A Response, supra note 6, at 671 (“[C]onsulation is a necessary 
means of establishing a workable and sensible appointments process.”).  
47See id. (“[W]e do not claim that consultation is formally necessary to make a nomination 
effective.”). 
48See Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, supra note 8, at 1514-15.  
49See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
50See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text. 
51See Strauss & Sunstein, A Response, supra note 6, at 673 (“[T]he relevant provisions of 
the text are too ambiguous to be decisive on the question of the Senate’s role.”). 
52Commentators have analyzed the history of the appointments clause thoroughly.  See 
infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.  This paper asserts that ideological scrutiny is a 
more recent phenomenon that began in 1987. 
53Dr. John C. Eastman, The Limited Nature of the Senate’s Advice and Consent Role, 36 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 633, 640-46 (2003); Fein, supra note 25, at 672-74; McGinnis, A Reply, 
supra note 3, at 652-59; Presser, supra note 3, at 252-53; see David J. Danelski, Ideology as a 
Ground for the Rejection of the Bork Nomination, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 900, 916 (1990) 
(“Senators . . . argued that historical precedents going back to the time of George Washington 
justified ideology as a ground for the rejection [of Judge Bork].  That argument, as the 
preceding examination of cases for Tribe’s thesis has shown, is unpersuasive.”  (footnote 
omitted)); id. at  920 (“[T]he history of judicial nominations does not justify ideological 
rejection of Supreme Court nominees. . . .”); Richard D. Friedman, Tribal Myths: Ideology 
and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 95 YALE L.J. 1283, 1283-1300 (1986) 
[hereinafter Friedman, Tribal Myths] (reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS 
HONORABLE COURT (1985)). 
54See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Robert Walsh (Feb. 5, 1811), in 3 THE LIFE OF 
GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, WITH SELECTIONS FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS 
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a nominee, such as political favoritism by the President, or ethical lapses by the 
nominee, are especially compelling.55  Notably, the great majority of historical 
evidence does not mention ideology as a criterion.56  Some commentators, however, 
have concluded otherwise.57  The debate over the history of the appointments clause 
has been fruitful and voluminous.58  For reasons to be explained, I cast my lot with 
the ideological minimalists.  The Senate’s consideration of a nominee’s ideology 
finds its historical roots not in 1787, but in 1987, the year of the Bork nomination.59  
Regardless of one’s historical interpretation, the tone and substance of Senate 
Judiciary Committee hearings have changed dramatically over the past two 
decades.60  I now turn to that recent history. 
                                                          
PAPERS 260, 261 (Jared Sparks ed., Boston, Gray & Bowen 1832); see also 4 THE DEBATES IN 
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 134 
(Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d photo reprint 1941 (1836)); see THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 76, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The Senate could not be 
tempted by the preference they might feel to another to reject the one proposed. . . .”); see id. 
(“To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate? I answer, that the necessity of 
their concurrence would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent operation.”  (emphasis 
added)); see id. (“It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, 
and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, 
from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity.” (emphasis 
added)); see id. (“[I]t is not likely that their sanction would often be refused, where there were 
not special and strong reasons for the refusal.”  (emphasis added)); see also THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 77, supra, at 429 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The censure of rejecting a good [nomination] 
would lie entirely at the door of the Senate, aggravated by the consideration of their having 
counteracted the good intentions of the executive.”); McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 635-
40 (analyzing these materials). 
55Gerhardt, Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 42, at 475 (stating that the 
compromise “embodied in the Appointments Clause . . . seeks to protect against the 
appointments of presidential cronies and legislative flunkies”).  
56See supra note 54. 
57See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1387 (1990) 
(book review) [hereinafter Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork] (“Bork also seems oblivious to the 
historical fact that his rejection was not the first time the Senate had evaluated someone’s 
judicial philosophy in determining whether to confirm a nominee.”); Strauss & Sunstein, 
Confirmation Process, supra note 8, at 1514-20; TRIBE, supra note 53, at 92 (“[T]he simple 
truth [is] that the upper house of Congress has been scrutinizing Supreme Court nominees and 
rejecting them on the basis of their political, judicial, and economic philosophies ever since 
George Washington was President.”); see generally Gary J. Simson, Taking the Court 
Seriously: A Proposed Approach to Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 7 
CONST. COMM. 283 (1990) [hereinafter Simson, Proposed Approach] (advocating ideological 
scrutiny of judicial nominees). 
58See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.  
59Cf. Fein, supra note 25, at 673 (“If continued, the Senate’s departure from the 
Hamiltonian model in favor of this more intrusive form of scrutiny bodes ill for the quality of 
Supreme Court Justices.”). 
60See Oona A. Hathaway, Book Note, The Politics of the Confirmation Process, 106 YALE 
L.J. 235, 238 (1996) (reviewing JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT 
NOMINEES (1995)) (“A close reading of his own historical accounts suggests that the highly 
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1.  The Bork Nomination 
In 1987, President Reagan nominated Judge Robert Bork for Justice Lewis 
Powell’s seat on the Supreme Court.  Prior to his nomination to the Supreme Court, 
Judge Bork was a law professor at Yale University, Solicitor-General of the United 
States, and a private practitioner.  Minutes after President Reagan announced the 
nomination, Senator Kennedy sharply denounced Judge Bork’s record.61  Interest 
groups followed Senator Kennedy’s lead, and the Bork nomination quickly became 
controversial.  “All at once the political passions of three decades seemed to 
converge on a single empty chair: the Supreme Court seat vacated by Lewis 
Powell.”62  The focus soon shifted to Bork’s chair in the Senate Judiciary Committee 
hearings.63  For his part, Judge Bork did not fare well on television under sharp 
questioning from Senate Democrats.64  Judge Bork’s opponents alleged that he 
opposed women’s rights, the right to privacy, and enforcement of civil rights laws.65  
Many law professors criticized Bork’s judicial philosophy of originalism as “outside 
the mainstream” of legal thought.66   
Some Senators made more controversial claims, one being that Judge Bork’s 
judicial philosophy resembled the Dred Scott decision.67  Politically weakened by the 
                                                          
ideological tenor of recent nomination hearings is a relatively new phenomenon.”  (footnote 
omitted)). 
61133 CONG. REC. S9188 (1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
62Richard Lacayo, The Battle Begins; Bork’s Nomination Is Likely to Stir a Fiercely 
Political Senate Fight, TIME, July 13, 1987, at 10. 
63See id. 
64Gerhardt, Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 42, at 521. 
65See MICHAEL PERTSCHUK & WENDY SCHAETZEL, THE PEOPLE RISING: THE CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST THE BORK NOMINATION 254 (1989). 
66ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA 
196-98 (1989).   
67Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 314 
(1987) (quoting Senator Paul Simon).  Besides accusing him of authoring a 1977 Supreme 
Court decision with which they disagreed, see supra note 15, Judge Bork’s opponents also 
claimed that he favored mandatory sterilization.  See BRONNER, supra note 66, at 179.  
Planned Parenthood claimed that Judge Bork forced factory women to choose between 
mandatory sterilization and keeping their jobs.  Id.  The case referred to is Oil, Chemical & 
Atomic Worker International Union v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Bork, J.).  In that case, Judge Bork, writing for a unanimous panel, concluded that the 
word “hazard” in the Occupational Safety and Health Act did not address an employer’s 
policy requiring women of child-bearing age to be sterilized or else lose their jobs.  Id. at 450.  
The case involved a relatively straightforward question of statutory interpretation.  Id. at 445 
(“Congress has enacted a statute and our only task is the mundane one of interpreting its 
language and applying its policy.”).  Ironically, Judge Bork noted what the case did not 
involve.  Id. (“We may not, on the one hand, decide that the company is guilty because it 
chose to let women decide for themselves which course was less harmful to them. . . .  These 
are issues of no small complexity, but they are not for us.”).  Commentators were disgusted by 
the misrepresentation of American Cyanamid.  See BRONNER, supra note 66, at 178 (quoting 
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Iran-Contra scandal and nearing the end of his second term, President Reagan never 
acted quickly enough to defend Judge Bork.68  Few expected the tide of public 
opinion to turn against Judge Bork.69  But the tide did indeed turn, and the Senate 
rejected Judge Bork’s nomination.70  Judge Bork soon resigned from the bench and 
returned to the sanctuary of the legal academy.71 
Whatever one thinks of Judge Bork’s judicial philosophy, his confirmation 
hearing is not a model for future confirmation hearings.72  The political rhetoric 
                                                          
Professor Laurence Tribe).  Many commentators have regretted the treatment Judge Bork 
received.  See infra note 72. 
68BRONNER, supra note 66, at 202. 
69See id. 
70Walsh & Marcus, supra note 2. 
71Judge Bork’s first publication after his confirmation hearing consisted of an answer to 
his critics.  See BORK, supra note 15, at 323-36.  Reflecting the controversy surrounding his 
nomination, many commentators criticized the book.  See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Robert 
Bork’s Grand Inquisition, 99 YALE L.J. 1419, 1420 (1990) (book review) [hereinafter 
Ackerman, Grand Inquisition] (“And yet, judging from Bork's performance, the time isn’t ripe 
for a Great Crusade. Bork has succumbed to his own temptation. Proclaiming his fidelity to 
history, his constitutional vision is radically ahistorical.”); Ronald Dworkin, Bork’s 
Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 660 (1990) (book review) (“Bork’s caustic 
jurisprudence debases the quality of the debate. He coarsens the public argument by reducing 
it to a stock Western drama, heroes against horse thieves. He may find the real argument too 
complex for his polemical purposes. But he should not stoop to tactics he rightly deplores 
when they are aimed against him.”); Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, supra note 57, at 1359 
(“This Book Review Essay argues that Bork’s theory of original understanding cannot 
coherently and consistently overcome certain problems endemic to the interpretation of the 
written constitutional text, the search for objective historiography, and the reconsideration of 
precedents not based on original understanding.”); David A.J. Richards, Originalism Without 
Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373, 1407 (1990) (book review) (“It is surely a chilling 
commentary on the state of American public culture that Bork’s incoherent originalism was 
accredited to the extent it was.”); Suzanna Sherry, Original Sin, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1215, 1215 
(1990) (book review) (“[Bork’s] positions on most issues are as extremist as his critics have 
portrayed them. His intellectual abilities are weaker than his opponents suspected. He is an 
abysmal historian, which . . . is a fatal flaw in a self-professed originalist.”).  Others, however, 
harbored a more charitable view of Judge Bork’s book and judicial philosophy.  See, e.g., 
Stephen L. Carter, Bork Redux, or How the Tempting of America Led the People to Rise and 
Battle for Social Justice, 69 TEX. L. REV. 759, 788 (1991) [hereinafter Carter, Bork Redux] 
(“Bork’s constitutional theory, while flawed, is sensible and well thought out. What it is not 
outside is the mainstream of constitutional thought, which was, to my way of thinking, the 
unfairest charge of all.”); Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 
44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1049 (1992) (“The American people must be brought to see again what 
they seem to have forgotten: that self-government and federalism are their most important 
constitutional rights and the best protection of their freedom, security, and prosperity.  Robert 
Bork’s book has done more than any other to help the American people understand this.”). 
72Carter, Bork Redux, supra note 71, at 762 (stating that the treatment Judge Bork received 
from his “most vociferous opponents was shameful”); see also Bruce Ackerman, 
Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1164 (1988) [hereinafter Ackerman, 
Transformative Appointments] (“It is a tragedy that the republic should pay [Bork] for his 
decades of service by publicly humiliating him.”). 
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spewed in the Bork confirmation hearing reached alarmingly inaccurate heights.73  
Some commentators lauded the Bork confirmation hearing as a perfect example of 
public participation in the confirmation process.74  Considering the many distortions, 
omissions, and inaccuracies of Judge Bork’s record made by his critics, this 
conclusion is somewhat strange.75  Unsurprisingly, these distortions were only 
corrected long after Judge Bork’s confirmation hearing.76  No one ever disputed 
Judge Bork’s qualifications, yet Judge Bork was “outside the mainstream.”  Judge 
Bork, however, was confirmed unanimously to the D.C. Circuit—and recommended 
by the New York Times.77  Moreover, many law professors have argued that Judge 
Bork is not “outside the mainstream.”78  Embittered by the Bork nomination, Senate 
Republicans vowed to gain revenge. 
2.  President George H.W. Bush 
Republicans fulfilled that vow after gaining control of the Senate in 1994.  Their 
anger toward the confirmation process had only increased following the near-failure 
of the Clarence Thomas nomination in 1991.79  In President George H.W. Bush’s last 
year of office, many nominees never received hearings; the Bush Administration 
accused Democrats of waiting on the election returns.80  After President Clinton’s 
win in 1992, Republicans demanded greater input in nominating judges.81  
3.  President Bill Clinton 
Nevertheless, President Clinton’s election restored balance to the confirmation 
process.82  Until 1994, the confirmation process had regained some sense of 
normalcy.  President Clinton’s two Supreme Court nominees–Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
and Stephen Breyer–were easily confirmed with little Republican opposition.83  
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch enjoyed strong relations with the 
                                                                
73See supra note 15. 
74See, e.g., Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to 
Know, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1213, 1228 (1988). 
75See supra note 72. 
76See supra note 15. 
77See Editorial, Echoes of Watergate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1981, at A30 [hereinafter 
Editorial, Echoes of Watergate]. 
78See, e.g., Carter, Bork Redux, supra note 71, at 788. 
79See, e.g., JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE 
THOMAS 293-95 (1994); see also Kline, supra note 18, at 326. 
80Cf. Kline, supra note 18, at 264. 
81See id. at 293-94. 
82See id. at 247. 
83See id. at 314 n.209. 
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White House, and both parties worked reasonably well together.84  That working 
relationship changed, however, toward the end of President Clinton’s first term.85 
To say that many Clinton nominees never received hearings during President 
Clinton’s second term oversimplifies what occurred.86  The results are far worse than 
that.87  Many Clinton nominees were placed on hold informally; Senate Republicans 
never allowed those nominees to appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee.88  
Some nominees went years before they received a hearing; other nominees never 
even received hearings.89  The number of confirmed judges declined steadily after 
1996, leading many commentators to claim that a vacancy crisis existed in the 
federal judiciary.90   
Senate Democrats accused Senate Republicans of changing the “rules of the 
game” in the confirmation process.91  Senate Republicans, of course, claimed that 
they were merely exercising the powers of “advice and consent.”92  Others noted that 
Senate Republicans were gaining political revenge for the Bork nomination.93  
Advice and consent became “abuse and dissent;”94 few people were satisfied with the 
confirmation process.95  The confirmation process stalled completely in President 
Clinton’s last year in office, prompting President Clinton to utilize a recess 
appointment to nominate Roger Gregory for a seat on the Fourth Circuit.96   
During President Clinton’s second term, it became far more procedurally difficult 
for his nominees to receive hearings.97  Even when hearings took place, however, the 
obstacles placed before nominees were vast.98  Many Clinton nominees were accused 
                                                                
84See id. at 247. 
85See Kline, supra note 18, at 248 (detailing the decrease in judges confirmed by the 
Senate from 1994 to 1997). 
86See id. at 249-51. 
87For a thorough examination of Clinton nominees who did not receive hearings, see id. at 
260-64. 
88Id. at 308-12 (discussing the use of informal “holds” by Senate Republicans). 
89Id. at 301. 
90See REHNQUIST, 1996 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 19, at 4 (calling the vacancy crisis 
the most immediate problem faced by the federal judiciary). 
91See Kline, supra note 18, at 268. 
92Id. at 324. 
93Id. at 327 n.256 (noting that many Republicans considered 1997 the tenth year of the 
Bork battle, not the tenth anniversary of the Bork battle). 
94Edward Kennedy, Alliance for Justice Luncheon Speech (April 30, 1997), quoted in 
Kline, supra note 18, at 333 n.275. 
95Certainly not Senate Democrats.  See id. at 329-30.  
96President Bush renominated Judge Gregory, and the Senate confirmed Judge Gregory 
just two months after he was nominated. 
97See id. at 323-43. 
98See id. at 277-87. 
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of being “outside the mainstream” because they were “judicial activists.”99  Many of 
the charges made against Clinton nominees were based on gross distortions of a 
nominee’s record.100  If Senate Republicans could not find material in a nominee’s 
record to distort, they refused to grant that nominee a hearing.101  This was 
particularly true for nominees to the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth 
Circuit, and the Sixth Circuit.102 
President Clinton nominated Missouri Supreme Court Judge Ronnie White for a 
judgeship.  Judge White subsequently appeared before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, and suffered a Bork-style confirmation hearing at the hands of Senate 
Republicans.103  Then Senator John Ashcroft claimed that Judge White unduly 
favored the rights of criminals and was “outside the mainstream.”104  Judge White’s 
record on the Missouri Supreme Court proved otherwise.105  Senator Ashcroft, 
however, opposed the White nomination with particular ferocity.106  The Senate 
rejected Judge White’s nomination on a party-line vote for the same reason that it 
rejected Judge Bork’s nomination: by the time anyone fairly evaluated Judge White’s 
record, the nomination had been rejected.107  Judge White became the rallying cry for 
                                                                
99Id. at 250-55. 
100See, e.g., id. at 338-40. 
101See Kline, supra note 18, at 308-09 (“The hold process was so secretive that sometimes 
it is difficult to tell exactly which nominees have had holds placed on them.”  (footnote 
omitted)). 
102See id. at 265-69; see Carl Tobias, Sixth Circuit Federal Judicial Selection, 36 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 721 (2003) [hereinafter Tobias, Sixth Circuit] (discussing the controversy 
surrounding nominations to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals during President Clinton’s two 
terms in office).  
103See Editorial, A Sad Judicial Mugging, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at A26 [hereinafter 
Editorial, A Sad Judicial Mugging]. 
104See 145 CONG. REC. S11932 (1999) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (detailing his concerns 
regarding Judge White’s record). 
105See, e.g., State v. Lyons, 951 S.W.2d 584, 587 (Mo. 1997) (White, J.); State v. Smith, 
944 S.W.2d 901, 909 (Mo. 1997) (White, J.); State v. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Mo. 
1996) (White, J.); State v. Copeland, 928 S.W.2d 828, 834 (Mo. 1996); State v. Kreutzer, 928 
S.W.2d 854, 859 (Mo. 1996); State v. Smulls, 935 S.W.2d 9, 13 (Mo. 1996) (White, J.); see 
also 145 CONG. REC. S11867 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“I just note that Justice Ronnie 
White is far more apt to affirm a death penalty decision than to vote as one of many members 
of the Supreme Court to reverse it. He has voted to affirm 41 times and voted to reverse only 
17 times.”). 
106See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S11867 (1999) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (“But I urge my 
fellow Senators to consider whether we should sanction the life appointment to the 
responsibility of a Federal district court judge for one who has earned a vote of no confidence 
from so many in the law enforcement community in the State in which he resides.”). 
107Judge White is anything but a “left-wing” jurist.  See supra note 105 and accompanying 
text.  Any claims to the contrary are the same sort of misrepresentations that Judge Bork 
suffered.  Senator Ashcroft “Borked” Judge White.  See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE 
DICTIONARY 154 (2d ed. 1999) (stating that the verb “Bork” means “to attack (a candidate or 
public figure) systematically, especially in the media”). 
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Senate Democrats disgusted with the confirmation process.108  He became their Bork, 
and they vowed that they would never forget his experience.109 
4.  President George W. Bush 
a.  Defining the Rules of the Game 
After the Supreme Court decided Bush v. Gore,110 Senate Democrats were 
disgusted with the Supreme Court and several law professors.111  Senate Democrats 
claimed that the “Rehnquist Five” had irreparably harmed the Court’s integrity.112  
They announced that severe ideological scrutiny of President Bush’s nominees was 
forthcoming.113  Some commentators went further, arguing that none of President 
Bush’s nominees should even receive hearings.114  These announcements were 
noteworthy for their promptness; President Clinton enjoyed two years of relatively 
peaceful relations with Senate Republicans on judicial nominations.115  By contrast, 
Senate Democrats defined the rules of the game before President Bush took the oath 
of office.116  Senate Democrats fired the warning shot by almost unanimously voting 
                                                                
108See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S11918 (1999) (statement of Sen. Daschle).    
109Senate Democrats, as one would expect, still invoke Judge White’s name.  See, e.g., 
148 CONG. REC. S8280 (2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
110531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
111
 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Politics over Principle, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at 
A35; Randall Kennedy, Contempt of Court, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1-15, 2001, at 15; Jeffrey 
Rosen, Disgrace: The Supreme Court Commits Suicide, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 25, 2000, at 18 
[hereinafter Rosen, Disgrace]. 
112See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S1671 (2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
113See Schumer, supra note 18 (arguing that President Bush lacks a mandate to nominate 
conservative judges).  For criticism of the argument that the President needs a political 
mandate to nominate judges of his ideological persuasion, see Part III.A.2 infra. 
114Bruce Ackerman, Foil Bush's Maneuvers for Packing the Court, L.A. TIMES, April 26, 
2001, at B11 [hereinafter Ackerman, Foil Bush's Maneuvers] (“This unprecedented situation 
requires the Senate to ask new questions and draw new lines.  The first step should be a 
moratorium on Supreme Court appointments until the American people return to the polls in 
2004.”).  But see Matthew D. Marcotte, Note, Advice and Consent: A Historical Argument for 
Substantive Senatorial Involvement in Judicial Nominations, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
519, 561 (2001) (“President George W. Bush is entitled to the same deference as any other 
President who takes office under controversial circumstances. This means that his nominees to 
the Supreme Court should neither be rejected out of hand, nor confirmed without careful 
examination of their philosophies and qualifications to serve on the Supreme Court.”). 
115See Kline, supra note 18, at 247-48. 
116See, e.g., Ackerman, Foil Bush's Maneuvers, supra note 114. 
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against Senator Ashcroft’s nomination to be Attorney General.117  The rules of the 
game, Senate Democrats argued, would change.118   
The rules changed drastically.119  Many of President Bush’s nominees went 
almost two years without a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee.120  
Senator Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee after the defection of 
Senator Jim Jeffords, stated that more controversial nominees would take more 
deliberation.121  Notably, the Senate has confirmed many district court judges.122  The 
percentage of Circuit Court nominees confirmed during Senator Leahy’s tenure, 
however, was less than stellar.123  Nominees who appeared before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee endured hearings of an almost entirely political character.124  As 
promised, Senate Democrats frequently voted against nominees they considered 
“outside the mainstream.”125  Many of President Bush's Circuit Court nominees were 
deemed “outside the mainstream,” including Professor Michael McConnell, who 
received the support of over 300 law professors, and Miguel Estrada, who served for 
five years in the Office of Solicitor General during the Clinton Administration.126  
                                                                
117Helen Dewar, A Serious Breach in Bipartisanship: Democrats Fire “Shot Across Bow,” 
WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2001, at A6 [hereinafter Dewar, Serious Breach] (noting that forty-two 
Democrats voted against Senator Ashcroft’s nomination for Attorney General). 
118Cf. id. 
119See infra notes 120-34 and accompanying text. 
120See United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Courts of Appeals, at 
http://www.senate.gov/~judiciary/nominations_appeals.cfm (last visited Aug. 8, 2003). 
121148 CONG. REC. S9975-02 (2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“Most Senators understand 
that more controversial nominees require greater review.  This process of careful review is 
part of our democratic system.”). 
122Senator Leahy justly deserves credit for this.  See Editorial, Forgetting Anyone?, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 11, 2002, at A36 [hereinafter Editorial, Forgetting Anyone?] (“Mr. Leahy deserves 
credit for having moved nominees at a faster clip than the Senate managed in recent years.”).  
For a full list of confirmed district court nominees, see United States Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, U.S. District Courts, at http://www.senate.gov/~judiciary/nominations_district.cfm 
(last visited Aug. 8, 2003).  At last count, the Senate has confirmed eighty-six district court 
judges.  Id. 
123See Circuit and District Court Judicial Nominations, at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/ 
2yearcomparison.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2003) (noting that 53% of President Bush’s Circuit 
Court nominees were confirmed during the first two years).   
124Senators interrogated Mr. Estrada concerning allegations made by an anonymous source 
that he imposed litmus tests on Supreme Court clerkship candidates while conducting 
screening interviews for Justice Kennedy.  See infra note 331 (discussing the nomination of 
Miguel Estrada). 
125See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S11502-01 (2002) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (detailing his 
concerns regarding the nomination of Dennis Shedd); see also infra Part II.B.4.c (discussing 
the Owen nomination). 
126As a result of attacks from Senate Democrats, Mr. Estrada withdrew his name from 
consideration on September 9, 2003.  Mr. Estrada’s opponents made quite an interesting 
argument against confirmation: No one knows Mr. Estrada's views on legal issues, and those 
views are “outside the mainstream.”  Compare Jack Newfield, The Right’s Judicial 
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John G. Roberts, Jr., one of the best Supreme Court advocates in recent memory, did 
not receive a hearing during Senator Leahy’s tenure.127 
When asked about his treatment of President Bush’s judicial nominees, Senator 
Leahy frequently responded by criticizing the record of his predecessor, Senator 
Hatch.128  Noting that many of President Clinton’s nominees never received hearings, 
Senator Leahy has bluntly stated that President Bush would have been wise to 
nominate many of those individuals.129  Senate Judiciary Committee hearings have 
often degenerated into shouting matches between Senators Leahy and Hatch.130  
President Bush refused to shy away from nominating individuals of a conservative 
bent; Senator Leahy refused to stop subjecting those individuals to close ideological 
scrutiny.131 
                                                          
Juggernaut, NATION, Oct. 7, 2002, at 11 (quoting Senator Schumer as saying: “Estrada is like 
a Stealth missile—with a nose cone—coming out of the right wing’s deepest silo”), with Neil 
A. Lewis, Bush Judicial Choice Imperiled By Refusal to Release Papers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 
2002, at A28 [hereinafter Lewis, Bush Judicial Choice Imperiled] (“Senate Democrats . . . 
suggested that they would not vote on his nomination unless the administration relented and 
provided internal legal memorandums Mr. Estrada wrote when he was a government 
lawyer.”); id. (quoting Senator Schumer as saying: “Everyone I’ve spoken with believes such 
memoranda will be useful in assessing how [Mr. Estrada] approach[es] the law. . . .”). 
Mr. Estrada worked in the Office of the Solicitor General for five years during the Clinton 
Administration.  Senate Democrats refused to vote on the nomination until Mr. Estrada’s 
memoranda and papers during his stint in the Office of the Solicitor General were released.  
Lewis, Bush Judicial Choice Imperiled, supra.  One case they should have examined is NOW 
v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994).  There, Mr. Estrada argued for the United States, as amicus 
curiae, that the RICO statute applied to anti-abortion protestors.  See id.  The Court, however, 
chose not to address that particular issue.  Id. at 262 n.6 (“[T]he question presented for review 
asked simply whether the Court should create an unwritten requirement limiting RICO to 
cases where either the enterprise or racketeering activity has an overriding economic motive. 
. . .  We therefore decline to address the First Amendment question argued by respondents and 
the amici.”).  Scheidler represented Mr. Estrada’s public involvement in the issue of abortion. 
127See United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Courts of Appeals, at 
http://www.senate.gov/~judiciary/nominations_appeals.cfm (last visited Aug. 8, 2003).  Mr. 
Roberts was confirmed on May 8, 2003.  Id. 
128148 CONG. REC. S9975-02 (2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
129See id. (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
130Compare 148 CONG. REC. S8510-02 (2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“We have also 
now confirmed more of President George W. Bush’s judicial nominations since July, 2001—
75—than were confirmed in all of 1989 and 1990, the first 2 years of the term of his father 
President George H.W. Bush—73.”), with id. (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[T]he Committee 
under my chairmanship permitted the nomination to go to the floor for a full Senate vote. My 
colleague from Vermont certainly cannot say the same. In the last fifteen months, the 
Democrat-controlled Judiciary Committee has already voted against two nominees in 
committee. . . .”) 
131The Republican takeover of the Senate in the 2002 Midterm Elections gives President 
Bush a unique opportunity to “begin repairing the broken judicial nomination system.”  
Editorial, Second Chance on Judges, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2002, at A30 [hereinafter Editorial, 
Second Chance on Judges].  President Bush’s proposal that the Senate hold hearings on a 
nomination within 90 days of receiving a nomination, and that the full Senate vote within 180 
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Just as Senate Republicans blocked many of President Clinton’s nominations, 
Senate Democrats blocked many of President Bush’s nominations.132  Senate 
Democrats have criticized Senate Republicans for past sins in the confirmation 
process, yet they have shown that they are equally adept at blocking a President’s 
judicial nominees for less-than-compelling reasons.133  The Senate Judiciary 
Committee rejected two of President Bush’s nominees to the Fifth Circuit—District 
Judge Charles Pickering and Texas Supreme Court Justice Priscilla Owen—on party-
line votes.134  Both individuals received “Well Qualified” ratings from the ABA, so 
presumably each nominee’s qualifications were not at issue.  Ideology, however, was 
certainly at issue in both hearings. 
b.  The Pickering Nomination 
When President Bush nominated Judge Charles Pickering for a seat on the Fifth 
Circuit, few observers expected Judge Pickering's confirmation hearing to be that 
contentious.135  After all, Senator Trent Lott is a close friend of Judge Pickering,136 
and Judge Pickering received a “Well Qualified” recommendation from the ABA.137  
Yet, Judge Pickering’s hearing quickly became quite a spectacle.138  He was accused 
of having a poor record on civil rights, and supporting racial segregation in a Law 
Review article.139  Many Senate Democrats argued that the Fifth Circuit has 
                                                          
days, “would improve the nominations process.”  Id.  More important than the timetable for 
consideration of nominations, however, are the criteria utilized to evaluate nominees. 
132See Robert Novak, Dysfunctional Senate Stalled on Judicial Nominees, CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002, at 33 (“Democratic treatment of Bush’s early nominees is worse in 
degree but not different in kind than Republican treatment of President Bill Clinton’s late 
nominees.”). 
133See id. 
134See infra Part II.B.4 (discussing both nominations). 
135See House Member Drops Out of Running for U.S. Judge, WASH. POST, May 26, 2001, 
at A13 (perfunctorily noting the nomination of Judge Pickering to the Fifth Circuit). 
136Considering Senator Lott’s recent (and very likely racist) remarks on the subject of race 
at Senator Thurmond’s retirement dinner, being a friend of Senator Lott is hardly a political 
asset these days. 
137See id. 
138See Senate’s Approval of Judicial Nominee Foretells Struggles, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 
2002, at A25 (noting that women’s rights groups, civil rights groups and liberal groups 
expressed strong concerns about the nomination of Judge Pickering). 
139See John Nichols, Fighting Pickering: Civil Rights Record of Judicial Nominee Charles 
Pickering Questioned, NATION, Mar. 18, 2002, at 5.  Judge Pickering’s casenote is not the 
piece of racist propaganda that many allege it to be.  Judge Pickering wrote a casenote 
analyzing a recent Mississippi Supreme Court decision.  See Charles W. Pickering, Note, 
Recent Cases: Criminal Law—Miscegenation—Incest, 30 MISS. L.J. 326, 326-27 (1959).  The 
case, Ratcliff v. State, 107 So. 2d 728 (Miss. 1958), involved an appeal by an African-
American woman who had been convicted of cohabitating with a white man.  The Mississippi 
Legislature passed a law forbidding cohabitation between persons “whose marriage is 
prohibited by law by reason of race or blood and which marriage is declared to be incestuous 
and void.”  Thus, Mississippi Code Section 2000 required two elements for conviction: a 
marriage prohibited by law, and a marriage declared to be incestuous.  Id.  The Mississippi 
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frequently reversed Judge Pickering’s rulings.140  Statistics supporting this charge, 
however, have been lacking.141  Yet by the time Judge Pickering’s hearing ended, 
                                                          
Supreme Court reversed Ratcliff’s conviction because she and the white man were engaged in 
a miscegenetic relationship, not an incestuous one.  Id. at 730.  The statute, however, required 
an incestuous relationship.  Id. The State failed to prove one of the elements of unlawful 
cohabitation; thus, the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction.  Id.   
Ratcliff is a straightforward case of statutory interpretation.  The Mississippi Legislature 
required two elements for conviction of unlawful cohabitation, and the State only proved one 
of those elements.  The decision—merely three pages in length—was unanimous.  The Court 
noted that it had to construe the statute as written, not as the Legislature intended the statute to 
be written.  Id.  Had the Court adopted the latter view of statutory interpretation, it likely 
would have upheld the conviction.  The Court, however, punished the Mississippi Legislature 
for poor legislative drafting.  See id.  
Judge Pickering’s casenote recited the facts of Ratliff, the legislative history surrounding 
Section 2000 of the Mississippi Code, and the mistake in drafting committed by the 
Mississippi Legislature.  See Pickering, supra, at 326-27.  Judge Pickering noted that, in 
criminal cases, most courts do not interpret a statute beyond its literal terms.  Id. at 327.  Judge 
Pickering then surveyed miscegenation statutes in other states, id., noting that such statutes 
were frequently attacked as unconstitutional.  id. at 327-28, yet upheld by the United States 
Supreme Court.  Id. at 328 (citing Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883)).  Judge Pickering 
then stated that Mississippi’s miscegenation statute was “more comprehensive than the 
statutes in most of the other states.”  Id. 
The final paragraph of Judge Pickering’s casenote is the most controversial paragraph.  It 
begins with this telling statement:  “Certain recent decisions in the fields of education, 
transportation, and recreation, would cause one to wonder how long the Supreme Court will 
allow any statute to stand which uses the term ‘race’ to draw a distinction.”  Id. at 329.   
Thus, Judge Pickering—at a minimum—doubted the constitutionality of miscegenation 
laws.  See id. One may fairly wonder why, if Judge Pickering is a racist, he would have 
included that sentence in his casenote.  In the next sentence, however, Judge Pickering 
predicted that the Supreme Court would not invalidate miscegenation statutes.  Id. at 329 & 
n.15.  Judge Pickering concluded his casenote with this sentence: “Therefore, if Section 2000 
of the Code of 1942 is to serve the purpose that the legislature undoubtedly intended it to 
serve, the section should be amended.”  Id. at 329. 
Judge Pickering’s concluding sentence mirrored the sentiments of the Court in Ratcliff—if 
the Mississippi Legislature wanted to obtain convictions for illegal cohabitation, it should 
have drafted its miscegenation laws properly.  Otherwise, any future convictions for illegal 
cohabitation would likely be overturned.  Judge Pickering suggested ways to amend the statute 
only because the statute was poorly written.  Considering that Judge Pickering doubted the 
constitutionality of the miscegenation statute, it’s difficult to conclude that Judge Pickering 
wanted to “strengthen” the miscegenation statute.  Id. at 329.  The fact that the Mississippi 
Legislature amended the statute and removed the requirement of an incestuous relationship, 
does not make Judge Pickering responsible for the hateful sentiments that produced the 
Mississippi miscegenation statute.   
140Id. 
141One can use statistics, however, to prove nearly anything.  Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002) (Stevens, J., joined by O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg & 
Breyer, JJ.) (concluding that a national consensus has developed against capital punishment 
for the mentally retarded because eighteen state legislatures have passed laws exempting the 
mentally retarded from capital punishment), with id. at 342 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, 
C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that a national consensus against executing the 
mentally retarded does not exist because “less than half (47%) of the 38 States that permit 
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many people had accused him of being an outright racist.142  Judge Pickering's 
nomination was defeated on a party-line vote.143 
c.  The Owen Nomination 
President Bush nominated Justice Priscilla Owen to the Fifth Circuit on May 9, 
2001.144  Justice Owen received a “Well Qualified” rating from the ABA.145  More 
than one year later, she appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee and 
encountered significant opposition.146  Justice Owen’s opponents argued that she is 
beholden to big business and special interests, corrupted by Texas’s system of 
judicial elections, and “outside the mainstream” of legal thought.147  Detractors 
focused on her opinions regarding abortion, claiming that Justice Owen has refused 
to follow Supreme Court precedent.148  In the end, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
rejected Justice Owen’s nomination on a party-line vote.149 
                                                          
capital punishment (for whom the issue exists) . . . have very recently enacted legislation 
barring execution of the mentally retarded”). 
142See Neil A. Lewis, Judicial Confirmation Hearing Evokes Civil Rights Struggle, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at A16 [hereinafter Lewis, Civil Rights Struggle] (noting that Senator 
Durbin questioned Judge Pickering about his alleged contacts with the Mississippi 
Sovereignty Commission). 
143One commentator claims that the Pickering nomination is an example of how the 
confirmation process should work.  See Sheldon Goldman, Unpicking Pickering in 2002: 
Some Thoughts on the Politics of Lower Federal Court Selection and Confirmation, 36 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 695, 719 (2003).  Professor Sheldon does not offer any detailed analysis of 
Judge Pickering’s record.  See id. at 707-18.  Instead, he claims, the Senate acted properly by 
rejecting a nomination that was viewed as too conservative.  Id. at 719.  Contrary to 
expectations, President Bush renominated Judge Pickering.  It is quite likely that Senate 
Democrats will filibuster Judge Pickering’s nomination if that nomination ever goes to the 
Senate floor. 
144Neil A. Lewis, Bush to Nominate 11 to Judgeships Today, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2001, at 
A24 [hereinafter Lewis, Bush to Nominate]. 
145Helen Dewar, Senate Panel Rejects Bush Court Nominee, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2002, at 
A1 [hereinafter Dewar, Senate Panel Rejects] (discussing the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
rejection of the Owen nomination). 
146Charles Lane, Judicial Nominee Challenged on Abortion Views, WASH. POST, July 24, 
2002, at A4 [hereinafter Lane, Judicial Nominee Challenged]. 
147Dewar, Senate Panel Rejects, supra note 145. 
148Neil A. Lewis, Debate on Court Nominee Centers on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 
2002, at A10 [hereinafter Lewis, Debate Centers on Abortion].  Opinion regarding Justice 
Owen differed even among newspapers of a similar political bent.  Compare Editorial, The 
Wrong Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2002, at A20 (“Justice Owen’s nomination should be 
rejected.”), with Editorial, The Owen Nomination, WASH. POST, July 24, 2002, at A18 
[hereinafter Editorial, The Owen Nomination] (“[Justice Owen] is still a conservative.  And 
that is still not a good reason to reject her.”). 
149Dewar, Senate Panel Rejects, supra note 145.  Then-Senate Majority Leader Tom 
Daschle stated that the message sent by the Senate to President Bush by the rejection of the 
Owen nomination is the following: “Don’t send us unqualified people.”  Id.  This statement is 
surprising, considering that the American Bar Association—the much-touted “gold standard” 
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Opponents of Justice Owen claimed that she is a “judicial activist” who would 
overturn Roe v. Wade.150  They claimed that White House Counsel (then-Texas 
Supreme Court Justice) Alberto Gonzales, in his concurring opinion in In re Doe 
1,151 lambasted Justice Owen’s interpretation of the Texas Parental Notification Act 
as “an unconscionable act of judicial activism.”152  Interest groups and Senate 
Democrats repeated this charge with particular ferocity.153  Senator Leahy cited In re 
Doe 1 to prove that Justice Owen is a “conservative judicial activist.”154 Many 
commentators accepted this charge as gospel.155  Unfortunately, this charge is wholly 
false.156 
                                                          
for rating judicial nominees, 148 CONG. REC. S8253 (2002) (statement of Sen. Kyl)—gave 
Justice Owen its highest rating of “Well Qualified.”  Id. 
150410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
15119 S.W.3d 346, 365-66 (Tex. 2000) (Gonzales, J., joined by Enoch, J., concurring). 
152Id. at 366 (Gonzales, J., joined by Enoch, J., concurring).  The full sentence reads: 
“Thus, to construe the Parental Notification Act so narrowly as to eliminate bypasses, or to 
create hurdles that simply are not to be found in the words of the statute, would be an 
unconscionable act of judicial activism.”  Id. (Gonzales, J., joined by Enoch, J., concurring). 
153See, e.g., Lane, Judicial Nominee Challenged, supra note 146 (quoting Senator Richard 
Durbin as saying: “You tend to expand and embellish on the text of the law”). 
154See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S8447 (2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (analyzing In re Jane 
Doe 1, and other cases, to prove that Justice Owen is a “conservative judicial activist”). 
155Jonathan Groner, Activist Label Defeats Owen’s 5th Circuit Nomination, TEX. LAW., 
Sept. 9, 2002, at 1 (quoting attorney David Keltner as stating: “[The Democrats] have a 
concurring opinion from the president’s own lawyer that accuses her of being activist”); Lane, 
Judicial Nominee Challenged, supra note 146; Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Reject Bush Pick in 
Battle Over Court Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2002, at A1 [hereinafter Lewis, Democrats 
Reject Bush Pick] (“To the discomfort of Republicans, Democrats repeatedly cited the words 
of Alberto R. Gonzales, Mr. Bush’s White House counsel who served with Justice Owen on 
the Texas court.”); Newfield, supra note 126 (“Gonzales wrote that Owen’s dissent was ‘an 
unconscionable act of judicial activism.’”); Jeffrey Rosen, Obstruction of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 11, 2002, § 6, at 38 [hereinafter Rosen, Obstruction of Judges] (“In the case of Priscilla 
Owen, . . . the Democrats’ concerns are arguably justified: even President Bush’s White House 
counsel, Alberto Gonzales, called Owen's attempt to narrow a Texas law allowing minors to 
have abortions without their parents’ consent ‘an unconscionable act of judicial activism’. 
. . .”).  One can only wonder how Justice Owen attempted to narrow a law she did not 
interpret.  See infra text accompanying notes 157-71.   
156Very few commentators or political observers, it seems, read In re Jane Doe 1 and 
reached this conclusion.  See, e.g., Editorial, The Willful Majority, WEEKLY STANDARD, Aug. 
5, 2002, at 45 (“Owen has more narrowly construed the statute than have some of her 
colleagues, including then Justice Alberto Gonzales (now White House counsel). But her 
interpretation of the law—the subject that dominated her hearing—is well within the bounds 
of reason.”); Steve Chapman, A Conservative Judge’s “Judicial Activism,” CHICAGO TRIB., 
Aug. 22, 2002, at 19 (“There is no ‘judicial activism’ in respecting the findings of a trial court 
judge, as Owen did.”); Charles Lane, Judge’s Abortion Votes Likely to Dominate Senate 
Hearing; Opposition to Nominee Presages Larger Battle, WASH. POST, July 23, 2002, at A15 
[hereinafter Lane, Judge’s Abortion Votes Likely] (“Justice Nathan L. Hecht accused the 
justices in the majority of imposing their ‘personal views’ and ignoring the rights of parents.  
Gonzales’s concurring opinion was written largely as a response to Hecht’s dissent.”).  
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In Re Doe 1 considered whether a minor could obtain a judicial bypass from the 
Texas Parental Notification Act157 and obtain an abortion.158  Justice Gonzales 
concurred in the majority opinion, stating: “[T]o construe the Parental Notification 
Act so narrowly as to preclude bypass would be an unconscionable act of judicial 
activism.”159  Justice Gonzales did not mention Justice Owen by name in that 
sentence.160  Nor did he cite her dissenting opinion at all.161  Considering Justice 
Gonzales’s concerns about judicial activism, one would expect that Justice Gonzales 
would have mentioned Justice Owen by name if her dissent constituted an act of 
judicial activism.162  Instead, Justice Gonzales cited Justice Nathan Hecht,163 who 
dissented and disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the Texas Parental 
                                                          
Strangely, Justice Gonzales agreed that he criticized Justice Owen.  Lewis, Debate Centers on 
Abortion, supra note 148 (“In a recent interview, Mr. Gonzales sought to minimize the impact 
of his remarks.  He acknowledged that calling someone a ‘judicial activist’ was a serious 
accusation. . . .”). 
157TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003 (Vernon Supp. 2002).  
158In re Doe 1, 19 S.W.3d 346, 346 (Tex. 2000). 
159
 Id. at 366 (Gonzales, J., joined by Enoch, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
160Id. (Gonzales, J., joined by Enoch, J., concurring). 
161Id. (Gonzales, J., joined by Enoch, J., concurring).  Similarly, the majority opinion does 
not criticize Justice Owen’s interpretation of the Texas Parental Notification Act.  Id.  This 
absence of criticism entirely makes sense, considering that Justice Owen did not offer her own 
interpretation of the Texas Parental Notification Act.  The opening sentence of Justice Owen’s 
dissent makes this point obvious.  See id. at 376 (Owen, J., dissenting) (“Rather than conduct 
an appellate review to determine if there was evidence to support the lower courts’ 
determination, this Court has usurped the role of the trial court, reweighed the evidence, and 
drawn its own conclusions.”).  One could argue that Justice Owen gave deference to the trial 
court’s findings because of her views on abortion and parental choice.  Justice Owen’s 
opponents, however, certainly did not make that argument.   
162Particularly considering Justice Gonzales’s repeated exhortations for members of the 
Texas Supreme Court to follow legislative intent in construing a statute.  Id. at 365 (Gonzales, 
J., joined by Enoch, J., concurring) (“Legislative intent is the polestar of statutory 
construction.”  (citation omitted)); id. at 366 (Gonzales, J., joined by Enoch, J., concurring) 
(“[I]t is my obligation as a judge to impartially apply the laws of this state without imposing 
my moral view on the decisions of the Legislature.”).  Justice Gonzales’s failure to cite Justice 
Owen’s dissent—either by name or by implication—means one of two things: either that the 
sentence has no meaning, or that the sentence refers to another Justice’s opinion.  The latter 
statement is true. 
163Id. at 366 (Gonzales, J., joined by Enoch, J., concurring) (“Justice Hecht charges that 
our decision demonstrates the Court’s determination to construe the Parental Notification Act 
as the Court believes the Act should be construed and not as the Legislature intended.”  
(citation omitted)). 
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Notification Act.164  Justice Hecht, not Justice Owen, was Justice Gonzales’s nemesis 
in In re Doe 1.165  
Justice Owen, however, didn’t even offer her own interpretation of the Texas 
Parental Notification Act.166  She focused her dissent on principles of appellate 
review, such as giving deference to the rulings of trial courts.167  Reasonable minds 
can disagree with the trial court's conclusion that Jane Doe was not entitled to a 
judicial bypass; Justice Owen acknowledged this.168  The claim that Justice Owen 
sought a more restrictive interpretation of the Texas Parental Notification Act is 
baseless because Justice Owen didn’t advance any interpretation of the statute.169  
Justice Owen criticized the majority for giving no deference to the trial court’s 
ruling.170  Ironically, Justice Owen pointedly asked which Justice the majority 
opinion referred to as a “judicial activist.”171   
                                                                
16419 S.W.3d at 367 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s utter disregard for the legislative 
history cited by fifty-six legislators in support of their view of the Parental Notification Act is 
an insult to those legislators personally, to the office they hold, and to the separation of powers 
between the two branches of the government.”). 
165Id. at 366 (Gonzales, J., joined by Enoch, J., concurring).  Justice Hecht’s sharp 
criticism of the majority opinion drew significant criticism from Justice Enoch for its lack of 
collegiality and decorum.  Id. at 364 (Enoch, J., joined by Baker, J., concurring) (“[Justice 
Hecht’s] writings in these cases have been inappropriate. Deep convictions do not excuse a 
judge from respecting his colleagues, the litigants, or the law.”).   
166See id. at 376-82 (Owen, J., dissenting). 
167Id. at 382 (Owen, J., dissenting) (“The issue is whether there was some evidence to 
support the trial court’s failure to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Doe was 
mature and sufficiently well informed to make a decision to have an abortion without 
notifying one of her parents.”).  Justice Owen was also displeased with the majority’s methods 
in In re Doe: 
But I dissent from far more than the judgment rendered in this particular appeal.  I 
strongly dissent from the methods employed by the Court in rendering that judgment.  
The Court summarily reversed the lower courts, without an opinion and without the 
opportunity for considered, substantive deliberations. Now that the Court has, after the 
fact, issued an opinion, it has obliterated, with the stroke of a pen, more than fifty 
years of precedent regarding appellate review of a trial court’s findings.  The Court’s 
actions raise disturbing questions about its commitment to the rule of law and to the 
process that is fundamental to the public's trust in the judiciary. 
Id. at 377 (Owen, J., dissenting). 
168Cf. id. at 381 (Owen, J., dissenting) (“The trial court could reasonably find that Doe was 
not mature enough to make the abortion decision without telling one of her parents.”). 
169Compare id. at 382 (Owen, J., dissenting) (“It is the Court who has acted irresponsibly 
in this case by summarily rendering judgment without careful consideration of the record, by 
manufacturing reasons to support its actions, and by ignoring the evidence that supports the 
trial court's judgment.”), and id. at 376 (Owen, J., dissenting) (“The Court has forsaken any 
semblance of abiding by principles of appellate review.”), with id. at 367 (Hecht, J., 
dissenting) (“The Court is well aware of the near-universal criticism of its construction of the 
Parental Notification Act, and the defensiveness of the majority and concurring opinions is 
striking.”). 
170Id. at 381 (Owen, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s analysis of whether Doe was sufficiently 
well informed is also incorrect.  If the Court were to follow well-established law, it would 
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Justice Owen’s opponents claimed that her views on abortion are “outside the 
mainstream.”172  As a matter of politics, that charge is dubious—parental notification 
statutes enjoy strong public support.173  As a matter of law, that charge is equally 
dubious.  To claim that a Justice or Judge opposes abortion because that Judge or 
Justice ruled against someone seeking an abortion confuses reasoning with results.174  
Justice Owen has never criticized Roe and its progeny.  Even if she did, as a Fifth 
Circuit judge, her role would be to follow—not make—Supreme Court precedent.   
Forced to find something to use against Justice Owen, her opponents misread and 
misrepresented her dissent in In re Doe 1.175  In doing so, Justice Owen’s opponents 
committed the same sin that she was accused of committing—substituting one’s 
personal views for precedent.  Justice Owen’s nomination demonstrates the many 
dangers inherent in ideological scrutiny.  It is certainly not the first time that Senators 
have misrepresented a nominee’s judicial opinion.  Should the Senate continue to 
evaluate a nominee’s ideology, it certainly will not be the last time either.   
The recent history of the confirmation process is entirely at odds with the history 
surrounding the appointments clause.176  It is difficult to conclude that the Framers 
would have advocated rejecting a nominee because, in part, a nominee is “not 
Hispanic enough,”177 a nominee participated in anti-war demonstrations,178 or a 
                                                          
consider evidence in the record that supports the trial court's judgment rather than disregard 
that evidence.”). 
171Id. at 383 (Owen, J., dissenting) (“I challenge the Court to state plainly how any judge’s 
personal convictions have entered into analyzing what is strictly a legal issue in this case.”). 
172See Lane, Judge’s Abortion Votes Likely, supra note 156. 
173See Chapman, supra note 156. 
174See infra note 389 (noting that it is quite possible for a judge to follow and apply Roe 
despite that judge’s reservations). 
175See supra text accompanying notes 157-71 (discussing In re Doe 1). 
176Cf. Fein, supra note 25, at 672. 
177See Edward Walsh, Hispanic Caucus to Oppose Estrada, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2002, 
at A4 [hereinafter Walsh, Hispanic Caucus] (“The Congressional Hispanic Caucus, composed 
entirely of House Democrats, plans to announce today that it opposes the nomination of 
Miguel Estrada. . . .  In a statement they will release today and in interviews, the caucus’s 18 
members portrayed Estrada as aloof from the everyday concerns of Latinos.”  (emphasis 
added)).  Senate Democrats have noted that Miguel Estrada grew up in an upper middle-class 
family.  See Lewis, Bush Judicial Choice Imperiled, supra note 126 (“In a colloquy with the 
nominee, Mr. Leahy put on the record that Mr. Estrada did not grow up poor, his father was a 
banker and lawyer and that he attended a private school.”).  The claim that Mr. Estrada is “not 
Hispanic enough” surely cannot succeed as a matter of genetics.  Additionally, considering the 
political biases of the various parties who claim or deny legitimate racial lineage, these claims 
are neither objective nor relevant. 
178See Mark Shields, Commando Phil Gramm, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1997, at A22 
(quoting Senator Gramm, speaking out in opposition to Texas trial judge Michael Schattman, 
as saying: “The Dallas-Fort Worth area has a lot of defense contractors, and so how is a guy 
who is opposed to all war going to make a fair shake to people whose job it is to make the 
weapons of war?”) 
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nominee dared criticize a Supreme Court decision.179  Many prudential reasons 
would lead a Senator of even modest caution to conclude that ideological scrutiny 
must end. 
d.  The 2002 Midterm Elections 
After the 2002 Midterm Elections, and toward the end of Senator Leahy’s tenure 
as Chairman, some progress was made in the confirmation process.  In its last 
hearing under Senator Leahy’s leadership, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved 
the nominations of Judge Dennis Shedd and Professor Michael McConnell.180  The 
full Senate confirmed both men shortly thereafter.181  It appears that Senator Leahy 
brought both nominations to the floor as a sign of goodwill.182  Nevertheless, Senate 
Democrats have used the filibuster to prevent consideration of the “most 
controversial” nominees.183  While the Senate is now under Republican control, it is 
doubtful that this change in leadership will end the rampant controversy surrounding 
the confirmation process.184 
e.  The Estrada Nomination 
President Bush’s nomination of Miguel Estrada to the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals ignited a firestorm of controversy.  This controversy, however, did not focus 
on qualifications—Mr. Estrada received a unanimous “Well Qualified” rating from 
the American Bar Association.185  Many Senate Democrats would likely agree that 
                                                                
179See, e.g., Editorial, Judging Michael McConnell, supra note 5 (“Mr. McConnell has not 
merely expressed abstract reservations about the Roe v. Wade ruling, but has also actively 
crusaded against it.”).   
180Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Vote No, But Allow Judicial Nominee to Advance, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at A28 [hereinafter Lewis, Democrats Vote No]. 
181See Thurmond’s Wish Granted by Senate; Protege Promoted to Federal Court Despite 
Accusations, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 21, 2002, at A4; Washington in Brief, WASH. POST, Nov. 
19, 2002, at A10. 
182See Lewis, Democrats Vote No, supra note 180 (“The Shedd nomination was, still, a 
tribute of sorts to Mr. Thurmond.”). 
183Amy Goldstein & Charles Lane, GOP Eyes Quick Approvals; Judicial Nominees Focus 
of Plans, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2002, at A27 (“Warning that the ideological balance of the 
judiciary was at stake, [Senate Democrats] predicted that the GOP’s intentions could lead to a 
new form of judicial battle, gravitating from debates in the Judiciary Committee to filibusters 
and other tactics on the Senate floor.”).  Senate Democrats have begun to fulfill this promise 
by filibustering the Estrada nomination. 
184See id. 
185Some Senate Democrats, however, claimed that Mr. Estrada lacked judicial experience.  
This claim was somewhat debatable, considering that Mr. Estrada served as a law clerk on the 
Second Circuit and on the United States Supreme Court, worked in the Appellate Division of 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, and served for five years in 
the Office of Solicitor-General.  Surely these experiences are at least related to the judicial 
process.  Additionally, the American Bar Association deemed Mr. Estrada “Well Qualified” 
by a unanimous margin.  Even assuming this claim to be true, more than a few Circuit Judges 
and Justices were confirmed without having previously served in the judiciary, including, 
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Mr. Estrada possesses quite impressive credentials.  However, some argued that 
insufficient information exists to determine Mr. Estrada’s views on contested legal 
issues.186  Specifically, they claim that Mr. Estrada refused to answer questions 
regarding his judicial philosophy.187  Because of this alleged lack of information, 
Senate Democrats filibustered the Estrada nomination, refusing to bring the 
nomination up for a vote until they received more information concerning Mr. 
Estrada’s views.188 
Senate Democrats made rather odd arguments against confirming Mr. Estrada.189  
First, they argued that no one can determine Mr. Estrada’s views on contested legal 
issues or his judicial philosophy.190  Second, they argued that these views are outside 
the mainstream.191  Put simply, Senate Democrats simultaneously knew too much yet 
not enough about Mr. Estrada.192  The lack of logic in these arguments is quite 
apparent.193  Worse yet, Mr. Estrada’s opponents claimed, rather offensively, that Mr. 
Estrada “is not a real Hispanic, . . . [but] was nominated only because he is 
Hispanic.”194 
Even if one ignores the rather desperate arguments advanced against 
confirmation,195 the precedent set is quite troubling.196  Senate Democrats have 
                                                          
among others, Judges David Tatel, Harry Edwards, and Justices Earl Warren, Byron White, 
Lewis Powell, and William Rehnquist. 
186See Lewis, Bush Judicial Choice Imperiled, supra note 126.  Specifically, Senate 
Democrats demanded that the Bush Administration release memoranda written by Mr. Estrada 
during his tenure in the Office of Solicitor-General.  That demand, however, has been opposed 
by every living Solicitor-General, in a letter written to Senator Leahy.  The letter can be found 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/solicitorsletters.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2003).  If all seven living 
Solicitor-Generals can agree on a contested topic, that opinion is certainly worth listening to.  
187See Lewis, Bush Judicial Choice Imperiled, supra note 126. 
188See id. 
189See supra note 126. 
190See Lewis, Bush Judicial Choice Imperiled, supra note 126. 
191See Newfield, supra note 126. 
192See supra notes 126, 190-91. 
193See Editorial, Filibustering Judges, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2003, at A22 (arguing that 
Senate Democrats should not filibuster the Estrada nomination); see also supra note 125. 
194Editorial, Just Vote, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2003, at A24.   
195Ignoring the logical flaws in the arguments against confirming Mr. Estrada is quite a 
daunting task.  See id. (“The arguments against Mr. Estrada’s confirmation range from the 
unpersuasive to the offensive.”).  Another argument against confirmation is that Mr. Estrada 
has represented clients who have unfairly sought to implement anti-loitering ordinances.  
Charles Lane, Nominee for Court Faces Two Battles; Senate Panel to Focus on Ideology, 
Immigrant Past, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2002, at A1 [hereinafter Lane, Nominee].  
Representation of a client, however, does not imply endorsement of that client’s position by a 
lawyer.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (1983).   
196See Gerhardt, Confirmation Mystery, supra note 8, at 421-22 (“[T]he Senate has never 
rejected anyone for saying too little in a confirmation hearing and, thus, the most serious part 
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already stated that they will vote against any nominee holding a judicial philosophy 
with which they disagree.197  In the event that no incriminating information exists (or 
the nominee hasn’t provided his or her own noose), Senate Democrats will refuse to 
vote on that nomination.198  Consequently, the principle established by the Estrada 
nomination is this: the failure by Senate Democrats to assemble a legitimate case 
against a nominee is itself grounds to vote against that nominee.199  The actions taken 
by Senate Democrats are troubling on a scale far larger than the immediate 
consequences for Mr. Estrada and the D.C. Circuit.200  These actions represent a 
wholesale escalation of the confirmation process.201   
Neither political party has clean hands in the confirmation process.202  Senators of 
both parties have used any means necessary to defeat nominees when it suited their 
respective purposes.203  Along the way, Senators from both parties have grasped at 
any legal principle or fact—whatever its relationship to reality may be—to defeat a 
nomination.204  Undoubtedly, Senate Democrats filibustered Mr. Estrada’s 
nomination as payback for the sins committed by Senate Republicans during 
President Clinton’s two terms in office.205  This sort of “They Started It” argument206 
                                                          
of the threat to judicial independence—the coercion of a vote—has never been realized.”  
(footnote omitted)).   
197See, e.g., Schumer, supra note 18. 
198It is highly doubtful that Senate Democrats would have given Mr. Estrada any credit for 
revealing his views on contested legal issues or his judicial philosophy.  For example, 
assuming that Mr. Estrada would have said that Roe was wrongly decided, Senate Democrats 
more than likely would have used this information to characterize Mr. Estrada as “outside the 
mainstream.”  Additionally, Senate Democrats would likely have argued that a view on a 
disputed issue such as Roe created a conflict of interest that would have prevented Mr. Estrada 
from hearing cases involving abortion.  See infra note 598 and accompanying text.  One can 
only wonder why, as Senate Democrats claimed, there was no information regarding Mr. 
Estrada, considering that a year and a half transpired before Mr. Estrada even received a 
hearing.  Simply put, Senate Democrats succeeded in getting Mr. Estrada to defeat his own 
nomination.  See supra note 126.  This approach was not different, in principle, from the 
actions of Senate Republicans during the Clinton years.  When Senate Republicans found no 
information that would defeat a nomination, some Senators simply refused to hold hearings on 
Clinton nominees.   
199Editorial, Filibustering Judges, supra note 193. 
200Id. (“[A] world in which filibusters serve as an active instrument of nomination politics 
is not one either party should want.”). 
201Id. (noting that the confirmation process is “a war that long ago got out of hand”). 
202See supra Part II.B. 
203See supra Part II.B. 
204See supra Part II.B. 
205E.J. Dionne, Jr., They Started It, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2003, at A27 [hereinafter 
Dionne, They Started It]. 
206For some, that argument seems to be the only argument that justifies rejecting Mr. 
Estrada’s nomination.  See id.  This argument can only lead to a continued escalation of the 
confirmation process. 
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only leads to further bloodshed and conflict, whatever the facts may be.  By seeking 
to defeat the Estrada nomination, Senate Democrats all but waived any right to 
object to future, obstructionist tactics by Senate Republicans.207  In effect, the 
confirmation process has achieved a full transformation to a system where 
Democrats vote against Republicans, and Republicans vote against Democrats.  
III.  WHY IDEOLOGICAL SCRUTINY MUST END 
A.  Ideological Scrutiny Violates Principles of Separation of Powers 
1.  A Concentration of Constitutional Powers in the Presidency 
One commentator thoughtfully argues that Senators must counteract the 
President’s ambition with their own ambitions.208  If the President takes ideology into 
account in selecting nominees, so too should Senators.209  An overly strong 
Presidential role undermines the “ambition-countering-ambition” principle.210  
Because “[t]he modern history is one of unprecedented presidential domination of 
the appointment process,”211 the Senate must counteract Presidential ambition.212 
                                                                
207Senate Democrats have also blatantly contradicted earlier statements, made during the 
Clinton years, that all nominees should receive a vote by the full Senate.  See, e.g., 145 CONG. 
REC. S11103 (1999) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“These nominees and their families deserve 
a decision by the Senate.”); 145 CONG. REC. S11098 (1999) (statement of Sen. Kohl) (“These 
nominees, who have put their lives on hold waiting for us to act, deserve an up or down 
vote.”); 144 CONG. REC. S11031 (1998) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (“Vote the person up or 
down.”); 144 CONG. REC. S6522 (1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“If we don't like somebody 
the President nominates, vote him or her down. But don’t hold them in this anonymous 
unconscionable limbo, because in doing that, the minority of Senators really shame all 
Senators.”); 143 CONG. REC. S10926 (1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“[I]t is the 
responsibility of the U.S. Senate to at least bring [nominations] to a vote.”); 143 CONG. REC. 
S9166 (1997) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“Let’s bring their nominations up, debate them if 
necessary, and vote them up or down.”). 
208Tushnet, supra note 32, at 50; see also Gerhardt, Selection as War, supra note 40, at 
394. 
209Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: In Search of 
Constitutional Roles and Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 556-58, 563 (1986); see 
also Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 619, 620 (2003) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Selection of Federal Judges] (“Every 
President in American history, to a greater or lesser extent, has chosen federal judges, in part, 
based on their ideology.  Likewise, since the earliest days of the nation, the United States 
Senate also has looked to ideology in the confirmation process.  This is exactly how it should 
be.”). 
210Tushnet, supra note 32, at 79. 
211Simson, Supreme Unfitness, supra note 14, at 647-48. 
212Id.; see also Tushnet, supra note 32, at 66 n.61.  Were the President to nominate 
someone for a judgeship solely because of ideology, the Senate should subject that nominee to 
an “ideologically-based confirmation.”  Lively, supra note 209, at 565-67.  This concept of 
procedural justice will, in theory, prevent Court-packing.  See id. at 567.   
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While certainly well reasoned, this view of the confirmation process ignores the 
fact that the confirmation process assigns more power to the President.213  Power 
may be separated in the confirmation process, but it is not an even separation by any 
means.214  Once the President receives 270 electoral votes and is sworn in, the 
President alone has the constitutional power to nominate.215  Evaluation of a 
nominee’s judicial philosophy must end because the Senate’s power is reactive, not 
proactive.216  The Senate cannot put forth a nomination; it can only reject a 
nomination.217  If the Senate rejects a nomination, the President can nominate an 
individual sharing the ideology of the rejected nominee.218  The President, not the 
Senate, has the lion’s share of the power.219  The final act of a judicial nomination, as 
Marbury v. Madison220 tells us, is a Presidential signature of the nominee’s 
commission.  While a separation of powers exists, so too does a concentration of 
powers—in the Presidency.221 
The President has the power to nominate; thus, it is hardly unreasonable to argue 
that the President is the actor who can act with ambition.222  This ambition is born of 
and justified by an electoral and constitutional victory.223  Presidential candidates are 
                                                                
213See Gerhardt, Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 42, at 532.  
214See id. 
215See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
216William G. Ross, The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court 
Appointment Process, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 633, 647-48 (1987).  Though Professor Ross 
does believe that ideology should be part of the Senate’s consideration, id. at 660-61, he does 
note that initial deference to the President’s nominee is “a practical necessity as well as a 
constitutional command.”  Id. at 681.  In short, the Senate may not substitute its own nominee 
for the President’s judgment.  Id. 
217Id.; see also Lively, supra note 209, at 551; THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 54, at 
425 (Alexander Hamilton) (“But his nomination may be overruled; this it certainly may, yet it 
only can be make place for another nomination by himself.”). 
218See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 54, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The Senate 
could not be tempted by the preference they might feel to another to reject the one proposed; 
because they could not assure themselves that the person they might wish would be brought 
forward by a second or by any subsequent nomination.”  (emphasis added)).  
219See Gerhardt, Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 42, at 532. 
2205 U.S. 137, 155 (1803).  
221Gerhardt, Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 42, at 532 (“[T]he constitutional 
structure grants the president the balance of power in the federal appointments process. . . .”).   
222See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 54, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (“He 
will, on this account, feel himself under stronger obligations, and more interested to 
investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled, and to prefer with 
impartiality the persons who may have the fairest pretensions to them.”). 
223See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 646-47 (“Thus, the President appears to be 
under a constitutional obligation to nominate an individual who he believes will interpret the 
Constitution in a manner that generally accords with his view of lawful construction.”  
(footnote omitted)). 
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fully entitled to set goals for those whom they would appoint to the federal bench.224  
Whether these goals are achieved depends on whether or not the public votes for that 
candidate.225  Once elected, a President has a constitutional duty to nominate Judges 
or Justices of his or her ideological persuasion.226  A failure to do so would abrogate 
the President’s constitutional responsibilities.227   
2.  Mandating a Political Mandate 
Some commentators claim that a President must have a political mandate to 
nominate judges sharing his judicial philosophy.228  Thus, they argue that President 
Bush lacks a mandate to nominate conservative judges.229  Federal judges, however, 
have never been selected based on electoral returns.230  No Senate Republicans told 
                                                                
224See id. at 647-48.  Debates regarding judicial philosophies have occurred in every 
Presidential election since 1980.  See infra notes 236-41 and accompanying text. 
225See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 648 (noting that presidential candidates make 
“a pact with the people concerning the exercise of one of their fundamental presidential 
responsibilities” when they pledge to nominate judges of a particular judicial philosophy). 
226See id. at 647 n.59 (“The early Presidents all nominated candidates who the Presidents 
believed reflected their views of proper constitutional construction.”).  
227Id. at 647 (“A President who . . . agreed with the Senate in advance to nominate a jurist 
whose constitutional views differed substantially from his would abrogate this most solemn 
oath.”). 
228See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 
87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1107 (2001) [hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional Revolution] 
(“As we have argued, a party’s authority to stock the federal courts with its ideological allies 
stems from its repeated victories at the polls.”). 
229Professors Balkin and Levinson have this to say concerning President Bush's mandate 
and legitimacy: 
He may occupy the White House by the grace of his brother the Governor of Florida, 
Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris, and five Justices of the Supreme Court.  
But he should not have the right to appoint life-tenured judges who further the 
constitutional revolution unless he won a mandate from We the People.  He won no 
such mandate.  Indeed, more people opposed his candidacy than favored it, and his 
victory in the electoral college is equally dubious given the disenfranchisement of 
thousands of African-American voters and the Supreme Court’s hijacking of the 
national political process.  That is why Bush v. Gore matters. George W. Bush is 
assuming a legitimate power to reshape the Constitution through judicial appointments 
that he simply does not possess. It is the obligation of the Democratic opposition in the 
Senate to resist his attempts.     
Id. at 1106-07. 
230See Statement by C. Boyden Gray, in Senate Committee Hearings on the Judicial 
Nomination Process, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 429, 438 (2002) (“After all, it's not uncommon for the 
White House and the Senate to be in the hands of different political parties, and we’ve never 
apportioned judicial seats on the breakdown of the vote in the last election.”).  One could 
argue that President Reagan possessed a strong political mandate when he won re-election and 
forty-nine states in the Electoral College in 1984.  Professors Balkin and Levinson 
acknowledge President Reagan’s “triumphant reelection.”  Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional 
Revolution, supra note 228, at 1069.  However, they argue that President Reagan’s mandate 
ended following the Democratic takeover of the Senate in 1986.  See id. at 1070.  In the end, 
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President Truman that he lacked a mandate to nominate judges of a particular 
ideological bent because he barely beat Dewey in 1948.231  Similarly, no Washington 
insiders informed President Kennedy that he lacked a mandate to nominate judges 
after he narrowly beat President Nixon in 1960.232  The only mandate required to 
nominate an individual is 270 electoral votes.233  As recent history has demonstrated, 
these 270 electoral votes can come from a majority, a minority, or a plurality of the 
popular vote.234   
Many Presidential candidates have made their views well known concerning 
those whom they would nominate to the federal judiciary.235  This was true in 
1980,236 1984,237 1988,238 1992,239 1996,240 and 2000.241 Once that particular, 
                                                          
political mandates begin or end when members of the opposing political party want them to 
begin or end.  One could either argue that President Clinton’s “semi-triumphant” re-election 
over Senator Robert Dole gave President Clinton greater authority to nominate judges.  Or, on 
the other hand, one could argue that President Clinton’s failure to garner a majority of the 
popular vote proved that he lacked a mandate to nominate judges.   
231Cf. Statement by C. Boyden Gray, in Senate Committee Hearings on the Judicial 
Nomination Process, supra note 230, at 438. 
232Cf. id. 
233See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
234John O. McGinnis, The Law of Presidential Elections: Issues in the Wake of Florida 
2000: Popular Sovereignty and the Electoral College, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 995, 996 (2001) 
[hereinafter McGinnis, Law of Presidential Elections] (“Paying attention to the popular vote in 
this context is like suggesting we should pay attention to the total number of runs a team got in 
the World Series rather than the number of games won.”  (footnote omitted)).   
235See, e.g., Fred Barbash, Election Could Also Determine Future Course of Supreme 
Court, WASH. POST, July 15, 1984, at A3 (“One close Mondale aide said that in making 
[Supreme Court] appointments he would be conscious of bringing the current court back 
toward ‘the center’ and would look for ‘centrists’ as justices.”). 
236See Reagan: Look at “Philosophy” for High Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1980, at A3 
(“Republican presidential nominee Ronald Reagan says he would choose Supreme Court 
justices on the basis of ‘the whole broad philosophy’ they would bring to the bench—and 
would not rule out jurists who support abortion.”).  
237See Editorial, Court Bashing, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1984, at A14 (“The wide 
differences between Mr. Mondale and Mr. Reagan on how justices should settle these and 
other issues provide the basis for a legitimate political debate.”). 
238Cf. George Will, A Case for George Bush, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1988, at C7 [hereinafter 
Will, A Case] (“A Bush-directed change in the court’s composition might result in reversal of 
the 1973 abortion ruling, but that might not result in much change in abortion policy. It would 
ignite 50 arguments by restoring to states the right to regulate abortion.”). 
239See Editorial, Gov. Clinton’s Litmus Test, WASH. POST, July 9, 1992, at A22 (“Now 
Gov. Bill Clinton has said that he will apply an abortion litmus test (the term is one he 
accepts) in nominating Supreme Court justices. . . .  [H]is appointments to the Supreme Court 
‘will be strong supporters of Roe v. Wade.’”). 
240See Nat Hentoff, An ‘F’ For Both of Them, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1996, at A17 
(“Moreover, Bob Dole has pledged that if he is elected, ‘only conservative judges need apply.’  
But Bill Clinton . . . has said that he would appoint only Supreme Court judges who are pro-
choice, and he has kept his word.”). 
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constitutional mandate is received, a President has the power to nominate judges.242  
The power to nominate rests inherently in the President’s constitutional powers; it is 
affected neither by polls nor by disputes over a political mandate.243   
Judicial nominations have rarely, if ever, been an issue in Senate campaigns.244  
Each Senator wins elections based predominately on local or regional issues.245  Can 
one seriously claim that one Senator has a national mandate to thwart or reject the 
President’s nominees?  Probably not.  Arguments in favor of an assertive Senate role 
fail of their own accord.  Additionally, the President can easily determine which 
individuals to nominate.246  A President “institutionally is better suited than the 
Senate to picking one candidate out of a list of many.”247   
3.  Institutionalized Presidential Discretion 
Those who advocate ideological scrutiny have expressed profound shock and 
surprise at past Supreme Court nominees.248  The best example of this, as one might 
imagine, is the Bork nomination.249  Some commentators have proposed that the 
President and the Senate be equal partners in the confirmation process so the 
                                                          
241See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., Bush Falls Short, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2000, at A35 
[hereinafter Dionne, Bush Falls Short] (“Gore said he would favor Supreme Court justices 
who support abortion rights. Bush said he’d appoint ‘strict constructionists,’ which every 
right-to-lifer knows means someone like conservative Antonin Scalia.”) 
242See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
243This term “mandate” traces its lineage to the political process.  Thus, its application to 
the confirmation process is quite questionable.  Whether a President receives 270 or 400 
electoral votes, that President retains the powers vested in him or her according to the 
Constitution of the United States.  President Clinton received less than 50% of the popular 
vote in 1992 and 1996.  President Kennedy barely won the popular vote in 1960; President 
Truman narrowly beat Thomas Dewey in 1948.  No claims that a mandate was lacking were 
made when these Presidents nominated Justices.  This is entirely unsurprising—arguments in 
favor of ideological scrutiny lack historical support.   
244But see U.S. Senate; Cornyn v. Kirk: More than U.S. Senate Seat at Stake Here, 
HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 27, 2002, at 2 (“Cornyn has repeatedly urged Senate confirmation of 
all of Bush’s nominations to federal judgeships. Kirk has been more selective. Notably, Kirk 
opposed confirmation of Texas Supreme Court Justice Priscilla Owen’s appointment to the 5th 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.”). 
245See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 54, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that 
the President is institutionally better suited than the Senate to nominate individuals). 
246Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. Advice and Consent: The Role of the United States 
Senate in the Judicial Selection Process, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 200, 204-05 (1987). 
247Yvette M. Barksdale, Advise and Consent, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1399, 1418 (1997). 
248
 Gary J. Simson, Mired in the Confirmation Mess, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1035, 1051-52 
(1995) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994)) [hereinafter Simson, Mired in the Confirmation Mess].   
249Id. at 1051 (“By any measure, President Reagan’s nomination of Bork was a solid right 
to the jaw of liberals and even centrists in the Senate.”  (emphasis added)). 
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President won’t nominate someone as “provocative” as Judge Bork.250  A President, 
however, can nominate as “provocative” a nominee as he or she wants.251  A 
President has a constitutional duty to consider ideology when selecting nominees.252  
Moreover, “[a] President is entitled to reflect his judicial and political philosophy in 
his [or her] judicial nominations.”253  Since time immemorial, Presidential nominees 
and Presidents have promised to achieve various goals on the federal judiciary.254   
Even if a Senator disagrees with the President’s choice for a judgeship, mere 
disagreement with a nominee's ideology should not invalidate the President's 
choice.255  Admittedly, the Constitution does not delineate the criteria that Senators 
should utilize to examine judicial nominees.256  History and logic, however, caution 
against ideological scrutiny.257   
4.  Pre-appointment Senate Prerogatives 
The Constitution assigns no mandatory preappointment role to the Senate.258  
Three Supreme Court Justices agree with this argument.259  Additionally, one of the 
                                                                
250Id. at 1052.  Judge Bork (once) received a glowing recommendation from the New York 
Times.  See Editorial, Echoes of Watergate, supra note 77 (“Mr. Bork, moreover, is a legal 
scholar of distinction and principle.”).  Interestingly, that editorial supported Judge Bork’s 
nomination to the D.C. Circuit in spite of disagreement with his views.  See id. (“One may 
differ heatedly with him on specific issues like abortion, but those are differences of 
philosophy, not principle.  Differences of philosophy are what the 1980 election was about; 
Robert Bork is, given President Reagan’s philosophy, a natural choice for an important 
judicial vacancy.”). 
251See, e.g., Fein, supra note 25, at 672. 
252Cf. Grover Rees III, Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hearings: 
Excluding the Constitution, 17 GA. L. REV. 913, 934-36 (1983).  
253Mathias, supra note 246, at 204-05. 
254See supra notes 236-41 and accompanying text.  
255Mathias, supra note 246, at 204-05.  
256Wolfe, supra note 32, at 364-65. 
257As one commentator has noted, the mere claim that “advice and consent” means 
whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in 
history allows unending political shenanigans.  Kline, supra note 18, at 278 n.97.  Senators 
who have not cared about a nominee’s judicial philosophy in years (because their party 
controlled the White House) will suddenly parse every sentence of a district court opinion 
soon after the White House switches parties.  Likewise, Senators who have insisted on 
thorough, belabored interrogations of judicial nominees will quickly argue the benefits of 
Presidential discretion.     
258McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 635.  The President could, of course, consult with 
Senators as he wishes.  See id. 
259Id. at 639 n.23 (citing Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 483 
(1989) (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
text gives “[n]o role whatsoever . . . to the Senate or to Congress as a whole in the process of 
choosing the person who will be nominated for appointment”)); see also Presser, supra note 3, 
at 261 n.65. 
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Court’s first cases states the same principle.260  Even those who favor an assertive 
Senate role admit this.261  Any role the Senate might have is conditioned on the 
President’s discretion.262  Put another way, a President might find it politically 
advisable to float “trial balloons” concerning potential Justices.263  On the other hand 
the President might informally invite Senators to the Oval Office to discuss their 
recommendations for judges.264  These two techniques would likely be politically 
prudent, but neither technique is constitutionally required.265  Historical evidence 
bears this out.266  Advice may be heeded, ignored, valued, or downplayed.267  
Determining whether to “advise and consent” to a nomination is, however, 
mandatory in the confirmation process.268  The absence of a pre-nomination role for 
the Senate does not preclude an aggressive, post-nomination Senate role.269  An 
active pre-nomination role for the Senate, however, is not constitutionally prudent. 
5.  Burdening a Judicial Nominee with the Burden of Proof 
Some commentators argue that a Supreme Court or Circuit Court nominee bears 
the burden of proof in a confirmation hearing.270  One commentator even advocates 
                                                                
260McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 639 (“[The nomination] is the sole act of the 
President. . . .”  (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 155 (1803)).  
261Simson, Supreme Unfitness, supra note 14, at 662.  But see Roger J. Miner, Advice and 
Consent in Theory and Practice, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1075, 1078 (1992) (“It seems clear to me 
that the Senate cannot fulfill the advice requirement unless it has input in the nomination 
itself.”). 
262
 See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 646 (“To be sure, some Presidents have 
consulted with key Senators and a few with the Senate leadership, but they have done so out of 
comity or political prudence and never with a declaration of constitutional obligation.”  
(emphasis added)).   
263President Clinton used this technique skillfully in nominating Justices Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer to the Supreme Court.  Kline, supra note 18, at 247-48.   
264See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 646. 
265Presser, supra note 3, at 261 n.65.  But see Miner, supra note 261, at 1078. 
266Moreover, as one commentator has noted, arguments to the contrary are based on errors 
and omissions in the historical record.  See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 634-38.  Some 
errors are arguably harmless ones.  See Friedman, Tribal Myths, supra note 53, at 1285 (noting 
that Chief Justice John Marshall was nominated only after Oliver Ellsworth resigned from the 
Supreme Court, not immediately after the Senate rejected John Rutledge’s nomination, as 
Professor Tribe claimed).  Other errors, however, are more serious.  See id. at 1291-1312. 
267Cf. McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 646 (“Not one subsequent President has 
recognized a constitutional role for senatorial advice prior to nomination.”); see also supra 
Part II.A (discussing the structure of the Appointments Clause). 
268James E. Gauch, Comment, The Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme Court 
Appointments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 339-40 (1989). 
269Id. at 340; see also Mathias, supra note 246, at 202. 
270Simson, Mired in the Confirmation Mess, supra note 248, at 1038.  Other commentators 
advocating ideological scrutiny argue that a nominee should have the burden of proof in a 
confirmation hearing.  Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, supra note 8, at 1519.   
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increasing the votes needed for approval to 2/3 in both the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and the Senate floor.271  Other commentators have proposed all manner of 
interrogations concerning a nominee’s commitment to various causes or issues.272  
As a matter of textual interpretation, this argument is permissible.273  History and 
practice, however, defeat this argument.274   
The Framers believed that the Senate should reject a nomination only for 
compelling reasons.275  To the extent that any burden existed, the burden rested with 
the President to select individuals of great character, intellect, and temperament.276  
Few individuals, the Framers thought, would have the capacity to be judges.277  Thus, 
an individual nominated to be a judge enjoys a presumption in favor of 
confirmation.278  Nowhere in any historical source does any indication exist that a 
nominee’s judicial philosophy is a relevant factor.279   
Recent history cautions against having a judicial nominee bear the burden of 
proof.280  Imposing a burden of proof on the nominee guarantees that the Senate will 
reject meritorious nominees.  The confirmation process, however, is designed to 
“screen out unfit characters.”281 Additionally, the concept of “burden of proof” is far 
too easy for a Senator not in the President’s party to manipulate for his or her 
political purposes.282   
The argument that a nominee has the burden of proof begs the question of what 
the nominee must prove.  What form or variety of “innocence” has a 
                                                                
271Simson, Mired in the Confirmation Mess, supra note 248, at 1045. 
272See, e.g., Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Nomination and Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices: 
Some Personal Observations, 45 ME. L. REV. 7, 11 (1993) [hereinafter Rauh, Jr., Some 
Personal Observations] (proposing that Senators refuse to confirm anyone to the Supreme 
Court whom they believe “has failed during his (or her) lifetime to show by word or deed 
substantial dedication to the Bill of Rights”  (quoting Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., An Unabashed 
Liberal Looks at a Half-Century of the Supreme Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 213, 248 (1990))). 
273Ross, supra note 216, at 635 (“The Constitution says nothing about the criteria upon 
which the Senate may base its decision.  Technically, therefore, the Senate may reject a 
nominee for any reason.”).   
274McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 636.  As one commentator notes, the Framers 
thought that nominees would have to pass a stringent test just to be nominated.  Id. at 636 
n.13.   
275Presser, supra note 3, at 264. 
276McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 653-54. 
277Presser, supra note 3, at 262.   
278Gerhardt, Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 42, at 477 nn.20-21, 479.   
279Were that the case, one would expect that the confirmation process has a low success 
rate for nominations.  The structure governing judicial confirmations, however, “is set up to 
ensure a high presidential success rate.”  Gerhardt, Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 
42, at 480.  
280See supra Part II.B. 
281Fein, supra note 25, at 687. 
282Cf. McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 636. 
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nominee/defendant been required to prove over the past two years?  Allegiance to a 
particular judicial philosophy?283  Support of one particular Supreme Court case?284  
Criticism of another Supreme Court case?285  A pledge to never criticize Roe v. 
Wade?286  All (or at least some) of the above?287  The increased politicalization of the 
confirmation process over the past fifteen years should make anyone think twice 
before requiring that a nominee carry the burden of proof.288  When one political 
party imposes a particularly strict burden of proof, the other political party can easily 
up the ante.  Any reforms placing the burden of proof on a nominee would stall the 
confirmation process completely. 
B.  Ideological Scrutiny Lacks Historical Support 
1.  The Past 
Significant historical evidence proves that the Framers did not intend Senators to 
examine a nominee’s judicial philosophy as a criterion for confirmation.289  Only 
compelling reasons justify rejection of a nomination, and a nominee’s ideology is not 
one of those reasons.290  Thus, a nominee enjoys a presumption in favor of 
confirmation.291  Further, the Framers contemplated that the Senate would bear a 
political burden to reject a nomination.292  Many commentators have argued that 
claims of an active Senate consideration of ideology since the founding of the 
Republic are somewhat spurious.293  Moreover, claims that history supports a 
thorough Senate review of ideology are marred by quite a few misrepresentations, 
omissions, and errors.294 
                                                                
283Unless that judicial philosophy is originalism.  See infra notes 460-68 and 
accompanying text. 
284Only if that case is Roe.  See infra notes 428-34 and accompanying text. 
285Unless that case is Roe.  See supra note 5.  
286Senate Democrats all but formalized this requirement over the past two years.  See 
supra Part II.B.4.c (discussing the Owen nomination). 
287Some of the above.  See supra notes 283-86 and accompanying text. 
288See supra Part II.B. 
289See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 54, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It would be 
an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to 
prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from 
personal attachment, or from a view to popularity.” (emphasis added)).  
290See id. (Alexander Hamilton) (“[I]t is not likely that their sanction would often be 
refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for the refusal.”  (emphasis added)). 
291See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 653 (noting that the Appointments Clause 
“makes it difficult for the Senate to reject a nominee unless it has compelling reasons”). 
292See id. 
293See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
294See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 636-38. 
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2.  The Recent Past 
Those who argue for ideological scrutiny tacitly admit this lack of historical 
support by claiming that recent history justifies assertive ideological scrutiny.295  
Forced to search for modern precedent, these commentators argue that recent 
political history mandates that the Senate independently examine each nominee’s 
judicial philosophy.296  Because Republican Presidents placed eleven consecutive 
nominees on the Supreme Court, the argument goes, ideological scrutiny is necessary 
to achieve ideological balance on the Court.297  Additionally, in an era of sharply 
divided government, the country has not made up its mind; thus, this profound 
division necessitates compromise between the President and the Senate.298 
3.  The Future 
Applying the “divided government” theory will prove quite difficult.299  The 
“divided government” theory rests entirely upon electoral returns.300  When President 
Clinton won in 1992, Professors Strauss and Sunstein argued that the entire basis for 
ideological scrutiny had disappeared.301  The reason: A Democrat occupied the Oval 
Office.302  This theory does not ensure consistent application, and Professors Strauss 
and Sunstein admit as much.303  When one considers the relationship between the 
popular vote and the Electoral College, applying this newfound theory becomes even 
more interesting.  Determining the scope of a political mandate is, rightfully, a 
subject of great debate.  Federal judges, however, are not elected, and in theory are 
not subject to the winds of political change.  The “divided government” theory lacks 
historical support; it simply cannot stand. 
                                                                
295The timing of proposals put forth by proponents of ideological scrutiny is quite 
interesting.  Frequently, these proposals correspond with the date of Presidential elections.  
See Friedman, Tribal Myths, supra note 53, at 1284 (“Given what Tribe calls the ‘greying’ of 
the present Court, and the consequent possibility that President Reagan will appoint several 
new justices, this is a most timely thesis.”  (footnote omitted)). 
296Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, supra note 8, at 1504-05. 
297Id. 
298Id. at 1505. 
299One could argue that the unprecedented Republican takeover of the Senate in the 2002 
Midterm Elections proves, or at least indicates, that the country is less divided than it was in 
2000.  It would seem that Professors Strauss and Sunstein would agree that this provides 
greater leeway for President Bush to nominate judges.  See Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation 
Process, supra note 8, at 1503 n.57.  Yet Professors Strauss and Sunstein ensure uncertainty in 
applying their own theory, stating: “Any relevant mandate is therefore quite muddled.”  Id. at 
1505. 
300See id. (“But in the last twenty-five years the nation has not made up its mind.  It has 
elected mostly Republican Presidents, but mostly Democratic Senates.”).   
301Strauss & Sunstein, A Response, supra note 6, at 669 n.4. 
302Id.  
303See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 651 (“It is unclear how seriously Professors 
Strauss and Sunstein take their own arguments.”). 
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Application of the “divided government” theory fails because control of the 
Senate could change every two years.304  It’s doubtful that Senator Kennedy would 
want Democratic nominees subjected to the kind of intense ideological scrutiny that 
many of President Bush’s nominees endured.  Indeed, Senator Kennedy has 
protested against past abuses in the confirmation process.305  Yet if the current 
system continues and a Democrat wins the Presidency in 2004, Senator Kennedy 
would bemoan the state of the confirmation process when Senate Republicans target 
Democratic nominees with judicial philosophies they disagree.306  Senate 
Republicans, of course, would have less to say.307 
C.  Continued Ideological Scrutiny Will Ensure an Endless Cycle of Political 
Retribution 
The third reason why ideological scrutiny must end is that any continuation of 
this practice will ensure endless political retribution.  The confirmation process is 
overly politicized.308  As previously stated, the Bork nomination quickly became a 
rallying cry for Senate Republicans.309  Senate Republicans then increased the 
ideological scrutiny on President Clinton’s nominees, publicly lambasting Senate 
Democrats for their treatment of Judge Bork.310  Senate Democrats then increased the 
ideological scrutiny on President Bush’s judicial nominees, noting that many of 
President Clinton’s nominees never received hearings.311 
It may be fair for a Senator whose party controls the Senate (but not the White 
House) to ask why he or she should forego ideological scrutiny.  In today’s political 
environment, it is uncertain whether Senators on the other side of the aisle would 
recognize those good deeds.  Mutual restraint by both political parties, however, will 
benefit both political parties.  Any slight—imaginary, real or perceived—committed 
against a President’s nominee by the other political party will be remembered when 
that President’s party controls the Senate.  Both Republicans and Democrats have 
responded in kind, and in varying degrees, to poor treatment of nominees by the 
other party.312  By doing so, Senate Republicans and Democrats have increased the 
degree of strife and bitterness in American politics.   
                                                                
304See Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, supra note 8, at 1503 n.57 (noting that 
many factors could change application of their theory). 
305See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S9186 (1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
306This was Senator Kennedy’s stance during the Clinton years.  See supra note 94. 
307Instead, Senate Republicans would insist on increased ideological scrutiny.  See supra 
Part II.B.3 (discussing judicial nominations during the Clinton years).  
308See Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, supra note 8, at 1494 (“The current 
process is too ideological and partisan.”). 
309See supra Part II.B.3 and accompanying text (discussing judicial nominations during 
the Clinton years). 
310See Kline, supra note 18, at 323-43. 
311See 148 CONG. REC. S8510-02 (2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
312See Novak, supra note 132. 
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Ideology is far too easy a subterfuge for Senators of either political party to 
utilize to defeat disfavored judicial nominees.313  Most commentators who have 
advocated ideological scrutiny have argued that “[t]he potential for abuse . . . does 
not support a conclusion that the Senate must refrain from a comprehensive 
assessment of a nominee’s qualifications or limit its inquiry to policy-neutral 
factors.”314  The potential for abuse, however, has been realized.  This development 
has threatened judicial independence.315  As Republicans and Democrats add names 
to the list of vanquished nominees, neither political party has recognized that each 
party has committed the same sins.316 
In its current form, the confirmation process benefits neither Democrats nor 
Republicans.317  The proposals introduced to improve the confirmation process—
evaluating a nominee’s ideology,318 placing the burden of proof on a nominee,319 and 
interrogating the nominee concerning hypothetical questions of constitutional 
law320—have been introduced based on political frustrations.  Put more bluntly, the 
party that loses the Presidency often seeks to resume that particular battle in 
Congress.321  When President Clinton won the White House, but won only a plurality 
                                                                
313See Lee Renzin, Note, Advice, Consent, and Senate Inaction—Is Judicial Resolution 
Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1739, 1739 n.4, 1746 (1998). 
314Lively, supra note 209, at 576.   
315See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Role of Ideology in Confirming Federal Court Judges, 15 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 127, 131 (2001) [hereinafter Rotunda, Role of Ideology]. 
316See Novak, supra note 132. 
317Many commentators advocating ideological scrutiny do so mainly out of anger about 
past sins committed during the confirmation process.  See Chemerinsky, Selection of Federal 
Judges, supra note 209, at 631 (“But now I feel outrage when I hear Republicans say that it is 
wrong for a Democratic-controlled Senate to look at ideology when that is exactly what 
Republicans did for the last six years of the Clinton presidency.  If I was too liberal for a 
Republican Senate, then nominees such as Miguel Estrada, Carolyn Kuhl, Michael 
McConnell, and Jeffrey Sutton should be regarded as too conservative by a Democratic 
Senate.”).  This sort of “They Started It” argument is equally simple and imprudent.  Cf. Elliot 
E. Slotnick, Federal Judicial Selection in the New Millenium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 587, 593 
(2003) (“I believe there are two alternative paths that could define the road ahead.  One is 
premised on the lessons we learned in our earliest Political Science classes—‘What goes 
around, comes around.’  The other, we learned from our mothers—‘Two wrongs don’t make a 
right.’”).  Professor Chemerinsky is a first-rate scholar who has contributed vast, profound 
insights to the study of constitutional law.  That his nomination was aborted in the face of 
Republican opposition is unfortunate and wrong.  Seeking retribution for past sins, however, 
only leads to further retribution—and, of course, cries for revenge.  Put more simply, the 
names of the victims change, but the song remains the same. 
318
 See Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, supra note 8, at 1510-14. 
319
 See Simson, Mired in the Confirmation Mess, supra note 248, at 1038. 
320See Schumer, supra note 18. 
321The most logical alternative would be for one to seek the election of a particular 
President.  See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 667; cf. Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional 
Revolution, supra note 228, at 1075-76 (“In short, there is nothing surprising about the 
transformation of constitutional law viewed in hindsight. . . .  Put another way, if you don’t 
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of the popular vote, Senate Republicans insisted upon greater power in selecting 
nominees.  When President Bush won the White House but lost the popular vote,322 
Democrats insisted upon increased ideological scrutiny.323  Political power grabs are 
nothing new in our nation’s capitol.324  The use of the Senate Judiciary Committee as 
a political battleground is a far more recent invention.325     
Not long ago, there existed a system that both Republicans and Democrats 
deplored when one party controlled the White House and the other party controlled 
Congress.  The Independent Counsel system, designed with the best of intentions, led 
to rather hellish results, including the impeachment of a President.  Senate 
Republicans found the law useful when a Democrat occupied the Oval Office; 
Senate Democrats, in turn, discovered a renewed zeal for investigations when a 
Republican occupied the Oval Office.  Over time, Presidents and administration 
officials of both parties suffered the consequences.  Eventually, Republicans and 
Democrats recognized the flaws in that particular law, and chose not to renew it.  
The reason: the political costs and the structural inequities of that law outweighed 
any benefits.  Developed after Watergate and the resignation of President Nixon, the 
Independent Counsel Statute326 died a natural death after the impeachment of 
President Clinton.327  
Ideological scrutiny has a similarly recent origin—the confirmation hearing of 
Robert Bork.328  Since then, the political and constitutional costs of ideological 
scrutiny have increased tremendously.  These costs far outweigh the “benefits” of 
utilizing ideology as a criterion.  Senator Charles Schumer stated that evaluating a 
                                                          
like what the Court is doing now, you (or your parents) shouldn’t have voted for Ronald 
Reagan.”); cf. Editorial, Echoes of Watergate, supra note 77 (“One may differ heatedly with 
him on specific issues like abortion, but those are differences of philosophy, not principle.  
Differences of philosophy are what the 1980 election was about; Robert Bork is, given 
President Reagan’s philosophy, a natural choice for an important judicial vacancy.”). 
322This fact is historically interesting and constitutionally irrelevant.  McGinnis, Law of 
Presidential Elections, supra note 234, at 996. 
323See Schumer, supra note 18 (“No one needs to be reminded that the president was 
elected by the narrowest of margins, while the Senate is closely split.  In such a time, the 
president and the Senate must collaborate in judicial appointments. . . .”). 
324See Kline, supra note 18, at 294 (“Senator Phil Gramm (R-Texas) drafted a proposal in 
1997 that would have allowed Republican Senators to veto nominees from their circuit.”). 
325So too is the practice of questioning judicial nominees at confirmation hearings.  
Rotunda, Role of Ideology, supra note 315, at 129 (“Senators have not normally asked such 
questions of judicial nominees. In fact, as discussed below, until 1955 traditionally judicial 
nominees did not appear at the confirmation hearing to answer any questions.”).  Even after 
nominees began appearing before the Senate, the scope of the questions remained quite 
limited.  See id. at 129-30. 
32628 U.S.C. §§ 591-94 (1994). 
327One commentator has a provocative proposal to reform the Independent Counsel 
system.  See Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 
2133, 2135-36 (1998) (proposing that the President nominate and the Senate confirm special 
counsels to investigate wrongdoing in the Executive Branch). 
328See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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nominee’s judicial philosophy would avoid the “gotcha politics” of past confirmation 
battles.329  If anything, recent ideological scrutiny has only led to “gotcha politics,”330 
as well as allegations against judicial nominees that lack merit.331   
The time has come for both Republicans and Democrats to acknowledge the 
inherent flaws in the current confirmation process, just as they did with the 
Independent Counsel statute, and reform the confirmation process.  Former White 
House Counsel Lloyd Cutler recognized the inherent dangers in continually having a 
Bork-style confirmation hearing.332  The reason: neither political party would want 
more “blood on the floor” after each confirmation hearing.333  President Clinton was 
                                                                
329See Schumer, supra note 18. 
330Id. 
331One charge that deserves special mention is the one made by Senate Democrats that Mr. 
Estrada accused a Supreme Court clerkship candidate of being “too liberal,” and subjected 
candidates to thorough ideological scrutiny.  See Newfield, supra note 126 (“Perhaps the most 
damaging evidence against Estrada comes from two lawyers he interviewed for Supreme 
Court clerkships.”).  For this evidence to be admissible, however, it would have to avoid 
application of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Both alleged conversations that Mr. Estrada had 
with these clerkship applicants qualify as hearsay.  See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’ is a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered 
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”); FED. R. EVID. 802.  It has been said 
many times that a confirmation hearing is a political process, not a legal process.  Even 
evaluated in the political realm, however, neither statement is especially damning.  One should 
be wary of the veracity of charges made by individuals who found Mr. Estrada’s conduct to be 
so offensive that they chose not to identify themselves.   
Additionally, it is difficult to argue that both clerkship candidates acted out of pure 
motives.  Justice Kennedy hired neither candidate; accordingly, both candidates are mad at 
Mr. Estrada.  See Newfield, supra note 126 (“Estrada was being obnoxious.”).  The main 
complaint of both clerkship candidates is that Mr. Estrada subjected them to thorough 
ideological scrutiny.  Id. (“[Mr. Estrada] asked me a lot of unfair, ideological questions, a lot 
about the death penalty, which I told him I thought was immoral. I felt I was being subjected 
to an ideological litmus test.”).  Even if one assumes, arguendo, that both encounters with Mr. 
Estrada did occur, these charges simply are not that remarkable.  Judges often (but not always) 
look for law clerks that share their judicial philosophies.  Once a law clerk starts working for a 
judge, that law clerk often prepares draft opinions consistent with his or her judge’s judicial 
philosophy.  These practices are not extraordinary.  See Alex Kozinski, Conduct Unbecoming, 
108 YALE L.J. 835, 868 (1999) (reviewing EDWARD P. LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE 
FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998)) 
[hereinafter Kozinski, Conduct Unbecoming] (“[S]ince when is it improper for a clerk to give 
advice that conforms to his Justice’s judicial philosophy and to prepare a draft ‘that might 
appeal to his boss?’  Most people think that is what law clerks are paid to do.”  (emphasis 
added) (footnotes omitted)).   
332Cutler, Limits of Advice and Consent, supra note 41, at 876.  Mr. Cutler also supported 
Judge Bork, which makes it difficult to claim that Judge Bork is “outside the mainstream.”  
See Lloyd N. Cutler, Judge Bork: Well Within the Mainstream, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1987, at 
A21 [hereinafter Cutler, Judge Bork]. 
333See Helen Dewar, Judge Kennedy Off to Smooth Start; Key Conservative Praises 
Nominee; Biden Calls Chances “Very Good,” WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1987, at A11 [hereinafter 
Dewar, Off to Smooth Start] (quoting Senator John McCain). 
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spared that fate when he nominated Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.334  If President 
Bush gets the chance to fill a Supreme Court vacancy, he probably will not have that 
luxury.335  If President Bush’s nominee endures a repeat of the Bork confirmation, 
the political rhetoric and invective will increase yet again.336  Ideological scrutiny 
benefits neither political party.  Ideological abstention, however, benefits both 
political parties.   
One may, of course, respond to this argument by asking, “So What?”337  With 
some exceptions, Americans have lived under a government with one political party 
in control of the Presidency and the other political party in control of Congress.338  
Accordingly, one can argue that ideological scrutiny is healthy because it prevents 
the President from exerting undue power and influence.339  Thus, one Senator’s vote 
against a nominee for purely political reasons is entirely permissible.340  One can 
aver that the Senate’s rejection of Robert Bork demonstrated the Senate’s refusal to 
allow President Reagan to pack the Court through “transformative appointments.”341 
The current maxim in American politics seems to be, if one dislikes the result of 
an election, one should “stay and fight” the results of that election.  Americans have 
seen the Supreme Court decide the outcome of one Presidential election, and there 
has been election litigation in New Jersey and elsewhere.342  This politicalization has 
infected the confirmation process.343  The confirmation process, however, has simply 
never served as a test of whether a President has a greater or lesser political 
mandate.344   
Nor is the confirmation process a proper venue on which to engage in political 
combat.  Continued ideological scrutiny will encourage members of each political 
                                                                
334Justices Ginsburg and Breyer were both confirmed quite easily.  Kline, supra note 18, at 
314 n.209. 
335See Gerhardt, Selection as War, supra note 40, at 393.  
336See id. 
337See Tushnet, supra note 32, at 50 (“[T]here is nothing . . . cynical in the view that . . . 
the constitutional scheme authorizes a member of Congress to act solely with reference to his 
or her concerns for reelection—that is, to be partisan in the narrowest possible sense in taking 
positions on matters of constitutional import.”).   
338See Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, supra note 8, at 1505 (“But in the last 
twenty-five years the nation has not made up its mind.  It has elected mostly Republican 
Presidents, but mostly Democratic Senates.”). 
339See Tushnet, supra note 32, at 79 (“[A] system that made it normatively impermissible 
for a senator to consider such predictions would tilt the balance of authority rather strongly in 
favor of the President. . . .”).   
340See id. at 81 (“[A]ll the Constitution really requires is that politics be given its ordinary 
range of operation, that ambition be set to counteract ambition.”). 
341Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, supra note 72, at 1164-67. 
342See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 
A.2d 1025 (N.J. 2002). 
343See supra Part II.B.4. 
344Cf. supra note 208. 
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party, if they dispute a President’s mandate, to take the political fight to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee hearing room.  This newfound development threatens the 
quality of the federal judiciary and the system of checks and balances.345  By treating 
control of the judiciary as the latest political war, Senators of both parties have 
ensured nothing except political casualties, the most prominent one being judicial 
independence.346 
Checks and balances already exist in the nomination process.347  There are good 
reasons for the Senate to reject a nomination.348  For example, ethical scandals have 
forced Presidents to withdraw quite a few nominations.349  Adding a nominee’s 
ideology to the criteria for Senate consideration, however, worsens the situation.  
The federal judiciary constitutes a separate, dynamic branch of government that is 
not fully dependent on the most recent political whims.350  If that were the case, 
constitutional law would be neither principled nor stable.351   
D.  Continued Ideological Scrutiny Will Worsen the Confirmation Process Even 
Further 
1.  Failed “National Referenda” 
In principle, Senate confirmation hearings have a normative function.352  The 
nominee appears before twenty Senators elected by the people, addresses concerns 
about his or her nomination, and discusses his or her views.353  Aided by research 
into the nominee’s background, Senators can engage in an open conversation with 
the nominee.354  In practice, however, Senate confirmation hearings have become far 
more political and contentious than originally envisioned.355  The original purpose 
behind confirmation hearings was to screen out unfit characters, not to hold a 
“national referendum” on constitutional law.356  Even those Senators who have 
sought “national referenda” have engineered show trials instead of legitimate 
                                                                
345See supra Part III.A.1. 
346See Rotunda, Role of Ideology, supra note 315, at 131-32. 
347See infra Part V.A.1. 
348See infra Part V.A.1. 
349HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF 
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 14-15 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing President Nixon’s 
nomination of Judge Clement Haynsworth to the Supreme Court). 
350See infra notes 356-57 and accompanying text. 
351See infra notes 356-57 and accompanying text.  
352Ross, supra note 216, at 674. 
353See id. 
354See id. 
355Fein, supra note 25, at 690. 
356Id. at 687. 
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confirmation hearings.357  Most hearings are particularly pointless exercises, 
particularly when the nominee’s views are well known.358   
Instead of serving as evaluations of a nominee’s character and qualifications, 
Senate confirmation hearings focus only on “a few distinct, political issues.”359  
While Senator Hatch was Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman during President 
Clinton’s second term, Senator Hatch unfairly accused many Clinton nominees of 
being “left-wing” judicial activists hell-bent on legislating from the bench.360  While 
Senator Leahy was Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman during the past two years, 
Senator Leahy unfairly accused many Bush nominees of being “right-wing” judicial 
activists hell-bent on overturning Roe.361  Even assuming, arguendo, that Senators 
should evaluate a nominee’s judicial philosophy, one would expect Senators to 
examine a nominee’s views on a broad range of topics.362  By being organized to 
discuss only one issue, Senate confirmation hearings have lacked meaning and focus.  
2.  A Regrettable Fusion of Law and Politics 
By imposing single-issue litmus tests on nominees, Senators have reduced the 
boundary between law and politics.363  This boundary is not a “wall of separation;” it 
is far more flexible.364  I do not contend that law is wholly independent of politics.365  
Presidents have judged and will continue to judge the political consequences of 
judicial nominations.366  Presidents have nominated an individual to appease a 
party’s base.367  Other times, Presidents have utilized the press to leak the names of 
potential nominees, then picked a nominee who has widespread support.368  Politics 
is certainly present in the confirmation process.369 
                                                                
357Id. at 688-90. 
358Ross, supra note 216, at 670 n. 181, 673. 
359McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 665. 
360See supra Part II.B.3. 
361See supra Part II.B.4. 
362McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 665. 
363Id. at 642. 
364Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE 
L.J. 1407, 1458 (2001) [hereinafter Balkin, Law and Politics].  
365See Carl Tobias, Fostering Balance on the Federal Courts, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 935, 959 
(1998) [hereinafter Tobias, Fostering Balance]. 
366See Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional Revolution, supra note 228, at 1068-73. 
367See id.  Professors Balkin and Levinson note that President Bush might “take a lesson 
from his father and nominate a conservative Hispanic to fill the first Supreme Court vacancy, 
daring the Democrats to oppose the first Hispanic appointment to the United States Supreme 
Court.”  Id. at 1070 n.113. 
368See infra note 651.  
369See, e.g., Lively, supra note 209, at 575. 
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There is, however, a distinction between nomination of a judge that shares the 
President’s judicial philosophy—“high politics”—and the “low politics” of 
ideological scrutiny in a Senate confirmation hearing.370  The former act has 
legitimate motives; the latter act often does not.371  Ending ideological scrutiny will 
enable “high politics”—a recognition that legitimate differences in constitutional 
interpretation exist.372  Along the way, much of the bitterness of recent years will 
likely disappear.   
3.  Senators as Law Professors 
Senators, the central actors in Senate confirmation hearings, are poorly suited to 
engage in meaningful constitutional discourse.373  Senators over the past twenty years 
have hardly proved their merit as cross-examiners or law professors in confirmation 
hearings.374  This makes perfect sense; with some exceptions, most Senators are 
neither lawyers nor law professors.375  Additionally, “[t]he Senate is designed to be a 
deliberative body, but not necessarily a deeply intellectual one.”376   
Regardless of a Senator’s qualifications, Senators have interest groups and 
constituencies about which to worry when a controversial confirmation hearing 
occurs.377  Arlen Specter during Judge Bork’s confirmation hearing and the Arlen 
Specter during Justice Thomas’s confirmation hearing were two different Senators.378  
                                                                
370Cf. Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional Revolution, supra note 228, at 1063 (arguing 
that, in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001), 
which held that plaintiffs may not sue states to recover money damages for violations of Title I 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Court engaged in “high politics”—“the promotion 
of certain core political principles in constitutional doctrine”). 
371Compare id. at 1063 (noting that “constitutional revolutions always concern ‘high 
politics’—the promotion of larger political principles and ideological goals”), with Neil A. 
Lewis, Democrats Readying for Judicial Fight, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2001, at A19 [hereinafter 
Lewis, Democrats Readying] (noting that Senate Democrats met in early 2001 to discuss how 
to “change the ground rules” in the confirmation process). 
372See Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional Revolution, supra note 228, at 1063 (“Thus, one 
might criticize Garrett because one disagrees with the political principles of the five 
conservatives, which, one believes, are false to the best understandings of the Constitution.”  
(emphasis added)). 
373See Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, at 1195; cf. Richard D. Freer, Advice? 
Consent? Senatorial Immaturity and the Judicial Selection Process, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 495, 
511 (1999) (“But, ultimately, I cannot imagine, however, that someone of the intellectual and 
academic caliber of Stephen Breyer considers himself enlightened by hearing some 
politician’s theory of the Constitution.”). 
374Simson, Supreme Unfitness, supra note 14, at 656-58; see also Fein, supra note 25, at 
673. 
375McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 637 n.18. 
376Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, at 1195. 
377Henry Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1202, 1207 (1988).  
378Simson, Supreme Unfitness, supra note 14, at 646-47. 
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One likely reason: Senator Specter was up for reelection in 1992, but not in 1988.379  
Similarly, Senator Kennedy now frequently criticizes Justice Scalia; sixteen years 
ago, however, Senator Kennedy had nary a word to say against Justice Scalia.380  One 
likely reason: Senator Kennedy chose not to attack a nominee of Italian descent, 
considering that Italian-Americans are an influential constituency in 
Massachusetts.381  Due to political concerns, Senators are hardly the right individuals 
to evaluate a nominee’s judicial philosophy consistently.382 
4.  Result-Oriented Confirmation Hearings 
a.  Results Instead of Rational Analysis 
One of the most serious charges leveled by one judge against another is that the 
judge in question decided the case as he or she saw fit, then found the reasoning to 
justify that result.383  The charge is called “result-oriented” jurisprudence; it is not a 
term of endearment, and it appears often in the volumes of the Federal Reporter.384  
Senate confirmation hearings are oriented toward exclusive consideration of the 
results of cases instead of the reasoning a judge utilized to resolve those cases.385  
When a nominee rules against factory women, that nominee must favor forced 
                                                                
379See id. 
380See Howard Kurtz & Al Kamen, First Day of Questioning Leaves Scalia Unscathed; 
Nominee Praised as Brilliant Legal Scholar, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1986, at A6.  
381See LOU CANNON, PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE ROLE OF A LIFETIME 723-24 (1991) 
(speculating that both Justice Scalia and Judge Bork would have been confirmed to the 
Supreme Court if President Reagan had nominated Judge Bork first). 
382See Simson, Supreme Unfitness, supra note 14, at 646-48; see also Freer, supra note 
373, at 512 (“[S]enators ask only about those narrow, hotbutton issues important to their 
primary constituencies—interest groups.  We are not getting judicial philosophy.  We are not 
getting contemplative reflection. . . .  We are getting soundbites to appease interest groups.”). 
383This charge is easy to make and much harder to prove.  See Carter, Confirmation Mess, 
supra note 16, at 1191 n.13 (noting that the accusation that a judge is ‘results-oriented’ “can 
easily be made of virtually all the important work of the current Court”).  Additionally, this 
charge is quite subjective.  Id. (“In public debate, of course, the charge that a judge is result-
oriented has greater or lesser force depending on the popularity of the results in question.”). 
384Frequently, the dissenting judge or Justice accuses the majority of being “result-
oriented.”  See, e.g., Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 783 (1987) (Marshall, J., joined by 
Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (“The Court’s analysis in this area strikes me as result 
oriented, to say the least.”); Bezanson v. Metro. Ins. & Annuity Co., 952 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 
1991) (Seyla, J., dissenting) (“[B]ecause because the court’s result-oriented response to this 
pleasureless predicament makes a bad situation worse, I dissent.”); Cahill v. Rushen, 678 F.2d 
791, 805 (9th Cir. 1982) (Wallace, J., dissenting) (“And when the extension occurs, as it does 
here, without anything more than naked statements unsupported by rational analysis, one 
wonders whether this extension can be considered anything less than result-oriented 
decisionmaking.”).   
385Cf., e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S11512 (2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards) (“Judge Shedd 
could not point to one instance in his eleven years on the bench in which an individual 
alleging discrimination—based on race, sex, age or disability—has ever won a case in his 
court.”). 
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sterilization.386  When a nominee rules for a criminal defendant instead of the state, 
he or she must be “too soft on crime.”387  Discussions at confirmation hearings avoid 
consideration of the arguments made and the issues raised in cases.388   
It is entirely possible for a Judge to follow Roe while expressing concerns about 
Roe.389  It is also entirely possible for a judge to uphold the constitutionality of the 
death penalty while acknowledging concerns about the death penalty.390  Knowledge 
of the result of a case tells one little besides its procedural disposition.  Knowledge 
of how that case was adjudged, however, is far more important.391  Constitutional 
subtleties of any variety, however, are rarely noticed in Senate confirmation 
hearings.392  By the time anyone has actually examined the reasoning or logic of a 
judicial opinion, the nominee has been rejected, and the point is moot.393 
                                                                
386See supra note 67; see also infra note 454 (discussing Judge Bork’s opinion in 
American Cyanamid). 
387See, e.g., John Biskupic, Nominee Tests Clinton’s Judicial Balance Amid Crime Debate, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1994, at A10 (discussing the confirmation hearing of Judge Rosemary 
Barkett, a Clinton nominee accused of being “soft on crime” and “outside the mainstream on 
important issues”). 
388It is far more useful to know why a Judge reached a particular result in a case than 
merely to know the procedural result of that case.  Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, 
at 1193 (“For a constitutional theorist . . . , a decision is only as legitimate as the judicial 
process that it reflects. . . .  To the theorist, what matters is the legitimacy of the reasoning 
offered by the Justices to connect the Constitution to the end result.”).   
389See Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 32 (5th Cir. 1992) (Garza, J., concurring 
specially) (“Because the decision to permit or proscribe abortion is a political choice, I would 
allow the people of the State of Louisiana to decide this issue for themselves.  Nonetheless, I 
acknowledge that Casey controls, and therefore, I concur.”).   
390See United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 70 (2d Cir. 2002) (concluding that 
appellant’s arguments against the constitutionality of the Federal Death Penalty Act are 
foreclosed by the Court’s decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)). 
391See Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, at 1193; cf. 147 CONG. REC. S593 (1999) 
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (“Focusing on the egregious facts of (rather than the legal analysis 
underlying) a death penalty case is a disingenuous and inappropriate way of evaluating the 
qualifications of sitting judges.”  (emphasis added)). 
392See Carter, Bork Redux, supra note 71, at 762. 
393Cf. id.  “Result-oriented” charges have been filed against some of President Bush’s 
judges.  See E.J. Dionne, Jr., Payback in Judges, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2003, at A21 
[hereinafter Dionne, Payback] (“[C]onsider the ruling of Judge John D. Bates in December 
declaring that Congress’s General Accounting Office—and thus the public—had no right to 
learn the specifics about meetings between Vice President Cheney’s famous energy task force 
and various energy executives and lobbyists.”).  But see Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 
51, 74-75 (D.D.C. 2002) (Bates, J.) (concluding that the General Accounting Office lacked 
standing to sue Vice-President Cheney); Michael M. Gallagher, Letter to the Editor, Mind 
Your Mudslinging, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2003, at A21 (noting that Judge Bates instead held 
that the General Accounting Office lacked standing to sue Vice-President Cheney). 
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b.  An Illustration 
It is all too easy for a nominee’s opponents to misrepresent his or her judicial 
opinions.394  A simple illustration of a “result-oriented” charge against a nominee 
proves this point.  Suppose that the President nominates a Circuit Judge for a 
vacancy on the Supreme Court.  Though the nominee is a well-respected Judge, one 
of the nominee’s opinions is quite troubling.  In that case, an African-American man 
was convicted of rape and sentenced to death.395  On appeal, the defendant, on 
appeal, argued that the imposition of the death penalty was racist and unfair.396  
Rather than recognize the racial disparities inherent in the death penalty, as well as 
the discrimination that African-Americans endure in the American justice system, 
the nominee wrote an opinion affirming the conviction.397  The nominee’s opinion 
demonstrates insensitivity toward civil rights; additionally, the nominee refused to 
enforce basic constitutional rights.398  Fortunately, the Supreme Court, in a per 
curiam opinion joined by seven Justices, reversed the nominee’s opinion.399  This 
case plainly illustrates that the nominee cannot serve as an impartial arbiter of 
constitutional rights for millions of minorities.400 
The preceding illustration is a rather inaccurate depiction of a past Circuit Court 
decision.  Neither Judge Bork nor Judge Pickering, however, wrote the opinion in 
question.  Instead, Justice Harry Blackmun wrote the opinion while he was a Circuit 
Judge on the Eighth Circuit.  The case—Maxwell v. Bishop401—did involve an appeal 
by an African-American defendant of a rape conviction.402  The defendant in 
Maxwell did argue that the imposition of the death penalty was racist and unfair.403  
Justice Blackmun rejected this argument; however, he did so by faithfully following 
and applying Supreme Court precedent.404  True to his nature as a thoughtful, caring 
jurist,405 Justice Blackmun agonized over the decision.406  He expressed his doubts 
                                                                
394Cf. Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, at 1191 n.13 (noting that the accusation 
that a judge is ‘results-oriented’ “can easily be made of virtually all the important work of the 
current Court”). 
395Jonathan L. Entin, The Confirmation Process and the Quality of Political Debate, 11 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 407, 417 (1993) (discussing the case). 
396Id. at 417 n.56 (discussing the defendant’s constitutional challenge to the death 
penalty). 
397See id. at 417. 
398See id. (noting that the nominee “rejected an important civil rights claim”). 
399Id. at 418. 
400See id. at 417 (noting that the nominee “held a less-than-ideal civil rights record”). 
401398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968) (Blackmun, J.), vacated and remanded, 398 U.S. 262 
(1970). 
402Id. at 139. 
403Id. at 141-44. 
404Id. at 146-48. 
405Sherry F. Colb, Breakfast with Justice Blackmun, 71 N. DAK. L. REV. 13, 14 (1995) 
(“His humility was and is as genuine as it is extraordinary. Though he knew that part of 
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about the validity of capital punishment.407  Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun wrote a 
well-reasoned opinion.408  The Supreme Court did reverse Justice Blackmun, but the 
Court did so based on grounds unrelated to the defendant’s constitutional challenge 
to the death penalty.409  A fair reading of Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Maxwell 
easily demonstrates the factual flaws of the above illustration.410 
Fortunately, Justice Blackmun did not have to endure misrepresentations of his 
opinions at his confirmation hearing.411  Nominated after the Senate rejected the 
nominations of Judge Haynsworth and Judge Carswell, the Senate confirmed Justice 
Blackmun unanimously.412  No one testified against Justice Blackmun, and Justice 
Blackmun’s nomination was quite uncontroversial.413  Were Justice Blackmun 
nominated to the Court today, his opponents could easily—and unfairly—
misrepresent his judicial opinions.414  Considering the bitter, contentious nature of 
the confirmation process, it is quite likely that Justice Blackmun’s record would be 
mischaracterized and misrepresented.415 
5.  Return of the “Stealth Nominee” 
One of the sad truths of the confirmation process is that many well qualified 
nominees have endured defeat either on the Senate floor or in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.416  As the process currently stands, most sensible nominees—rather than 
endure false character attacks and misrepresentations at the hands of opposition 
Senators—will likely stand on the sidelines.417  Continued ideological scrutiny will 
                                                          
judging was making decisions, choosing among difficult alternatives, he never stopped 
agonizing over those choices and coming to every new case with an open and critical mind.”). 
406See Maxwell, 398 F.2d at 153-54 (stating that the case was “particularly excruciating for 
the author of this opinion, who is not personally convinced of the rightness of capital 
punishment and who questions it as an effective deterrent”  (footnote omitted)). 
407Id. at 154. 
408See id. at 146-48. 
409Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 264-67 (1970), rev’g 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968) 
(Blackmun, J.). 
410See Maxwell, 398 F.2d at 139-54. 
411Entin, supra note 395, at 418 n.58 (citing JOHN P. FRANK, CLEMENT HAYNSWORTH, THE 
SENATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 122, 124 (1991)). 
412Id. at 418. 
413Id. 
414Ironically, as Professor Entin notes, Justice Blackmun authored a dissent on the 
Supreme Court showing far more sympathy to statistical claims of racial discrimination in the 
administration of the death penalty.  Id. at 417 n.56 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 
354 n.7 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).  
415Considering Justice Blackmun’s record as a champion of civil rights and civil liberties, 
this misrepresentation of his record would be particularly unfair and shameful. 
416See supra Part II.B. 
417See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 667 (“[A] greater role for the Senate is likely to 
make nomination and confirmation of distinguished nominees more difficult. . . .”). 
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likely force future Presidents to nominate true “stealth nominees.”418  Anyone 
aspiring to the federal bench will have to write nothing controversial, nothing except 
the most bland, general statements of law.419  “Stealth nominees” will resort to the 
only means necessary to gain approval at a confirmation hearing—saying nothing yet 
agreeing with everything.420   
The preponderance of “stealth nominees” will not be a positive development.421  
As former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler has noted, Senators of both parties 
should want bold judges with pronounced views on the great legal issues of the 
day.422  Some have said, however, that the federal judiciary needs “mainstream” 
judges who will take middle-of-the-road approaches to legal issues.423  It is hardly 
obvious that these individuals would improve the quality of the federal judiciary.424  
Nor is it necessarily true that reasonable, middle-of-the-road judges would be easily 
found. 
E.  Continued Ideological Scrutiny Will Harm the Federal Judiciary 
In its current form, the confirmation process will not help maintain the quality of 
the federal judiciary.  Three pervasive myths explain the deficiencies in the 
confirmation process. 
1.  The Myth of the “Mainstream” 
Like the phrase “judicial activism,” the phrase “outside the mainstream” is 
meaningless.425  Opponents of President Bush’s nominees have repeatedly argued 
that judicial nominees must be within the “mainstream.”426  The term “mainstream” 
exhibits inherent ambiguity.427  Does opposition to one Supreme Court case (such as 
Roe) place a nominee “outside the mainstream?”428  If recent history is any 
indication, the answer to that question is yes.429  Having one particular Supreme 
                                                                
418Fein, supra note 25, at 684.   
419Cutler, Limits of Advice and Consent, supra note 41, at 878. 
420Gerhardt, Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 42, at 521. 
421Rees, supra note 252, at 951 nn.131-32.  
422Cutler, Limits of Advice and Consent, supra note 41, at 878. 
423Statement by Senator Charles E. Schumer, in Senate Committee Hearings on the 
Judicial Nomination Process, supra note 230, at 509-10. 
424Statement by C. Boyden Gray, in id., supra note 230, at 438 (“Well, I don’t know if we 
want to appoint profoundly ambivalent judges.”). 
425Presser, supra note 3, at 265 (“The term ‘activism,’ then, is ambiguous at best, and 
misleading, if not pernicious at the worst.”). 
426Statement by Senator Charles E. Schumer, in Senate Committee Hearings on the 
Judicial Nomination Process, supra note 230, at 509. 
427Cf. Friedman, Tribal Myths, supra note 53, at 1289 (“’Balance’ and ‘equilibrium’ are, 
of course, squishy terms.”). 
428It shouldn’t.  See infra note 432 and accompanying text. 
429See supra Part II.B.4. 
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Court decision determine residence in the “mainstream” seems odd.430  Even Senator 
Kennedy once agreed with this argument.431  Professor Sunstein has stated that 
opposition to Roe should not disqualify one from becoming a federal judge.432  Many 
law professors have criticized Roe.433  Even if a lower court nominee dislikes Roe, 
those personal views are irrelevant if that nominee states that he or she will follow 
Roe because of stare decisis.434 
A confirmation process where one case determines residence in the “mainstream” 
invites political mischief.  Though Roe has served as the most recent litmus test, one 
can easily imagine Senate Republicans asking individuals nominated by a 
Democratic President about their views on United States v. Lopez,435 Printz v. United 
States,436 and United States v. Morrison.437  All three cases demonstrate a philosophy 
of the federal-state balance with which Senator Hatch agrees.438  If Senate 
Republicans administered such a litmus test in the future, Senate Democrats would 
be livid.439  Senate Republicans, however, have frequently objected to litmus tests 
over the past two years.440   
                                                                
430For purposes of fairness, this would hold true for cases such as United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as beyond 
Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause). 
431See Rees, supra note 252, at 918 (citation omitted). 
432See Cass R. Sunstein, A Conservative Liberals Should Love, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 
2002, at A20 [hereinafter Sunstein, A Conservative Liberals Should Love] (“But standing all 
by itself, disagreement with Roe should not be a disqualification for the federal bench.  Many 
people, of all political stripes, are uncomfortable with Roe as a matter of constitutional law.”). 
433Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the reasoning of Roe, yet has consistently spoken out in 
favor of a woman’s right to choose.  Ginsburg, Some Thoughts, supra note 5, at 382-84.  
Additionally, Professor John Hart Ely has denounced Roe.  John Hart Ely, The Wages of 
Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947-49 (1973).  One hopes that 
this criticism does not place Professor Ely “outside the mainstream.”  Cf. Rotunda, Supreme 
Court Justices in the Modern Era, supra note 27, at 579 n.101 (“[I]s John Hart Ely beyond the 
pale?”). 
434Cf. Sunstein, A Conservative Liberals Should Love, supra note 432 (“In any case Mr. 
McConnell is firmly committed to the law, and he would be a judge on a lower court, bound 
by Supreme Court decisions recognizing women's right to choose.”).   
435514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as 
beyond Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause). 
436521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the 
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program.  Today we hold that Congress cannot 
circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State’s officers directly.”). 
437529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000) (invalidating parts of the Violence Against Women Act as 
beyond Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
438This has already occurred.  See Kline, supra note 18, at 258-60.   
439See id. at 263. 
440See id. at 268. 
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If one defines “outside the mainstream” as refusing to follow all Supreme Court 
precedent, then a nominee fits this definition if he or she routinely thumbs his or her 
nose at the Supreme Court.441  This definition would regrettably fail for lack of 
political viability. Republicans would not accept it because of Roe; Democrats would 
not accept it because of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism and Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence.442  One could possibly determine whether a Circuit Court judge 
nominated for the Supreme Court is “in the mainstream” by examining how many 
dissents that judge has issued.443  This would likely indicate whether a nominee is 
within the “mainstream.”  Senators, however, have found little use for this test, even 
when a nominee has passed this test.444   
One could also determine whether a nominee is “outside the mainstream” based 
on how many times that nominee has been reversed by a higher court.445  Senate 
Republicans and Democrats have unfortunately misinterpreted or ignored statistics 
when it suited their political needs.  Any one of the previous three tests to determine 
whether one resides “in the mainstream” would be far more reliable than the recent, 
single-case litmus test.  Unfortunately, for reasons both personal and political, Senate 
Republicans and Democrats would rather continue administering single-case litmus 
tests.  
There are many problems with what Democrats or Republicans have defined as 
“the mainstream.”  The fundamental problem, however, is who defines the 
“mainstream.”446  Senators of both parties have used the terms “harmful to the 
                                                                
441This would likely disqualify many judges on the Ninth Circuit, which recently gained 
notoriety by being reversed unanimously by the Supreme Court three times on the same day.  
See Early v. Packer, 123 S. Ct. 362, 362 (2002) (per curiam) (“Because this decision exceeds 
the limits imposed on federal habeas review by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we grant the petition for 
certiorari and reverse.”), rev’g sub. nom. Packer v. Hill, 291 F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Woodford v. Visciotti, 123 S. Ct. 357, 357 (2002) (per curiam) (“Because this decision 
exceeds the limits imposed on federal habeas review by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we reverse.”), 
rev’g Visciotti v. Woodford, 288 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2002); INS v. Ventura, 123 S. Ct. 353, 
354 (2002) (per curiam) (“We agree with the Government that the Court of Appeals should 
have remanded the case to the BIA. And we summarily reverse its decision not to do so.”), 
rev’g Ventura v. INS, 264 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). 
442For a defense of Rehnquist Court’s federalism jurisprudence, see Presser, supra note 3, 
at 265-73; see also Stephen Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: 
In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 784-88, 826-30 (1995). 
443This concern was particularly relevant regarding the nomination of Justice Owen, 
because Senator Leahy accused her of being “outside the mainstream” of the “ultra-
conservative” Texas Supreme Court.  See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S8447 (2002) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy) (detailing his concerns regarding the Owen nomination). 
444Fein, supra note 25, at 685-86 (discussing Judge Bork’s voting record on the D.C. 
Circuit). 
445Perhaps then, one could evaluate a nominee based in part on how many rulings from 
that nominee’s Circuit have been reversed.  In that regard, the Ninth Circuit easily wins the 
prize for “Most Reversed Circuit.”  See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2001 Term: The Statistics, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 461 (2002) (noting that the Supreme Court reversed or vacated fifteen 
decisions of the Ninth Circuit during the October 2001 term). 
446More often than not, the person defining the mainstream is the commentator or Senator 
opposing the nominee.  See Friedman, Tribal Myths, supra note 53, at 1290 (arguing that 
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country” or “lunatic fringe” to describe the constitutional views of judicial 
nominees.447  One commentator avers that Senators should not confirm anyone 
whom they believe has not demonstrated a substantial commitment to the Bill of 
Rights in his or her lifetime.448  In proposing these various tests, Senators ignore the 
wholly subjective nature of their claims.449  “[F]ew senators . . . should oppose a 
nominee merely because the nominee occupies a place on the political spectrum a bit 
to the left or right of his or her own.”450  Senators often fail to account for legitimate 
differences in constitutional interpretation.451  Objections to a nominee’s judicial 
philosophy frequently mask the political objectives of Senators, who are motivated 
as much by concerns about re-election as they are by concerns about constitutional 
interpretation.452   
Single-case litmus tests are theoretically permissible.  If a judicial nominee 
disavowed Brown v. Board of Education,453 advocated forced sterilization of 
women,454 and stated that Korematsu v. United States455 was one of the greatest 
Supreme Court decisions ever, then Senators would certainly be justified in voting to 
reject that nomination.456  Constitutional interpretation, however, admits of a wide 
                                                          
Professor Tribe’s main goal is “to ensure that, to the extent possible, the Court is composed of 
Justices who think the way he does”). 
447See, e.g., Charles Black, A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court 
Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657, 663-64 (1970) (“If it is a philosophy the Senator thinks will make 
a judge whose service on the Bench will hurt the country, then the Senator can do right only 
by treating this judgment of his . . . as a satisfactory basis in itself for a negative vote.”). 
448Rauh, Jr., Some Personal Observations, supra note 272, at 11 n.8. 
449See Ross, supra note 216, at 681. 
450Rauh, Jr., Some Personal Observations, supra note 272, at 11 & n.8.   
451See Ross, supra note 216, at 681. 
452See Simson, Supreme Unfitness, supra note 14, at 658. 
453347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of public education the 
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”), overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896). 
454Judge Bork did not advocate forced sterilization of women.  Oil, Chem. & Atomic 
Workers Int’l Union v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[W]e think 
the language of the Act cannot be stretched so far as to hold that the sterilization option of the 
fetus protection policy is a ‘hazard’ of ‘employment’ under the general duty clause. 
Consequently, we affirm.”  (emphasis added)); see also id.  (“Nor may we decide that the 
company is guilty because it offered an option of sterilization. . . .  These . . . issues . . . are not 
for us. Congress has enacted a statute and our only task is the mundane one of interpreting its 
language and applying its policy.”). 
455323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (Black, J.) (upholding internment of Japanese-Americans 
during World War II).  Korematsu easily ranks as the worst decision of Justice Black’s 
otherwise illustrious career on the Supreme Court.  See Akhil Reed Amar, Hugo Black and the 
Hall of Fame, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1221, 1248 (2002) [hereinafter Amar, Hugo Black] (“Over the 
run of his extraordinary tenure on the Court, spanning five (!) decades, Black had many bad 
days, of course.”) (citing Korematsu)).     
456The above example illustrates a situation involving a nominee whose views are wholly 
antithetical to the Constitution.  In nearly all cases involving confirmation hearings, however, 
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range of reasonable disagreement.457  The debate over the jurisprudence of the 
Rehnquist Court has raged over the past sixteen years, as well it should.458  The issue 
is not whether the Rehnquist Court should be beyond criticism; it is not.  The issue is 
not whether all nine Justices should possess identical judicial philosophies; they 
should not. 
The term “mainstream,” however, refuses to recognize legitimate differences in 
judicial philosophy.459  In searching for the “mainstream,” Senators have embarked 
                                                          
such individuals are highly unlikely to appear.  See Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, 
at 1199 (“There is, in other words, no reason for the Senate to set itself the task of keeping off 
the Court nominees whose views stray too far beyond the discourse of the mainstream, for the 
Senators are then policing for criminals unlikely to appear.”  (emphasis added)).  Judge Bork 
does not qualify as one of those criminals.  See id.  Nor does Judge White.  See supra note 
105. 
457Despite claims to the contrary, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 
(1992) (“It is the dimension present whenever the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution 
calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting 
a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.  The Court is not asked to do this very often, 
having thus addressed the Nation only twice in our lifetime, in the decisions of Brown and 
Roe.”), Roe is at best a distant cousin of Brown when one considers Roe’s constitutional 
legitimacy and doctrinal foundation.  Brown overruled the invidious doctrine of “separate but 
equal” established in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  The national crisis that 
precipitated Brown divided this nation for two centuries and still divides this nation.  The 
constitutional basis for Brown is fairly evident; the constitutional basis for Roe—by Justice 
Blackmun’s own admission!—is entirely muddled.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 
(1973) (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept 
of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court 
determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to 
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”  (emphasis 
added)).   
Few commentators have criticized the rationale of Brown.  But see WHAT BROWN V. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (rewriting Brown).  Many 
members of the academy, however, have disagreed with the Court’s reasoning in Roe, or have 
denounced Roe entirely.  See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93-102 (1987) (offering an alternative justification for Roe); 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 1353-59 (2d ed. 1988) 
[hereinafter TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (offering an alternative justification for 
Roe); see also Ely, supra note 433, at 947-49 (concluding that Roe is bad constitutional law); 
Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 
104 HARV. L. REV. 989, 992 (1991) (stating his belief that Roe was wrongly decided).  It is fair 
to say that Roe has been one of the most lambasted Supreme Court decisions of the past two 
centuries.  It is true that Roe, like Brown, is “settled law” because of stare decisis.  Legitimate 
opposition exists to both the reasoning and result of Roe.  Brown, however, does not command 
the same degree of disapproval.  Consequently, claiming that a judicial nominee is “outside 
the mainstream” based solely on opposition to Roe is misguided.  See Sunstein, A 
Conservative Liberals Should Love, supra note 432.   
458For articles criticizing the Rehnquist Court, see infra note 509. 
459See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 665; see also Friedman, Tribal Myths, supra 
note 53, at 1290 (“No, Tribe’s concern is not with so elusive a concept as ‘balance.’  Rather, 
his goal is to ensure that, to the extent possible, the Court is composed of Justices who think 
the way he does.”). 
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upon a foolish, unending voyage across the murky waters of legal interpretation.  
Rather than continue this ill-fated voyage, Senators should eschew use of the term 
“mainstream.” They should recognize what many law professors and judges already 
have: that there exists reasonable disagreement over what the proper judicial 
philosophy is.  Senators should finally cast aside vastly overstated political rhetoric 
and conclude, at a minimum, that originalists do not support forced sterilization, and 
that non-originalists do not support weekend furloughs for convicted murderers. 
Many prominent law professors attacked Judge Bork’s judicial philosophy as 
outdated and unwieldy.460  Similarly, when some of President Clinton’s nominees 
faced the Senate Judiciary Committee, their views on cases were carefully 
scrutinized for any hint of “liberal judicial activism.”461  Both incidents illustrate the 
ongoing scholarly debate about the merits of originalism.  Democratic Senators and 
various law professors have recently criticized originalism.462  In doing so, they have 
proved that the debate concerning originalism's validity is an ongoing one.463  They 
have also proved that this debate is unsettled.464   
Claiming that originalism lacks any merit, however, is questionable.465  Like all 
judicial philosophies, originalism has its detractors and its defenders.466  Many 
Supreme Court Justices have utilized originalism over the past thirty years, and have 
                                                                
460See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
461Kline, supra note 18, at 258. 
462See, e.g., Statement by Professor Cass R. Sunstein, in Senate Committee Hearings on 
the Judicial Nomination Process, supra note 230, at 468-72; Statement by Professor Laurence 
R. Tribe, in id., supra note 230, at 442-44. 
463Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, at 1192 (“Whatever the degree of 
controversy among legal scholars on originalism as a method, however, it is just that—a 
controversy.”  (emphasis added)). 
464This debate intensified after the Bork nomination.  See id. (“Judge Bork was pilloried, 
for example, for his dogged reliance on the original understanding as a tool for interpretation.”  
(emphasis added)). 
465See id. at 1191 (“One of the gravest weaknesses of the liberal constitutional theory that 
currently dominates the academy is its inability to point to much in the Constitution’s text or 
history to explain the supposed wrongheadedness of the conservative assault on the work of 
the modern Court.”  (emphasis added)).  It is difficult to argue that the history of the 
appointments clause is irrelevant.  Scholars on both sides of the debate have researched the 
issue and reached different conclusions.  Compare McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 636 
(“The Framers thought the Senate should only reject nominees for weighty and publicly 
compelling reasons.”  (footnote omitted)), with Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, 
supra note 8, at 1495 (“The clause thus envisions a genuinely consultative relationship 
between the Senate and the President. . . .  History supports this view of the text.”).  Even 
those who have criticized originalism have examined the original understanding of the 
nominations clause thoroughly.  Cf. McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 655 n.102 (“One 
hopes that Professors Strauss and Sunstein have not suddenly converted to a view that specific 
intentions of individual Framers are controlling over the words of the Constitution.”). 
466See Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, at 1191-92.  For a thorough critique of 
originalism, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. 
L. REV. 204, 213-17 (1980). 
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examined the original understanding of the Constitution.467  This debate will not end 
anytime soon.468 
Ideological scrutiny, however, disallows legitimate constitutional debate.469  If 
Republicans continue to control the Senate Judiciary Committee, any individuals 
nominated by a future Democratic President would be wise to avoid criticizing the 
Rehnquist Court’s federalism jurisprudence.470  Any one of President Bush’s 
nominees over the past two years would have taken leave of his or her senses had 
that nominee said anything about Roe beyond: 1) It is “settled law;”471 2) It remains 
the law of the land;472 3) It should be upheld because of stare decisis.473  Continued 
ideological scrutiny will marginalize the opportunity for legitimate constitutional 
debate on contested issues.  In the end, ideological scrutiny prevents constitutional 
progress.  
                                                                
467Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, at 1192 n.14.  As Professor Carter states, 
“[e]very Justice who has sat on the Court in recent years has written or joined opinions 
invoking the original understanding to decide questions involving the separation of powers.”  
Id. (citing Bowshar v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1986) (Burger, C.J., joined by Brennan, 
Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ.) (appealing to original understanding on legislative 
action); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-51 (1983) (Burger, C.J., joined by Brennan, 
Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor, JJ.) (same); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 
771-78 (1982) (White, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) 
(appealing to original understanding on punishment of the President); City of Memhpis v. 
Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 154-44 n.18 (1981) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., 
dissenting) (invoking original understanding of thirteenth amendment); Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396-98 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment in part 
and dissenting in part) (invoking original understanding of fourteenth amendment)).  
468Id. at 1192 (noting that the controversy over originalism during the Bork nomination 
represented a “tendency in contemporary political rhetoric to say ‘philosophy’ but mean 
‘rights we like’”). 
469See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 665. 
470Otherwise, if the current practice of ideological scrutiny continues, those nominees 
would very likely be rejected.  See Kline, supra note 18, at 277-87 (noting that Senate 
Republicans asked many intrusive questions of President Clinton's nominees, ranging from 
their views on partial-birth abortions to their views on the constitutionality of capital 
punishment). 
471See Neil A. Lewis, Judicial Nominee Says His Views Will Not Sway Him on The Bench, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at A30 [hereinafter Lewis, Judicial Nominee] (noting that Judge 
Michael McConnell stated at his confirmation hearing that Roe was “settled law”). 
472See id. (noting that Judge McConnell stated that “he would comply with Supreme Court 
opinions with which he disagreed”). 
473See id. (quoting Judge McConnell). 
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The term “outside the mainstream” is one made out of whole political cloth.474  
Application of this term to the confirmation process is a recent, unsettling 
phenomenon.475  The continued determination of whether a judicial nominee is 
“outside the mainstream” will politicize the confirmation process further and deter 
qualified, distinguished individuals from willing to be nominated.476  Instead of 
engaging in prolonged political retribution, Senate Democrats and Republicans 
should return the phrase “outside the mainstream” to the political process.477 
2.  The Myth of Predicting a Judge’s Votes 
Senators should not consider a nominee’s ideology because one frequently 
cannot predict how a nominee will decide future cases.478  Even when a nominee 
plainly possesses a certain judicial philosophy, surprises still occur.479  Despite 
claims to the contrary,480 it would take a soothsayer reminiscent of Nostradamus to 
                                                                
474See, e.g., David S. Broder, Dukakis Keeps His Hopes Alive; Democrat Fends Off Bush 
Effort to Place Him Far to Left, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1988, at A1 (“Michael S. Dukakis kept 
the presidential race alive and in doubt tonight by showing a huge televised audience that he 
could deflect George Bush’s efforts to place him outside the mainstream of American 
politics.”  (emphasis added)); Editorial, Vote Chuck Robb, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1994, at C6 
(arguing that the views of Senate candidate Oliver North “are harsh and outside the 
mainstream”); Editorial, What Kind of Moderate?, WASH. POST, June 7, 1993, at A18 (noting 
that some pundits have claimed that “Mr. Clinton is in trouble because he has been ‘too 
liberal’ or ‘too far outside the mainstream’ or in some other unacceptable place”). 
475See Schumer, supra note 18. 
476See Editorial, Injuring the Judiciary, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2002, at A38 (“Do senators 
really want a confirmation process in which conservatives vote against liberals because they 
are liberals and liberals oppose conservatives because they are conservatives?”). 
477That’s where it came from.  See supra note 474. 
478
 Ronald D. Rotunda, Innovations Disguised as Traditions: A Historical Review of the 
Supreme Court Nominations Process, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 123, 131 [hereinafter Rotunda, A 
Historical Review] 
479See infra notes 483-98 and accompanying text. 
480See, e.g., Simson, Supreme Unfitness, supra note 14, at 655 (“There is a lot to be said 
for having a reasonably good idea of what you are getting, and you can make a reasonable 
prediction as to how candidates with substantial paper trails are generally apt to vote.”); 
Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, supra note 8, at 1514-15; Jeff Yates & William 
Gillespie, Supreme Court Power Play: Assessing the Appropriate Role of the Senate in the 
Confirmation Process, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053, 1063-64 (2001) (“Another argument 
advanced in favor of a constrained Senate role is the proposition that executive nominations 
based on a candidate’s ideological views are innocuous because the President is unable to 
predict a Justice's long-term voting trends.  This premise, however, is not supported by 
history. . . .”  (footnotes omitted)). 
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accurately predict how a nominee will vote on future cases.481  Judicial nominees are 
not Senators with voting records or baseball players with batting averages.482   
Judges and Justices have often frustrated the wishes of the Presidents who 
nominated them.483  President Eisenhower referred to Chief Justice Warren and 
Justice Brennan as the two greatest mistakes of his Presidency.484  President Nixon 
nominated Justice Blackmun and expected him to follow Chief Justice Burger.485  
Justice Blackmun, however, authored Roe v. Wade,486 and dissented in many death 
penalty cases.487 He quickly dashed President Nixon’s hope that he would become a 
“law-and-order” Justice.488  Similarly, Justice Powell argued that diversity could 
constitute a compelling governmental interest in higher education,489 and anchored 
the centrist wing of the Burger Court.490   
Anyone who predicted in 1975 that Justice Stevens would anchor the “liberal” 
wing of the Rehnquist Court would have encountered sharp disagreement, yet Justice 
Stevens has done just that.491  Barely two years after she was confirmed, Justice 
                                                                
481Presser, supra note 3, at 259 (“[P]redictions of what people will do when they ascend 
the bench are notoriously inaccurate.”).   
482See, e.g., Rotunda, A Historical Review, supra note 478, at 131 (“To the extent that the 
confirmation process tries to determine how the nominee will vote in particular cases, it is 
focusing on an issue that cannot really be answered.”).   
483Id. at 135.   
484RICHARD HODDER-WILLIAMS, THE POLITICS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 30 (1980); see 
also BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 5 
(1979) (“Later Eisenhower remarked that the appointment [of Chief Justice Warren] was ‘the 
biggest damned-fool mistake [he] ever made.’”  (footnote omitted)). 
485WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 484, at 97 (“Nixon found Blackmun’s moderate 
conservatism perfect. . . .  [Blackmun] had a . . . predictable, solid body of opinions that 
demonstrated a levelheaded, strict-constructionist philosophy. . . .  Blackmun was a decent 
man, consistent, wedded to routine, unlikely to venture far.”); see also Rotunda, Role of 
Ideology, supra note 315, at 136. 
486410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
487See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (“From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of 
death. For more than 20 years I have endeavored—indeed, I have struggled— . . . to develop 
procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the mere appearance of fairness to 
the death penalty. . . .”  (footnote omitted)). 
488See Rotunda, Role of Ideology, supra note 315, at 136. 
489Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) 
(“The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a diverse student body.  This 
clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”). 
490See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and the Art of Judicial Selection, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 597, 597 (1999) (“Lewis F. Powell, Jr. served on the Supreme Court from 1972 
through 1987. On the crucial issues of that time, his was the decisive voice.”). 
491See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 346-47 (2002) (Stevens, J., joined by O’Connor, 
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.) (finding that a national consensus has developed 
against capital punishment for the mentally retarded); cf., e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Balancing, 
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O’Connor criticized the trimester framework established in Roe.492  Nine years later, 
however, Justice O'Connor voted to reaffirm Roe’s central holding.493  Additionally, 
Justice O’Connor has frequently eschewed broad rulings, and has favored fact-
intensive tests.494  Justice Kennedy likely wins the prize for “Most Disappointing 
Justice” in the eyes of Republicans, because he has become a centrist on 
Establishment Clause issues.495  Many observers expected Justice Souter to be a 
reliable conservative.496 Instead, Justice Souter has defended Roe,497 and has sharply 
criticized the Rehnquist Court’s federalism jurisprudence.498   
                                                          
Justice, and the Eleventh Amendment: Justice Stevens’ Theory of State Sovereign Immunity, 
27 RUTGERS L.J. 563, 563 (1996) (“Though it was Justice William Brennan who initially led a 
four-Justice faction consistently hostile to sovereign immunity, Justice Stevens has become the 
Court’s leading opponent of sovereign immunity and leading proponent of holding the 
government judicially accountable for its actions.”  (footnote omitted)). 
492City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453-54 (1983) 
(O’Connor, J., joined by White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (“The trimester or ‘three-stage’ 
approach adopted by the Court in Roe, and, in a modified form, employed by the Court to 
analyze the regulations in these cases, cannot be supported as a legitimate or useful framework 
for accommodating the woman's right and the State's interests.”  (emphasis added)). 
493Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992) (“[W]e are led to conclude 
this: the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed.”). 
494See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“The temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction must be 
resisted.  The Takings Clause requires careful examination and weighing of all the relevant 
circumstances in this context.”  (emphasis added)). 
495See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000) (Stevens, J., 
joined by O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.) (holding that student-led, 
student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (Kennedy, J., joined by Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor & Souter, 
JJ.) (holding that school-sponsored prayer at a middle school graduation violates the 
Establishment Clause).  But see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2473 (2002) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ.) (holding that a pilot 
program enabling parents to choose between public and private schools does not violate the 
Establishment Clause).  Justice Kennedy has also developed a reputation as a particularly 
contemplative, soul-searching jurist.  See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]his case, like others before us from time to time, exacts its 
personal toll.”); id. at 420-21 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The hard fact is that sometimes we 
must make decisions we do not like. We make them because they are right, right in the sense 
that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result.”  (emphasis added)). 
496See, e.g., Rauh, Jr., Some Personal Observations, supra note 272, at 10. 
497See Casey, 505 U.S. at 845-46 (“[W]e are led to conclude this: the essential holding of 
Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed.”). 
498See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 612 n.2 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(stating that he would have given greater deference to Congress’s finding that the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990 addressed a subject substantially affecting interstate commerce). 
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There are Justices whose judicial philosophies have remained consistent.499  
Justices Scalia and Thomas have sought to reduce the “wall of separation” between 
church and state,500 have voted to limit the powers of the federal government,501 and 
have voted to uphold capital punishment.502  Justice Breyer has become a voice of 
moderation on the Rehnquist Court, occasionally joining ranks with Justices Scalia, 
Rehnquist and Thomas,503 but mostly opposing them.504  Chief Justice Rehnquist has 
consistently voted to increase government aid to religion,505 limit Congressional 
                                                                
499This paper does not claim that a nominee’s judicial philosophy will never indicate how 
he or she will decide cases once on the bench.  Cf. Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional 
Revolution, supra note 228, at 1070 (“To be sure, judges and Justices grow and develop over 
time, though, we strongly suspect, there is less ‘growth’ and ‘development’ than is suggested 
by the ideologically-freighted reassurance that one often hears that Justices are ruggedly 
independent and have thoroughly unpredictable views.”).     
500See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631-32 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, 
C.J., White & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]he Court—with nary a mention that it is doing 
so—lays waste a tradition that is as old as public school graduation ceremonies themselves, 
and that is a component of an even more longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian 
prayer to God at public celebrations generally.”). 
501See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“Until this Court replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more 
consistent with the original understanding, we will continue to see Congress appropriating 
state police powers under the guise of regulating commerce.”); Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Kennedy & Thomas, 
JJ.) (“We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a 
federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition 
by conscripting the State’s officers directly.”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“At an appropriate juncture, I think we must modify our Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence. Today, it is easy enough to say that the Clause certainly does not empower 
Congress to ban gun possession within 1,000 feet of a school.”). 
502See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 363 (2002) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., 
Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision is the pinnacle of our Eighth Amendment death-is-
different jurisprudence. . . .  Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon 
nothing but the personal views of its members.”). 
503See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 837 (2000) (O’Connor, J., joined by Breyer, 
J., concurring in the judgment). 
504See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2506-07 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
joined by Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting) (conceding that “the Establishment Clause 
currently permits States to channel various forms of assistance to religious schools . . . [such 
as] transportation costs for students, computers, and secular texts,” yet arguing that school 
vouchers violate the Establishment Clause); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356, 382-85 (2001) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Court owes Congress greater deference in evaluating legislation). 
505See, e.g., Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2473 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O’Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy & Thomas, JJ.) (holding that a pilot program permitting parents to choose between 
public and private schools “does not offend the Establishment Clause”).  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s battle to increase government aid to religion began thirty years ago.  See Comm. 
on Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 805-13 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., 
joined by Burger, C.J., & White, J., dissenting). 
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power,506 reduce Fourth Amendment protection,507 and overrule Roe.508  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s judicial philosophy has remained consistent; in applying it to cases, he 
has received persistent criticism from commentators.509   
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, authored Dickerson v. United States,510 which 
reaffirmed Miranda.511  In Kyllo v. United States,512 Justice Scalia authored an 
opinion striking down the use of thermal imaging as a surveillance tool.513  The 
preceding case defies political stereotypes.514  Justice Scalia wrote an opinion 
                                                                
506See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-27 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O’Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy & Thomas, JJ.) (striking down parts of the Violence Against Women Act as beyond 
Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
507See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by 
O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia & Thomas, JJ.) (holding that respondents, who had stayed in an 
apartment for two and a half hours to package cocaine, lacked standing because they had no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment). 
508See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by 
White, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
509See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term: Foreword: We the Court, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 168 (2001) (“The members of . . . the Rehnquist Court are constitutional 
fundamentalists, acting to restore the Constitution to what they believe is its true form.  Like 
most forms of fundamentalism, their belief rests on an imagined past that never existed.  How 
long must we let them continue fantasizing at our expense?”  (emphasis added)); see also 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term: Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 47 (1989) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Vanishing Constitution]  
(“Moreover, I believe that the [Rehnquist] Court’s approach to judicial review will have 
disastrous consequences for constitutional law and for the nation. . . .  Fewer clauses of the 
Constitution, whether dealing with the structure of government or with individual liberties, are 
being enforced.”). 
510530 U.S. 428 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, 
Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.). 
511Id. at 443.  One possible explanation for the Court’s holding in Dickerson might have 
been displeasure at Congress’s attempt to overrule Miranda through section 3501.  See 
Michael C. Dorf & Barry Freedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 
61, 72 (“[Section 3501] was a slap at the Court, and if any Court was likely to slap back it was 
this one.”). 
512533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
513Id. at 40 (Scalia, J., joined by Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.) (“[W]e hold the 
Thermovision imaging to have been an unlawful search. . . .”).  Justice Stevens, however, 
dissented, claiming that the use of Thermovision imaging was not a Fourth Amendment 
search, much less an unreasonable one.  Id. at 42-46 (Stevens, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., 
O’Connor & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).  
514As one commentator has thoroughly demonstrated, the Rehnquist Court defies political 
stereotypes.  See Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1139, 1210 (2002) (“The talk emanating from liberal academics holds that the current 
Court is on a programmatic mission to advance right-wing political goals. That talk—not to 
put too fine a point on it—is dishonest.”).  As Professor Young states, even “right-wing” 
professors and judges are dissatisfied with the Rehnquist Court, because these individuals feel 
that the Court is not conservative enough.  Id. at 1215 nn. 329-30. 
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invalidating the police’s search, while Justice Stevens argued that the use of thermal 
imaging was constitutional.515  Justice Scalia found that burning the American flag is 
free speech;516 Justice Stevens, however, concluded otherwise.517  Ironically, Justice 
Scalia advocated increased First Amendment protection, while Justice Stevens did 
not.518  Supreme Court cases often avoid quick application of political stereotypes.519 
The Rehnquist Court has undeniably charted a well-defined course on many 
constitutional issues.520  The political rhetoric regarding the Rehnquist Court, 
however, is misleading.521  The Rehnquist Court has easily been the most pro-First 
Amendment Court in history, striking down numerous statutes and upholding various 
practices.522  As one commentator notes, the statistics of how the Justices voted on 
free speech cases from 1994 to 2000 disprove the common perceptions concerning 
the Rehnquist Court.523  The “right-wingers” have voted to uphold First Amendment 
                                                                
515Compare Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (Scalia, J., joined by Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg & 
Breyer, JJ.) (“[W]e hold the Thermovision imaging to have been an unlawful search. . . .”), 
with id. at 43 (Stevens, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor & Kennedy, JJ.) (dissenting) 
(“[T]he notion that heat emissions from the outside of a dwelling is a private matter 
implicating the protections of the Fourth Amendment . . . is not only unprecedented but also 
quite difficult to take seriously.”). 
516See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, 
Blackmun, Scalia & Kennedy, JJ.) (“After publicly burning an American flag as a means of 
political protest, Gregory Lee Johnson was convicted of desecrating a flag in violation of 
Texas law. This case presents the question whether his conviction is consistent with the First 
Amendment. We hold that it is not.”). 
517Id. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If [the ideas of liberty and equality] are worth 
fighting for—and our history demonstrates that they are—it cannot be true that the flag that 
uniquely symbolizes their power is not itself worthy of protection from unnecessary 
desecration.”). 
518See Rotunda, Role of Ideology, supra note 315, at 140. 
519See Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 163, 195  (2002) (“Supreme Court seers are inclined to speak of liberal and conservative 
blocs and the effect of changes in personnel on their voting strength. . . .  [I]t is difficult to 
align the dispositions of these blocs with any coherent set of doctrinal or jurisprudential 
principles.”); see also Paula Alexander Becker & Richard J. Hunter, Jr., A Review of the 
Supreme Court’s 2000 Term: Is There a Consistent Theme?, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1463, 1474 
(2002) (“It is extremely difficult to provide an overall determinative characterization of the 
philosophy of the current United States Supreme Court.”). 
520See supra notes 499-509 and accompanying text. 
521For a thorough, well-reasoned response to the charge that the Rehnquist Court is an 
“activist” Court, see J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Is There a Distinctive Conservative 
Jurisprudence?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1383, 1385-89 (2002). 
522See Kramer, supra note 509, at 130 (“The Rehnquist Court has probably been most 
active in the area of First Amendment freedoms.  With respect to speech, the Court has 
demonstrated a strong libertarian bent. . . .”  (emphasis added)); see also id. at 130 nn. 546-
550 (collecting cases). 
523Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994-2000, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 1191, 1198 (2001) (“[T]he vote tallies are not speculation: They reveal that we can no 
longer assume that the Left generally sides with speakers and the Right with the 
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values, yet the “left-wingers” have sided with the government.524  Commentators 
rarely mention this commitment to civil liberties.525   
Instead, some commentators warn that the Rehnquist Court might strike down 
civil rights laws in the name of federalism and overturn Roe.526  The Rehnquist 
Court, however, has not hinted in any way that it will overturn civil rights laws.527  
Additionally, the Rehnquist Court has reaffirmed Roe’s central holding,528 declined 
many invitations to overrule Roe,529 and struck down a statute banning partial-birth 
abortions.530  The Rehnquist Court has damned Roe by faint praise, but it has gone no 
farther.531  Might the Rehnquist Court overturn Roe?532  This outcome is possible but 
                                                          
government.”); see also Young, supra note 514, at 1211 (“It is hard to imagine how the Court 
could be more aggressive in extending the limits of the Free Speech Clause.”). 
524Volokh, supra note 523, at 1198.   
525But see Kramer, supra note 509, at 131 (“Overall, it was a year to cheer the normally 
heavy hearts of civil libertarians. . . .  In the area of free speech, the Court struck down 
statutory restrictions on the arguments a government-funded legal services lawyer can make, 
and it prohibited states from including candidates’ positions on selected issues on the ballot. 
. . .”  (footnotes omitted)). 
526See, e.g., Balkin, Law and Politics, supra note 364, at 1457 & n.155 (“The Court, 
however, has embarked on a strong states’ rights path (pace Bush v. Gore itself) and one 
suspects that this is not the last civil rights statute it will strike down in the name of the 
inherent dignity and sovereignty of the states.”  (footnote omitted)).   
527United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609-10 (2000) (noting that the Rehnquist 
Court has “upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity 
where [the Court has] concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate commerce”  
(emphasis added)  (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995)).  Of particular 
importance, the Court in Morrison approvingly cited Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241 (1964), which upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a valid exercise of 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 361 (“We, therefore, conclude that the 
action of the Congress in the adoption of the Act as applied here to a motel which concededly 
serves interstate travelers is within the power granted it by the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution, as interpreted by this Court for 140 years.”).  Thus, it is quite doubtful that the 
Rehnquist Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence will return the nation “to the days of 
segregated lunch counters, segregated hotels, or segregated motels.”  Presser, supra note 3, at 
270. 
528See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992) (“[W]e are led to 
conclude this: the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again 
reaffirmed.”). 
529See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989) (“This case 
therefore affords us no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe, which was that the Texas statute 
unconstitutionally infringed the right to an abortion derived from the Due Process Clause. 
. . .”); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986) 
(“Again today, we reaffirm the general principles laid down in Roe. . . .”).   
530Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000). 
531As one commentator notes, the Rehnquist Court’s abortion jurisprudence is hardly 
based on impregnable logic.  See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term: 
Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 110 (2000) [hereinafter 
Amar, Document and Doctrine] (“If all sides are being invited to come together in good faith, 
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hardly certain.533  It is foolish to quickly characterize the jurisprudence of the entire 
Court or make rash predictions concerning the fate of disputed cases.534 
                                                          
it is hard to ask them to cohere around Roe simply because ‘this Court’ keeps incanting it 
without justifying it constitutionally.”). 
532Roe’s demise will not occur anytime soon.  See Presser, supra note 3, at 260 (“The 
empirical case that Republican appointees are a danger to the legality of abortion simply has 
not been made.”).  This outcome is entirely possible, but would require the confirmation of 
two “right wing” Justices nominated by President Bush.  See infra note 533. 
533Assuming, arguendo, that one can predict how the Justices will vote based on paper 
trails (which all current Justices have), one need only examine the views of the Justices to 
conclude that Roe is not in imminent danger of being overturned.   
Justice Stevens has consistently voted to uphold Roe.  See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron 
Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 419-20 (1983) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., 
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis, while perhaps 
never entirely persuasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a 
society governed by the rule of law.  We respect it today, and reaffirm Roe v. Wade.”  
(footnote omitted)).  Justice Souter and Justice Kennedy have voted to reaffirm Roe’s central 
holding.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 845-46 (“After considering the fundamental constitutional 
questions resolved by Roe, principles of institutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis, we 
are led to conclude this: the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once 
again reaffirmed.”).  Justice O’Connor joined Justices Souter and Kennedy in reaffirming 
Roe’s central holding, id., and has plainly rejected attempts by earlier Republican 
administrations to overturn Roe.  Id.; see also Webster, 492 U.S. at 526 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“When the constitutional invalidity of a 
State’s abortion statute actually turns on the constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade, there will 
be time enough to reexamine Roe.  And to do so carefully.”).  Justice O’Connor’s “undue 
burden” test is now the law of the land.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (“An undue burden exists, and 
therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle 
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”).   
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer came to the Court after Akron, Webster, and Casey, yet they 
both voted to invalidate a statute prohibiting partial-birth abortions.  Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922 
(Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.) (“We hold that this statute 
violates the Constitution.”).  Thus, both Justices would likely vote to reaffirm Roe.  This is 
particularly true in Justice Ginsburg’s case, as she has defended the result of Roe, while 
offering alternative justifications for Roe.  Ginsburg, Some Thoughts, supra note 5, at 382. 
On the other hand, Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court's sweeping invalidation of any restrictions on 
abortion during the first trimester is impossible to justify . . ., and the conscious weighing of 
competing factors that the Court’s opinion apparently substitutes . . . is far more appropriate to 
a legislative judgment than to a judicial one.”).  Justices Scalia and Thomas oppose Roe 
vehemently.  See, e.g., Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 980 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. & 
Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As some of my colleagues on the Court, past and present, ably 
demonstrated, [Roe v. Wade] was grievously wrong.”  (citations omitted)); Casey, 505 U.S. at 
1002 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part) (“We should get out of this area, where we have no right to be, 
and where we do neither ourselves nor the country any good by remaining.”); Webster, 492 
U.S. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The outcome of 
today’s case will doubtless be heralded as a triumph of judicial statesmanship. It is not that, 
unless it is statesmanlike needlessly to prolong this Court’s self-awarded sovereignty over a 
field where it has little proper business. . . .”).   
Thus, six Justices would likely vote to reaffirm Roe, while three Justices would vote to 
overturn Roe.  Of those six Justices who would vote to reaffirm Roe, four were nominated by 
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The gap between prediction and reality regarding Supreme Court justices is 
enormous.535  Very often, the “conventional wisdom” concerning a judicial nominee 
has turned out to be rather common and unwise.  Two years after Justice Souter was 
confirmed, one noted commentator labeled Justice Souter “a stealth right-winger.”536  
By that time, however, Justice Souter had written many opinions as a judge.537 
Additionally, anyone residing in the “right wing” of the Supreme Court would not 
claim Justice Souter as a member.538  Senators lauded Justice Kennedy’s open mind 
                                                          
Republican presidents.  Even the addition of a George W. Bush-nominated Justice would not, 
in all likelihood, result in Roe’s demise.  Assuming, arguendo, that President Bush places two 
“right-wingers” on the Court, concerns of stare decisis caution against overturning Roe.  Cf. 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Stevens, 
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.) (“We do not think there is such 
justification for overruling Miranda. Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice 
to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture.”  (citation omitted)).  
When one analyzes the previous opinions written by the Justices, not the various political 
stereotypes regarding the Justices, a surprising conclusion is reached.  Cf. Volokh, supra note 
523, at 1191 (“Which Supreme Court Justices are free speech maximalists and which are free 
speech minimalists? Counting their votes in recent cases yields surprising results.”).  Will this 
prediction come true?  Probably, but then, one never knows.  It’s a prediction.  
534See Balkin, Law and Politics, supra note 364, at 1446 (“As a teacher of constitutional 
law, I have been predicting the outcome of Supreme Court decisions for most of my 
professional career. . . .  During the last five years or so, I have been consistently wrong about 
what the Court was willing to do to promote its conservative agenda.”); Kramer, supra note 
509, at 129 (“The Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist has, by and large, favored conservative 
outcomes, though its full record is a complex mix that defies easy characterization.”).   
Some commentators argue that Roe is just one vote from being overturned.  See Elizabeth 
A. Cavendish, The Legitimacy of Considering Judicial Philosophy in the Nominations 
Process, 7 NEXUS J. OP. 27, 30 (2002) (“Roe v. Wade was decided by a 7-2 majority, but on the 
eve of its thirtieth anniversary, it is in peril. Just one new anti-choice justice, replacing a 
supporter of a woman’s right to choose, could undo Roe’s protections.”).   One can easily 
understand why die-hard supporters of Roe would propagate such a myth—it serves their 
interests in opposing President Bush’s nominees.  Proclaiming repeatedly that President 
Bush’s nominees will tear down the entire fabric of the Constitution, though false, will attract 
attention. 
535Fein, supra note 25, at 682 n.68, 683; see also Cutler, Limits of Advice and Consent, 
supra note 41, at 878. 
536Rauh, Jr., Some Personal Observations, supra note 272, at 10 (“President Bush added 
two new wrinkles to the game in his nominations.  The first such addition was a stealth right-
winger, Justice David Souter, about whom so little was known that it was politically difficult 
to justify voting against him.”).   
537Justice Souter was hardly a stealth nominee; he had written quite a few opinions before 
being nominated to the Court.  See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 661 n.120 (collecting 
cases).  As Professor McGinnis notes, “Justice Souter’s New Hampshire opinions disclose . . . 
a view that the rule of law is best promoted by generally treating law as a body of enumerated 
rules.”  Id. at 660-61 (footnote omitted). 
538Justice Souter certainly lost his membership in the Court’s “right wing”—barely a year 
after being confirmed—by joining Justices O’Connor and Kennedy in Casey. 
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after he was nominated to the Court.539  Now, many commentators criticize Justice 
Kennedy’s support of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism jurisprudence.540  The 
statement that wins the prize for “Least Accurate Prediction” is the one made shortly 
after Justice Scalia was confirmed that he was becoming a “stealth liberal.”541  
Considering Justice Scalia’s well-known views as a Professor, Circuit Judge, and 
Justice,542 that prediction would surely surprise him.543 
Even if one favors ideological scrutiny, Senate confirmation hearings will not 
help Senators determine how a nominee will vote on future cases.544  Given the 
current political climate, any remotely intelligent nominee facing a Senate controlled 
by the opposition party will profess a genuinely open mind concerning all issues, 
sing the praises of stare decisis, and claim that John Marshall is his or her favorite 
Supreme Court Justice.  A particular irony exists.  Not only does ideological scrutiny 
mischaracterize what federal judges have done, ideological scrutiny also fails to 
                                                                
539See Cynthia Gorney, A Cautious Conservatism; Justice Kennedy Lives By the Rules, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1987, at A1 (“Over the next 12 years, Kennedy wrote nearly 400 
opinions and established among most of his colleagues a reputation as a cordial and thorough 
jurist who could be relied on to give serious attention to all sides in a case before him.”).  At 
the time of his nomination, Justice Kennedy had written opinions that “were marked by 
deference to the political branches unless their actions violate[d] principles directly inferable 
from the text or structure of the Constitution.”  McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 661 
(footnote omitted); id. at 661 n.119 (collecting cases).  Yet Justice Kennedy had ruled on 
controversial constitutional issues, such as “Gays in the Military.”  See Beller v. Middendorf, 
632 F.2d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 1980) (Kennedy, J.) (“We conclude, in these cases, that the 
importance of the government interests furthered . . . outweigh whatever heightened solicitude 
is appropriate for consensual private homosexual conduct.”). 
540See Balkin, Law and Politics, supra note 364, at 1456-57. 
541Al Kamen, Scalia Making Conservatives Nervous; New Justice Sides with Liberals in 
Number of Early Decisions, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1987, at A1 (“The picture emerging, though 
preliminary, is not a shift to the right, but, if anywhere, to the left.”). 
542See Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must 
First Take Account of Race,” 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 152 [hereinafter Scalia, The Disease 
as Cure] (criticizing justifications for affirmative action); see also United States v. 
Richardson, 702 F.2d 1079, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[D]enying not only 
a constitutional double jeopardy claim but even a statutory right to appeal insufficiency of the 
evidence at an earlier trial—does not threaten to produce an inequitable criminal justice 
system in the future any more than it has in the several hundred years past.”), rev’d, 
Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 
644 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) 
(“Unfortunately, however, the Court has replaced Lemon with its psycho-coercion test, which 
suffers the double disability of having no roots whatever in our people’s historic practice, and 
being as infinitely expandable as the reasons for psychotherapy itself.”). 
543This prediction would certainly surprise Justice Scalia’s critics.  See, e.g., Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 HAWAII L. REV. 
385, 385 (2000) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, A Critical Appraisal] (“I argue below that 
[originalism] is an undesirable method of constitutional interpretation and one that Justice 
Scalia uses selectively when it leads to the conservative results he wants. . . .”). 
544See Simson, Supreme Unfitness, supra note 14, at 654. 
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predict what federal judges will do.545  No matter how many times Senators gaze into 
Aladdin’s lamp to glimpse the future of a Circuit or Court, constitutional 
interpretation defies political predictions.546 
3.  The Myth of Judicial Omnipotence 
Doctrinal shifts and modifications do not occur merely because of the 
confirmation of one Justice or Judge.  With some exceptions, the Supreme Court 
changes or modifies precedent gradually.547  Sometimes the Justices reach broadly; 
sometimes they choose a more limited course.  As a whole, however, complete 
doctrinal modifications are rare.548  For example, in 1976, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the federal death penalty statute;549 twenty-six years later, the 
Court carved out an exception for the mentally retarded.550 
Any individual not familiar with the legal system who saw a Senate confirmation 
hearing would probably make the following conclusions: 1) Every case decided in 
the federal courts is as controversial and important as Roe;551 2) The addition of one 
judge or Justice will fundamentally change a Circuit or the Court;552 3) Circuit Court 
                                                                
545See Rotunda, Role of Ideology, supra note 315, at 138 (“Business school studies 
typically conclude that it is very difficult—if not impossible—to  consistently time and beat 
the market over the long term. Similarly, it is extremely difficult—if not impossible—to 
predict with any consistency how Court nominees will turn out.”). 
546See supra notes 535-43 and accompanying text. 
547See Alex Kozinski, In Praise of Moot Court—Not!, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 178, 190-91 
(1997) [hereinafter Kozinski, Moot Court] (“[M]uch of the Court’s work consists of fine-
tuning its jurisprudence.”); see also id. at 190 n.33 (citing Supreme Court cases that 
represented a modest change in precedent).  It is perhaps this popular misconception of the 
Supreme Court that leads to the misguided nature of many Moot Court competitions, id. at 
192, and Senate Confirmation hearings.  Cf. Editorial, Well Qualified for the Bench, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 20. 2002, at A28 (“[T]he fate of abortion rights will not be decided by the 10th 
Circuit. . . .  Mr. McConnell says he would faithfully apply Supreme Court precedent 
protecting abortion, and in the absence of . . . evidence suggesting otherwise, he should be 
taken at his word.”).   
548Kozinski, Moot Court, supra note 547, at 190.  More common are gradual buildups 
toward a change in doctrine.  An example of this is the Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.  See Fried, supra note 519, at 173-74 (discussing the Court’s cases over the past 
thirty years). 
549Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
550Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 346-47 (2002). 
551Cf. 148 CONG. REC. S11306 (2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (hoping that Judge 
McConnell “will not seek to undermine women's reproductive rights derived from the 
Constitution and articulated in Roe v. Wade”); cf. Statement by Marcia D. Greenberger, in 
Senate Committee Hearings on the Judicial Process, supra note 207, at 483. 
552Cf. Statement by Marcia D. Greenberger, in Senate Committee Hearings on the Judicial 
Process, supra note 230, at 483 (arguing that the Senate must subject President Bush's judicial 
nominees to assertive ideological scrutiny because “the very ability of Congress to protect the 
American people is on the line”  (emphasis added)).   
69Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003
582 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:513 
judges have limitless power to decide cases.553  All of these conclusions are 
misleading and wrong.  First, many Circuit cases involve factual situations that 
judges resolve by logically applying precedent.554  Second, even if a nominee is 
confirmed to a federal appellate court, that nominee must convince at least one other 
judge on a three-judge panel to join his or her proposed opinion.  A Supreme Court 
Justice, however, can prevail only by convincing four other Justices to join his or her 
opinion.555  Third, Supreme Court precedent binds Circuit judges.556  A three-judge 
panel of a Circuit Court cannot overrule a prior Circuit decision.557  Only the full 
Circuit, sitting en banc, may escape or overrule Circuit precedent.558 
                                                                
553See 148 CONG. REC. S11512 (2002) (statement of Sen. Murray) (“These are lifetime 
appointments.  Furthermore, because the U.S. Supreme Court hears only a few cases, the 
Circuit Courts of Appeals are often the courts of last resort for citizens seeking justice from 
the federal bench.”). 
554See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 
VA. L. REV. 1335, 1335 (1998) [hereinafter Edwards, Collegiality] (“I will show that, even 
when one looks carefully at the so-called ‘empirical studies’ that purport to analyze the work 
of my Circuit, it is clear that, in most cases, judicial decision making is a principled enterprise 
that is greatly facilitated by collegiality among judges.”); Harry T. Edwards, Public 
Misconceptions Concerning the “Politics” of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. 
Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 621 (1985) [hereinafter Edwards, Public Misconceptions] 
(disagreeing with the “growing perception that federal judges decide cases on political 
grounds”).   
555One may fairly wonder how Judge Bork, had he been confirmed, would have convinced 
four other Justices of the United States Supreme Court to issue opinions re-instituting 
segregation, censoring artists and writers, invalidating the rights of women, and supporting 
lawless police raids at the stroke of midnight.  Many opponents alleged that Judge Bork posed 
that very danger.  See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. S9188 (1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).  Three 
explanations for this theory are possible.  The first one is that Judge Bork’s powers of 
persuasion and reason are greater than those of Socrates.  The second one is that nearly half of 
the Court’s Justices would be willing to mindlessly follow him on those revolutionary 
crusades.  The third, and most likely, explanation is that Judge Bork’s detractors 
misrepresented his positions significantly. 
556This is true even regarding the much-maligned Ninth Circuit.  See United States v. 
Orso, 266 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Paez, J., concurring) (“With some 
reluctance, I also concur in the conclusion that, under [Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 
(1985)], the district court need not suppress the confession Orso made after she was read, and 
then waived, her Miranda rights.”), reh’g denied, 275 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
123 S. Ct. 125 (2002).  In defending the denial of full court en banc rehearing in Orso, Judge 
O’Scannlain stated: 
Judge Trott’s impassioned dissent from our denial of full court en banc rehearing in 
this case makes clear that he disapproves of the methods that the police employed 
which produced Jody Orso’s Mirandized confession in this case.  His views are 
perfectly reasonable.  And who knows—if this court were free to rewrite Fifth 
Amendment law I might well agree with him. But we are not free to rewrite the law.  
And that is where I part company with Judge Trott and his merry band of dissenters. 
Orso, 175 F.3d at 1190 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in the denial of full court en banc 
rehearing) (footnote omitted). 
557See FED. R. APP. P. 35. 
558See id. 
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Senators propound the myth of judicial omnipotence without bothering to explain 
the limitations on the judicial role.  One Senator and many interest groups once 
argued that the confirmation of Judge Bork would lead to back-alley abortions, 
legalized slavery, institutionalized racism, and police searches on demand.559  
Similarly, when one of President Clinton’s nominees was in Republican crosshairs, it 
was alleged that confirmation of some nominees would result in activist rulings in 
favor of criminals.560  Senators should recognize that one Justice, much less a Circuit 
Judge, does not a sea change in law make.  This recognition would reduce much of 
the tension in the confirmation process. 
IV.  WHY IDEOLOGICAL SCRUTINY MUST CONTINUE—AND A REPLY 
A.  The Senate is Better Suited than the President to Represent the People’s Interests 
in the Confirmation Process 
Defenders of ideological scrutiny argue that the Senate is a diverse body that best 
represents America.561  After all, “[t]he Senate, no less than the President, is elected 
by the people.”562  The President, however, is elected based on the votes of all fifty 
states.563  Senators are elected based on local and regional issues—judicial 
nominations are rarely, if ever, an issue in Senate campaigns.564  Additionally, the 
Senate is composed of one hundred different individuals with one hundred different 
personalities, egos, and agendas.565  Thus, the Senate is at a disadvantage in the 
confirmation process.  Once a President is sworn in, that President has the power to 
                                                                
559Upon learning that Judge Bork had been nominated for Justice Powell’s seat on the 
Court, Senator Edward Kennedy had this to say: 
Robert Bork’s America is a land in which women would be forced into back-alley 
abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch counters, rogue police could break 
down citizens' doors in midnight raids, schoolchildren could not be taught about 
evolution, writers and artists would be censored at the whim or government, and the 
doors of the Federal courts would be shut on the fingers of millions of citizens for 
whom the judiciary is often the only protector of the individual rights that are the heart 
of our democracy.  
133 CONG. REC. S9188 (1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
560See, e.g., Biskupic, supra note 387 (discussing the confirmation hearing of Judge 
Rosemary Barkett, a Clinton nominee accused of being “soft on crime” and “outside the 
mainstream on important issues”). 
561Lively, supra note 209, at 576. 
562Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, supra note 8, at 1493. 
563See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
564Fein, supra note 25, at 674-75. 
565See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 636.  But cf. Richard D. Manoloff, The Advice 
and Consent of Congress: Toward a Supreme Court Appointment Process for Our Time, 54 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1104-07 (1993) (advocating participation by the House of Representatives 
in the confirmation process to ensure additional public participation). 
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nominate.566  Implicit in the power to nominate is the discretion to choose which 
individuals to nominate.567 
Proponents of ideological scrutiny argue that Senators should vote to reject a 
nominee if Senators feel that the nominee will be harmful to the Supreme Court.568  
This proposal ignores the political basis for such a judgment.569  This proposal also 
elevates political preferences over either qualifications or character.570  Application 
of this standard to the confirmation process invites another wholesale public shaming 
like the Bork nomination.571  In fairness to those commentators who have advocated 
such an approach, one must note that many of these proposals were put forth before 
the Bork confirmation hearing. 
The claim that a Senator should reject a nominee because he or she feels that 
nominee will be bad for the Court allows Senators to continually deny that the 
President even possesses the power to nominate judges.  This trend occurred after the 
Republicans took control of the House and Senate in 1994.572  This trend also 
occurred while Senator Leahy controlled the Senate Judiciary Committee.573  
Senators in the confirmation process, however, should place principles before 
politics.574  History proves this assertion.575   
On the other hand, an entirely non-deferential role for the Senate in the 
confirmation process usurps the President’s power to nominate.576  Many Senators 
have forgotten (or have chosen to forget) that a confirmation hearing should not 
serve as a means to second-guess of a nomination.577  The implementation of a 
rational standard for evaluating nominees would return the confirmation process to 
its constitutional foundations.  Political discretion by Senators would prove to be the 
better part of valor. 
                                                                
566See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 646-48. 
567See id. 
568Barksdale, supra note 247, at 1418; Black, supra note 447, at 663-64; Ross, supra note 
216, at 682. 
569See Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, at 1192-93. 
570See Barksdale, supra note 247, at 1414 (“[D]eference at least requires evaluation on the 
basis of arguable ‘qualifications’ rather than mere political preferences.”).   
571See Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, supra note 72, at 1164. 
572See supra Part II.B.3. 
573See supra Part II.B.4. 
574See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 54, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton); See also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 54, at 429 (Alexander Hamilton). 
575Mathias, supra note 246, at 206. 
576Barksdale, supra note 247, at 1402 n.14. 
577Mathias, supra note 246, at 206. 
72https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss4/3
2002-03] DISARMING THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS 585 
B.  Continued Ideological Scrutiny Will Lead to Ideological Balance in the Federal 
Judiciary 
Defenders of ideological scrutiny also argue that evaluation of a nominee’s 
ideology will eventually produce ideological balance in the federal judiciary.578  By 
forcing the President to nominate moderates, Senators will ensure that confirmed 
nominees represent the “mainstream” of American legal thought.579  This argument 
assumes that Senators can achieve and should pursue the goal of ideological balance.  
Neither assumption is correct. 
First, Senators historically have not used their powers of “advise and consent” to 
seek any sort of balance.580  Moreover, the worst that the Senate can do is reject a 
nomination.581  If the Senate rejects a nomination of an individual who has a well-
defined constitutional philosophy, one may argue that this rejection will dissuade the 
President from making further “provocative” nominations.582  As recent history 
demonstrates, Presidents are rarely dissuaded from nominating individuals sharing 
their constitutional philosophy because some of those nominees are rejected.583  
Senate rejection of a President’s nomination will make the President more obstinate, 
not more deferential.584  The President can nominate another individual with the 
same judicial philosophy.585   
Generally, elections determine whether a Republican or a Democrat occupies the 
White House and gets to nominate judges.586  Balance is impossible to achieve 
because either a Democrat or a Republican will have the power to nominate for four 
years.  If one political party controls both the White House and the Senate, then the 
President will likely nominate individuals whom he believes share his judicial 
philosophy.   
                                                                
578Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, supra note 8, at 1510-14. 
579Barksdale, supra note 247, at 1409 n.36. 
580Professors Strauss and Sunstein argue for prospective ideological scrutiny to ensure 
diversity on the Court.  See Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, supra note 8, at 1510-
14. 
581Ross, supra note 216, at 647-48. 
582Cf. Simson, Mired in the Confirmation Mess, supra note 248, at 1051-53. 
583President Bush has continued to nominate “conservative” judges, and there are no 
indications that he will reverse course.   
584It will also increase public scrutiny on the Senate.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra 
note 54, at 429 (Alexander Hamilton). 
585See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 54, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The Senate 
could not be tempted by the preference they might feel to another to reject the one proposed; 
because they could not assure themselves that the person they might wish would be brought 
forward by a second or by any subsequent nomination.”  (emphasis added)).  
586But see Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional Revolution, supra note 228, at 1050 
(“Simply put, a constitutional coup occurred [in 2000].  The Florida Republican Party and its 
operatives were central players in that coup.  So too were the five conservatives on the 
nation’s highest Court.”  (footnotes omitted)). 
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Second, it is also doubtful that Senators should seek ideological balance.587  Even 
apart from the observation that Republicans and Democrats want balance only when 
the opposing party controls the White House,588 the concept of a perfectly balanced, 
“reasonable person” judge is disconcerting.589  Instead of searching for “balanced” 
judges, Senate Democrats and Republicans should welcome a clash of ideological 
absolutes.590  The great legal debates in American history have occurred because of 
vast philosophical differences between Justices.591  The collective judgment of the 
Court is best served when each Justice possesses strong, developed views on 
disputed legal issues.592  A Court that decides cases based on “balance”—or  
frequently utilizes the “reasonable person test”—achieves nothing except doctrinal 
incoherence.593   
C.  Continued Ideological Scrutiny Will Depoliticize the Confirmation Process 
Finally, proponents of ideological scrutiny claim that ideological scrutiny will rid 
the confirmation process of the “gotcha politics” of the past.594  Because Senators 
will now focus on ideology instead of character accusations, more honest evaluations 
of judicial nominees will occur.595  Regrettably, the current focus on a nominee’s 
judicial philosophy has substituted one form of “gotcha politics” for another.596  
Instead of making false accusations about character—a criterion far more susceptible 
to fair measurement than ideology—Senators now make dubious claims about a 
nominee’s possible votes in future cases.597   
                                                                
587See Cutler, Limits of Advice and Consent, supra note 41, at 878. 
588Cf. Friedman, Tribal Myths, supra note 53, at 1284-85 (“Two of the principal defects in 
Tribe’s argument are his misleading use of history and his failure to recognize the double-
edged cut of his test.”  (emphasis added)). 
589Cf. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2536 (2002) (“Indeed, even if 
it were possible to select judges who did not have preconceived views on legal issues, it would 
hardly be desirable to do so.”). 
590See Cutler, Limits of Advice and Consent, supra note 41, at 878. 
591Cf. id. (“[I]f we were to go through a Bork hearing every time, is that we would end up 
with a ‘plain vanilla’ Court. . . .  We would lose the Justices who formulate broader and more 
creative statements than the particular case requires—statements that project twenty years 
ahead . . . .”). 
592Id. (“We want the kind of variety and stimuli that different Justices can provoke in one 
another.  What we should want in the Court is not balance in every single Justice, but balance 
in their collective collegial judgment.”  (emphasis added)). 
593See Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 4, at 1180 (“But it is no more possible to 
demonstrate the inconsistency of two opinions based upon a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test 
than it is to demonstrate the inconsistency of two jury verdicts. Only by announcing rules do 
we hedge ourselves in.”  (emphasis added)).  
594See Schumer, supra note 18. 
595See id. 
596
 See supra Part III.D.1. 
597Or they misread and misrepresent one of a nominee’s judicial opinions completely.  See 
supra Part II.B.4.c (discussing Justice Owen’s dissenting opinion in In re Doe 1). 
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This development is hardly a positive one.  Indeed, some of the charges leveled 
against recent nominees based on ideological scrutiny have been quite 
unpersuasive.598  One interest group argued that Professor (now Judge) Michael 
McConnell should recuse himself from any cases involving abortion.599  The reason: 
Professor McConnell’s impartiality might be “reasonably called into question” 
because he has criticized Roe.600  The grounds for judicial recusal do not include—
and have never included—possession of pronounced views on a legal issue.601  Many 
federal judges would have to recuse themselves if they applied this new standard for 
recusal.602   
On the other side of the aisle, Senator Phil Gramm placed a hold on a Clinton 
district court nominee because that nominee had been an anti-war protestor.603  By 
                                                                
598See supra notes 126, 331 and accompanying text (discussing the Estrada nomination). 
599See Susanne Martinez, Letter to the Editor, Appeals Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
20, 2002, at A26 (“Federal law requires that judges disqualify themselves from any 
proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  Given Mr. 
McConnell’s track record on reproductive rights alone, no reasonable person could judge him 
to be impartial.”).  Ms. Martinez accurately cites the standard regarding recusal in 28 U.S.C. § 
455(a) (1994) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate [magistrate judge] of the United States shall 
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.”  (brackets in original)). 
600Id.  Ms. Martinez is Vice-President for Public Policy of Planned Parenthood Federation 
of America.  Id. 
601It is also an argument neither found in nor supported by 28 U.S.C. § 455(b), which 
delineates the circumstances that mandate recusal, such as when the judge or his spouse is 
related to a party to or lawyer in the relevant civil action.  See id. § 455(b)(5).  Notably, having 
previously expressed views on a particular constitutional topic is not listed as a basis for 
mandatory recusal.  See id. § 455(b)(1)-(5).   
602See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 831 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.) (“My 
impression is that none of the former Justices of this Court since 1911 have followed a 
practice of disqualifying themselves in cases involving points of law with respect to which 
they had expressed an opinion or formulated policy prior to ascending to the bench.”  
(emphasis added)).  Had Ms. Martinez’s standard for recusal existed in 1900, Justices Black, 
Frankfurter, Jackson and Hughes would have recused themselves from various cases.  See id. 
at 831-34 (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.).  In short, such a standard for recusal contradicts 
both the law and two centuries worth of Supreme Court history.  See, e.g., id. at 837 
(memorandum of Rehnquist, J.) (noting that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes sat in several 
cases appealed from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, where he previously served as 
Chief Justice).  Given Judge McConnell’s views on Roe, it is unsurprising that Ms. Martinez 
would want Judge McConnell to disqualify himself from any cases involving abortion.  As 
then Justice Rehnquist put it:  
I would think it likewise true that counsel for Darby would have preferred not to have 
to argue before Mr. Justice Black; that counsel for Kristensen would have preferred 
not to argue before Mr. Justice Jackson; that counsel for the United States would have 
preferred not to argue before Mr. Justice Frankfurter; and that counsel for West Coast 
Hotel Co. would have preferred a Court which did not include Mr. Chief Justice 
Hughes. 
Id. at 834 (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.) (footnote omitted).  Dissatisfaction with a Judge’s 
or Justice’s views does not mandate recusal.  See id. (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.). 
603See Shields, supra note 178. 
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that same logic, attendance at Woodstock mandates recusal in cases involving drug 
seizures.  After all, the nominee might have consorted with individuals who smoked 
marijuana.  One hopes that these examples are not what proponents of ideological 
scrutiny consider rarefied discussions of constitutional law. 
Professors Strauss and Sunstein argued that, “[i]f the Senate insists on its ‘advice’ 
function, there will be a greater likelihood of bipartisan agreement before the 
nomination is made.”604  Both Professors believed that “there is good reason to think 
that the approach we suggest would result in a less politicized appointment 
process.”605  Those recommendations were made in 1992.606  Two years later, Senate 
Republicans began to follow the methods suggested by Professors Strauss and 
Sunstein.607  Few members of the legal academy defended the actions of Senate 
Republicans.   
Once President Bush was sworn in, however, Professor Sunstein and other 
professors returned to the fray, urging close examination of—and even wholesale 
opposition toward—President Bush’s nominees.608  Implementation of the methods 
advocated by Professors Strauss and Sunstein has overly politicized the confirmation 
process.609  Considering that President Clinton nominated many moderates instead of 
“left-wingers,” he cannot be blamed for the political misdeeds that marred the 
confirmation process during his two terms.610  In the end, ideological scrutiny has 
only led to regrettable results for both political parties.611 
V.  DISARMING THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS 
A.  Reforming Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings 
1.  Ideological Abstention 
The first reform is the simplest one: Senators should refrain from asking the 
nominee his or her views on legal issues, and should refrain from asking the nominee 
                                                                
604Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, supra note 8, at 1514. 
605Id. at 1513. 
606Id. 
607See Kline, supra note 18, at 277-87 (noting that Senate Republicans subjected many of 
President Clinton's nominees to intensive ideological scrutiny). 
608
 See, e.g., Ackerman, Foil Bush's Maneuvers, supra note 114. 
609In fairness, Professors Strauss & Sunstein argued that the election of a Democratic 
President and Senate in 1992 meant that their arguments were basically rendered moot.  See 
Strauss & Sunstein, A Response, supra note 6, at 669 n.4.  Thus, in their opinion, the methods 
advocated to achieve ideological diversity were no longer necessary.  Id.   
610See Kline, supra note 18, at 317; see also Neil Lewis, In Selecting Federal Judges, 
Clinton Has Not Tried to Reverse Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at A20 [hereinafter 
Lewis, In Selecting Federal Judges]. 
611See Editorial, Injuring the Judiciary, supra note 476 (discussing the Owen nomination); 
Editorial, A Sad Judicial Mugging, supra note 102 (discussing the Senate's rejection of Judge 
Ronnie White in 1999). 
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hypothetical questions of constitutional law.612  Senators should instead focus on 
three historically accepted criteria: character, temperament, and qualifications.613  
This approach begs the question of whether Senators will use one criterion as a 
pretext for disapproval of a nominee’s ideology.614  Regrettably, this has happened 
before.615  Nevertheless, Senators who blatantly use one of the three previously 
mentioned criteria as a “fig leaf” for opposition to a nominee's ideology will be 
plainly exposed.616  Moreover, these three criteria are far more objective than the 
criterion of judicial philosophy.617  As before, witnesses may be called and written 
statements and testimonials may be submitted.  With ideological scrutiny removed 
from the hearings, the hearings will improve greatly. 
2.  Moral Evaluation of Judicial Nominees 
Professor Stephen Carter proposes a slightly different approach to the 
confirmation process.618  In his article, The Confirmation Mess,619 Professor Carter 
disagrees with the argument that Senators should quiz the nominee concerning 
hypothetical Supreme Court cases and ask the nominee about his or her judicial 
philosophy.620  Professor Carter instead argues that Senators should examine the 
nominee’s moral capacity.621  A nominee’s “moral vision and the capacity for moral 
reflection are perhaps the most important aspects of the judicial personality.”622 Thus, 
                                                                
612See Rotunda, Role of Ideology, supra note 315, at 131 (“The Senators should ask 
nominees if they have made any promises to the President or his aides, other than the faithful 
performance of their judicial duties.”  (emphasis added)). 
613Rees, supra note 252, at 919 n.23.  Of course, it’s worth stating that almost all Supreme 
Court nominees—and Justices—during this century have had outstanding qualifications.  
Ross, supra note 216, at 645 n.66.  Some commentators will argue that merit really never has 
mattered.  Miner, supra note 261, at 1078.  Nevertheless, examination of a nominee’s 
qualifications is a necessary, and historically accepted, task.  Ross, supra note 216, at 645.  
614Tushnet, supra note 32, at 62. 
615Id. at 49-50, 56 n.22; see also Ross, supra note 216, at 648-50. 
616See Tushnet, supra note 32, at 70. 
617Wolfe, supra note 32, at 374.   
618See Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, at 1185 (disagreeing with traditional 
approaches to the confirmation process). 
619101 HARV. L. REV. 1185 (1988). 
620Id. at 1195 (“The Senate may lack the institutional capacity to evaluate judicial 
philosophy in any non-trivial theoretical sense, but that should not limit the senators to 
assessing the so-called ‘professional qualifications of the nominee.’”); id. at 1194 (“A 
nominee is not independent when she is quizzed, openly or not, on the degree of her reverence 
for particular precedents.”).  Professor Carter additionally argues that the Senate should reject 
a Presidential nomination when Senators know that the President has illegitimately taken a 
nominee’s judicial philosophy into account, and when the Senators “cannot comfortably 
countenance what the President has done.”  Id. at 1197 n.19. 
621Id. at 1199. 
622Id. 
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Senators should examine the nominee’s actions and refusals to take action.623  The 
goal of the confirmation process is confirmation of “good, trusted, upstanding 
individual[s].”624 
In many ways, Professor Carter’s approach to the confirmation process focuses 
on the symbolic, religious aspects of the judicial role.625  The Bible contains 
numerous references to the challenging role that judges play.626  Judges must possess 
a strong moral sense and the temperament to evaluate the merits of competing 
arguments.627  Judges must be individuals of impeccable character, “whose personal 
moral decisions seem generally sound.”628  Judges must seemingly exercise will and 
restraint simultaneously.629  Under Professor Carter’s approach to the confirmation 
process, a nominee’s judicial philosophy is far less important than a nominee’s 
individual choices.630  Heightened scrutiny of a nominee’s character is necessary.631 
Professor Carter’s approach to the confirmation process focuses on character and 
temperament instead of ideology.632  This proposal, as he admits, is perhaps “too 
idealized a notion of the relationship between the American people and the Supreme 
Court.”633  By focusing on the actions of nominees, however, Senators can 
                                                                
623Id. (“[A] lifetime habit of associating by choice with those who prefer not to associate 
with people of the wrong color tells something vitally important about the character and 
instincts of a would-be constitutional interpreter. . . .”). 
624Id. at 1200. 
625Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, at 1197-1201. 
626See, e.g., John 7:24 (New International Version) (“Stop judging by mere appearances, 
and make a right judgment.”). 
627Deuteronomy 1:17 (New International Version) (“Do not show partiality in judging; 
hear both small and great alike.  Do not be afraid of any man, for judgment belongs to God. 
Bring me any case too hard for you, and I will hear it.”); Proverbs 24:23 (New International 
Version) (“These also are sayings of the wise: To show partiality in judging is not good. . . .”). 
628Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, at 1199. 
629Deuteronomy 16:18 (New International Version) (“Appoint judges and officials for 
each of your tribes in every town the LORD your God is giving you, and they shall judge the 
people fairly.”  (emphasis added); Deuteronomy 19:18 (New International Version) (“The 
judges must make a thorough investigation. . . .”); Deuteronomy 25:1 (New International 
Version) (“When men have a dispute, they are to take it to court and the judges will decide the 
case, acquitting the innocent and condemning the guilty.”). 
630Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, at 1199 (“[I]t is far less useful to know that a 
nominee has ruled that private clubs violate no constitutional provisions when they 
discriminate against nonwhites than to know whether the nominee herself has belonged to a 
club with such policies, and for how long.”). 
631Id. 
632See id. at 1198 (arguing that Senators should “try to get a sense of the whole person, an 
impression partaking not only of the nominee's public legal arguments, but of her entire moral 
universe”).  But see id. at 1197 n.19 (averring that Senators should vote to reject a nomination 
when “they know full well that the President has (illegitimately) taken that very factor into 
account”). 
633Id. at 1201. 
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legitimately discern whether, by training and experience, that nominee possesses the 
character and temperament required to be a federal judge.634   
An increased focus on character is entirely consistent with the original 
understanding of “Advice and Consent.”635  It is more useful to know that a nominee 
blocked access to an abortion clinic or harassed doctors who perform abortions, than 
to know how that nominee would have drafted Griswold v. Connecticut.636  As 
previously stated, Senators have entirely reasonable criteria on which to evaluate a 
nominee if Senators abandon ideological scrutiny.637 
3.  Senators Instead of Law Professors   
Many commentators have advocated having law professors or lawyers—not 
Senators—question nominees.638  This proposal is unnecessary.639  With ideological 
scrutiny removed from confirmation hearings, Senators need not exercise previously 
hidden desires to emulate law professors.640  Even if Senators do continue to examine 
a nominee’s judicial philosophy, Senators have staffs of individuals who can conduct 
detailed research on various legal issues.641  If alleged ethical violations or issues 
concerning a nominee’s qualifications arise, Senators on the Judiciary Committee are 
fully capable of investigating those allegations.642 
B.  Sending Each Nomination to the Senate Floor 
Senators of both parties have averred that each judicial nomination should go to 
the Senate floor whether or not the Senate Judiciary Committee approves that 
nomination.643  As one former Senator notes, “the full Senate should have the 
                                                                
634
 See id. at 1199. 
635Compare Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, at 1199 (“First, the nominee ought 
to be a person for whom moral choices occasion deep and sustained reflection.  Second, the 
nominee ought, in the judgment of the Senate, to be an individual whose personal moral 
decisions seem generally sound.”), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 54, at 425 
(Alexander Hamilton) (noting that Senate scrutiny of a President’s nominees “would be an 
excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent 
the appointment of unfit characters”  (emphasis added)). 
636381 U.S. 479 (1965); Cf. Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 15, at 1199 (“[W]hat 
matters most is not what sort of legal philosophers sit on the Court, but what sort of moral 
philosophers sit there.”). 
637See supra notes 612-17 and accompanying text. 
638See Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, at 1195; Fein, supra note 25, at 673; 
Simson, Supreme Unfitness, supra note 14, at 657; Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, 
supra note 8, at 1519; see also Carter, Bork Redux, supra note 71, at 774. 
639See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 637 (stating that such a proposal, if adopted, 
would “further distance Senators from their essential constitutional responsibilities”). 
640See id. at 653. 
641See id. at 637 & nn.17-18. 
642See id. 
643Compare 148 CONG. REC. S7856 (2002) (statement of Sen. Nickels) (“But to hold up 
these individuals who have argued 30, and 15, and 9, and 10 cases before the Supreme Court 
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opportunity to consider each nomination on a complete record.”644  In practice, this 
principle has been sporadically applied.  Some nominations have been defeated 
based on party-line votes in the Senate Judiciary Committee; other nominations went 
to the Senate floor despite negative recommendations from the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.645  If a nominee’s judicial philosophy is as harmful as some Senators 
suggest, then the full Senate will recognize the nominee’s faults and vote to reject 
that nomination.646  Sending every nomination to the Senate floor is necessary and 
proper.   
C.  Presidential Consultation with the Senate  
Political prudence arguably mandates Presidential consultation with the Senate 
before announcing a Supreme Court or Circuit Court nomination.647  This 
consultation may well reduce Senate opposition to a President’s nominee.648  A 
President who faces a Senate controlled by the opposition party would do well to 
either seek advice before the nomination, or inform Senators of whom he will 
nominate in advance.649  If a President listens to the advice of Senators before 
nominating an individual, then Senators will be more likely to listen to the 
President’s reasons for nominating a particular individual.  Even if Senators disagree 
with the President’s choice, Senators might give the President credit for courtesy if 
nothing else.   
                                                          
and we do not even give them a hearing in committee, that is not fair. That is an injustice. That 
is an abuse of power.”), with 145 CONG. REC. S11867 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“Let 
us vote up or down. If Members do not want either one of them, vote against them; if 
Members want them, vote for them.  But allow them to come to a vote.  Do not hide behind 
anonymous holds.”). 
644Mathias, supra note 246, at 206.   
645Judge Pickering and Justice Owen, however, were defeated on party-line votes in the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.  See supra Part II.B (discussing both nominations). 
646On the other hand, one can argue that Senate Democrats voted to reject Justice Owen in 
committee because the full Senate would have voted to confirm her.  See Lewis, Democrats 
Reject Bush Pick, supra note 155 (“Republicans distributed a statement by Senator Zell Miller, 
a conservative Georgia Democrat, who said that if the nomination came to the floor he would 
[have] vote[d] to confirm Justice Owen. . . .”). 
647See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Takings Advice Seriously: An Immodest Proposal for 
Reforming the Confirmation Process, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1577, 1579 (1992) (“What we have to 
do is find a way to involve the Senate, in an advisory way, in the selection of judicial 
nominees without destroying the President’s role in the process.”); Carl Tobias, Rethinking 
Judicial Selection, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1257, 1285 [hereinafter Tobias, Rethinking] 
(“Consultation honors the Constitution’s phrasing, which states that the President appoints 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.”). 
648See Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, supra note 8, at 1518.  
649Reynolds, supra note 647, at 1579 (“[T]he President should be held under no 
constitutional duty to follow that advise—though there is perhaps a duty to listen to the advice 
before nominating anyone.”). 
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In the current political climate, consultation is rare; neither political party is 
willing to yield an inch.650  Yet strategically placed leaks and “trial balloons” 
regarding potential nominees might well clear the air.651  The President can gauge the 
level of opposition to potential nominees without having those nominees endure a 
confirmation hearing.652  A President could claim that he will nominate a 
controversial individual, but instead nominate a more moderate individual.  
Expecting to confront the more controversial nominee, Senators would likely realize 
that the latter nominee is the best they would ever expect.  Political courtesy would 
help reduce the tension in the confirmation process.  To be sure, Senators might still 
reassert their own prerogatives.653  They might additionally refuse to return their 
“blue slips” to the Senate Judiciary Committee.654  No amount of reform, however, 
will prevent Senators from exercising discretion.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Both Republicans and Democrats have lost the right to “start bleating about who 
is righteous about judges.”655  Ideological scrutiny has hurt both political parties.  
Ideological abstention, however, will best serve the interests of the American legal 
system.  The Senate’s refusal to impose litmus tests or ideological scrutiny can only 
benefit constitutional interpretation.  
The benefits of ideological abstention are simplicity and lack of cost.  All 
Senators have to do is not ask nominees about their judicial philosophies.656  Senators 
will also ensure a healthy relationship between law and politics and prevent the 
spillage of further blood on the Senate floor.657  These reforms would take about one 
                                                                
650Cf. Gerhardt, Selection as War, supra note 40, at 393 (noting that Senate Democrats 
have warned that there could be a “war” if President Bush has the opportunity to fill a 
Supreme Court vacancy).  
651Even with the Senate now under Republican control, the Bush Administration continues 
to “float” the names of possible Circuit Court nominees.  Neil A. Lewis, The Nation: Here 
Come the Judges; First the Senate, Now the Courts of Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002, § 4, 
at 3 [hereinafter Lewis, First the Senate] (“The White House has also thought about 
nominating another conservative Washington lawyer, Peter D. Keisler, a Maryland resident 
who is a former president of the Federalist Society. . . .”); id. (“The White House may also 
revive the notion of nominating Brett Kavanaugh, a White House lawyer.”). 
652See McGinnis, A Reply, supra note 3, at 648 (noting that the President may consult 
Senators in determining the political ramifications of a nomination). 
653See Gerhardt, Comprehensive Understanding, supra note 42, at 529-30. 
654This paper doesn’t address “blue slips.”  For a thorough examination of “blue slips,” see 
Brandon P. Denning, The “Blue Slip”: Enforcing the Norms of the Confirmation Process, 10 
WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS J. 75, 101 (2001).  Senator Hatch recently stated that “blue slips” 
will carry little weight in the confirmation process.  See Lewis, First the Senate. 
655Kline, supra note 18, at 326 n.255 (citation omitted). 
656This course of action will preserve judicial independence.  See Carter, Confirmation 
Mess, supra note 16, at 1194 (“A nominee is not independent when she is quizzed, openly or 
not, on the degree of reverence for particular precedents.”). 
657But cf. Simson, Supreme Unfitness, supra note 14, at 663 & n.162. 
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afternoon to implement.  At a confirmation hearing, Senators can instead evaluate 
nominees on the traditional criteria: character, temperament, and qualifications.658   
Unlike other proposals to reform the confirmation process, such as continued 
ideological scrutiny,659 lawsuits brought by defeated nominees,660 or a declaratory 
injunction,661 ridding the confirmation process of ideological scrutiny and returning 
the confirmation process to its original understanding would be very simple and 
painless.  Perhaps the reforms advocated here exhibit the same kind of idealism 
regarding the Senate that Professor Carter has regarding the relationship between the 
American people and the Supreme Court.662  It is unclear whether Senators will 
prefer long-term stability to short-term partisan warfare.663  This question, as judges 
are wont to say, is an open one.664 
                                                                
658See supra Part V.A.1.   
659See Strauss & Sunstein, Confirmation Process, supra note 8, at 1514-16.  
660See Tushnet, supra note 32, at 78 n.98 (“For example, one can imagine a lawsuit by the 
disappointed nominee for wrongfully withheld salary (at least if the jurisdictional statutes 
covered such a claim).”); cf. Fein, supra note 25, at 678 (“A President cannot obtain an 
injunction from a court requiring an affirmative confirmation vote.”). 
661Renzin, supra note 313, at 1748-49 (discussing possible judicial remedies to solve the 
vacancy crisis in existence during President Clinton’s second term). 
662Cf. Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note 16, at 1201 (“That perhaps is too idealized a 
notion of the relationship between the American people and the Supreme Court.  Perhaps 
results really are all that matter.”).  There are many reasons why ideological scrutiny should 
end.  There are far fewer reasons, however, why Senators will abstain from ideological 
scrutiny. 
663Considering the rapid deterioration of reason and civility in the confirmation process, 
this possibility is not entirely likely.  Cf. Entin, supra note 395, at 432 (“Too often the 
participants have seemed more interested in winning a short-term political battle than in 
facilitating deliberative politics or effective government. Unfortunately, the same can be said 
about many other aspects of contemporary political discourse.”  (footnote omitted)). 
664Cf. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 385 n.16, (2002) (“[W]e need 
not decide today whether § 1133(2) carries the same preemptive force of § 1132(a) such that it 
overrides even the express saving clause for insurance regulation, because we see no 
conflict.”); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001) (“As 
an initial matter, we note that it is an open question whether federal courts ever have authority 
to recognize a necessity defense not provided by statute.”). 
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